What you will be able to do
Explain why financing alone creates no value in a perfect market, using numbers.
Show why the cost of equity rises with debt and the WACC stays flat.
Value a permanent tax shield and say when it is worth less than its formula.
Describe the trade-off between the tax shield and the cost of failure.
Match the main theories to what they predict about real firms.
1In a perfect market the mix of debt and equity is irrelevant
Start with the cleanest case. If nothing interferes, cutting the same income into different slices cannot make the whole larger.
The value of a firm is set by what its assets earn, not by how the income is sliced
A pizza has the same size however you cut it
A company's assets produce a stream of cash. Lenders take a slice and shareholders take the rest. Changing the proportions changes who bears the risk. It does not change how much cash there is.
In 1958 Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller turned this into a proposition. In a perfect market, the value of a firm does not depend on its debt-equity mix. Perfect means no taxes, no cost of failure, equal information for everyone, and investors who can borrow on the same terms as companies.
Test it on Harmony with taxes switched off
The pattern has a formula. The return on equity equals the return on assets, plus a premium that grows with the debt-to-equity ratio and with the gap between the asset return and the cost of debt.
kE = ρ + (ρ − kD) × D/E and WACC = E/V × kE + D/V × kD = ρ
Here ρ is the return required on the assets, kE the cost of equity, kD the cost of debt, D the debt and E the equity at market values.
Equity beta rises with debt because the risk is concentrated on fewer shoulders
The same idea works with beta. If debt were riskless, the asset beta is the weighted average of a debt beta of zero and the equity beta. Harmony's equity beta is 1.34, so its asset beta is 1.34 × 114 / 144 = 1.06. Going the other way, relevering gives 1.06 × (1 + 30/114) = 1.34. Real debt carries a little risk too, which is why CF25 treats the details.
Investors can build leverage at home, so firms cannot sell it for a premium
Homemade leverage is the proof
Why must the value be the same? Because any investor can copy the firm's choice. Take an investor who wants leveraged exposure to Harmony. She can buy 1% of the shares of the simplified Harmony with 30 of debt for 0.90 and receive 0.105 a year. Or she can buy 1% of an all-equity Harmony for 1.20, borrowing 0.30 herself at 5%. Her own money is 0.90. She receives 0.12 − 0.015 = 0.105.
The two routes give identical cash for an identical outlay. If the levered shares cost more than 0.90, nobody would buy them, and prices would drift back. That is the arbitrage behind the proposition: firms cannot create value by offering what investors can do for themselves.
1.1 A heavier debt load
The simplified Harmony considers 45 of debt at 5.5% in the no-tax world, so equity is 75. Compute the cost of equity two ways: with the formula, and by dividing what shareholders receive by their equity. Then compute the WACC.
Formula: 10.0% + (10.0% − 5.5%) × 45/75 = 10.0% + 2.7% = 12.7%. Direct: interest is 2.475, shareholders receive 12.0 − 2.475 = 9.525, and 9.525 / 75 = 12.7%.
WACC = (75 × 12.7% + 45 × 5.5%) / 120 = 10.0%. The average does not move.
Marc is a carpenter. He reads that a company 'lowered its cost of funding by borrowing'. Explain to him, without the words WACC or beta, why its shareholders now want a higher return, and why that does not make the company more valuable.
Marc. A loan is a promise that must be kept, so shareholders bear all the ups and downs of the business. They are on a riskier road, so they want more. The cheap loan and the dearer shares balance out, and the business itself is no better.
Nadia. Too much debt makes failure likelier, and failure costs more than fees: suppliers want cash and customers go elsewhere. Also, the tax saving is only a quarter of the interest, and only if she makes profits.
a slider for the debt share from 0% to 60% of the simplified Harmony's 120. Bars show the cost of debt, the cost of equity and the WACC. The learner sees the cost of equity climb while the WACC stays flat, then flips a tax switch and sees the WACC start to fall. The point to discover: cheap debt is paid for by dearer equity.
1.2 Harmony's equity beta is 1.34 with debt, and 1.06 with none. Why does debt raise the beta of the shares without changing the risk of the business?
The business is equally risky, but with debt the shareholders absorb all of it, and the lenders none. The same risk is spread over fewer euros of equity, so each euro is riskier.
1.3 A manager says that a loan-funded buyback raised EPS by 16.7%, so shareholders gained. What is missing from the argument?
EPS rose because the share count fell, and the earnings are now spread over riskier shares. The price stays at 12.00 and the P/E falls to 8.6. Shareholders' wealth is unchanged.
1.4 Name the four conditions of a perfect market. Which one fails first in practice?
No taxes, no cost of failure, the same information for everyone, and equal borrowing terms for investors and firms. Taxes usually matter first, which leads into Part 2.
1
In a world without taxes, the simplified Harmony (EBIT 12.0 for ever, 10% required on assets) moves from 0 to 60 of debt. Its value…
The business is no riskier; only the split of risk changes.
Equity becomes dearer by exactly the amount saved.
There is no saving once dearer equity is counted.
Right. Value comes from the assets, not from how the income is sliced.
With 45 of debt at 5.5% and equity of 75, no tax, the cost of equity is…
The premium is (ρ − kD) × D/E, not ρ + kD.
That is the WACC, which does not move.
That is the cost of debt.
Right. 10.0% + 4.5% × 45/75, or 9.525 / 75.
Harmony borrows 30 to buy back shares at 12.00 and EPS rises 16.7%. What has happened to shareholders' wealth?
The 30 left the firm to buy shares.
Wealth is unchanged in a perfect market.
EPS is not wealth.
Right. Higher EPS pays for higher risk.
2Corporate tax makes debt valuable, up to a point
The first friction is the tax code. It treats the two kinds of payment differently, and that gives debt a real advantage.
The shield exists only for firms that pay tax and can deduct their interest
Four limits cut the shield down
Taxable profit. A loss-making firm has nothing to shelter. The shield is delayed, or lost.
Caps on deduction. Most countries now limit how much interest can be deducted.
Other shields. Depreciation and other deductions already reduce profit, so interest competes with them.
Personal taxes. Investors pay tax too. In 1977 Miller argued that if interest income is taxed more heavily than equity income, investors demand a premium on debt that can cancel the corporate gain.
Personal tax depends on the regime. Under a flat personal tax of 30% on both interest and dividends, one euro of operating profit paid out as interest leaves the investor 0.70. Paid as profit and then as dividend, it leaves 0.75 × 0.70 = 0.525. The corporate advantage survives intact.
2.1 Pedalia and the cap
Pedalia has EBITDA of 8.0, depreciation of 1.0 and net financial expenses of 3.6 (6% on its 30 of secured loan and 9% on its 20 of notes). Tax is 25% and the French cap applies. How much tax does it pay with the cap, and without? How much interest is effectively not deductible?
Without the cap: profit before tax is 8.0 − 1.0 − 3.6 = 3.4, so tax is 0.85. With the cap, only 3.0 of interest is deductible (the greater of 3.0 and 30% × 8.0 = 2.4). Taxable profit is 8.0 − 1.0 − 3.0 = 4.0, so tax is 1.00. (Tax EBITDA is taken here as equal to accounting EBITDA.)
0.6 of interest is not deductible this year, costing 0.15 in extra tax. French rules let the disallowed amount be carried forward to later years, which helps only if profits return. The firm in trouble is hit first, since its interest is highest against its earnings.
2
Harmony keeps 30 of debt for ever at 5%, with tax at 25%. The value of the tax shield is…
That is one year's saving.
That is the debt itself.
Right. 0.375 a year / 0.05 = 25% × 30.
That is the yearly interest.
Why is t × D an upper bound on the shield for most firms?
It is deductible up to a cap.
Right. Losses, caps and repayment all shrink it.
Dividends are paid after tax.
No.
Under a French flat tax at the same rate on interest and dividends, personal taxes…
Equity income has already borne corporate tax.
That needs interest income taxed more heavily.
Right. 0.70 via interest against 0.525 via dividends at 30%.
The comparison is for the investor.
3Distress costs stop firms from borrowing without limit
If the shield were the whole story, every company would be financed by debt alone. The second friction explains why they are not.
Too much debt makes failure likely, and failure is expensive
Distress costs are larger than the lawyers' fees
Financial distress begins when a firm struggles to meet its debt payments. Direct costs are the legal and adviser fees and forced asset sales. Indirect costs are bigger. Customers hesitate to buy a bike from a firm that might not honour its warranty. Dealers cut their orders. Suppliers demand cash on delivery. Engineers leave.
Distress also changes behaviour. Shareholders of a very indebted firm may refuse a good project because most of the gain would go to lenders. This is the underinvestment problem, and CF30 and CF41 develop it.
The trade-off theory sets the shield against the expected cost of failure
V levered = V unlevered + PV(tax shield) − PV(expected distress costs)
The expected cost is the probability of distress times the cost if it happens. The probability rises faster and faster as debt grows, while the shield rises in a straight line. Somewhere the two meet.
The cost of failure differs by business. Firms with tangible assets, such as property, can be sold at close to full value, and stable cash flows make failure rare. Firms with intangible assets, growth options and volatile profits lose value in distress, so they should borrow less.
3.1 A cheaper failure
In the table above, assume distress would cost only 20% of 90.0, or 18.0. Recompute the net gain at 45, 60 and 75 of debt. Where does the best level move, and what does that say about which firms borrow more?
Expected costs: 45 gives 0.08 × 18.0 = 1.44, net gain 11.25 − 1.44 = 9.81. 60 gives 0.20 × 18.0 = 3.60, net 11.40. 75 gives 0.40 × 18.0 = 7.20, net 11.55.
The best level moves to 75, the top of the grid. Firms whose distress costs little, such as those with tangible, easily sold assets, can borrow more.
Your friend Nadia runs a restaurant. She thinks that because interest is tax-deductible, she should borrow as much as the bank will lend. Give her two reasons to stop earlier, in everyday words.
a chart of the shield line, the expected-distress curve and their difference, with sliders for the tax rate, the cost of distress and how fast the probability rises. The learner drags the sliders and watches the best debt level move, and sees how flat the top is. The point to discover: the optimum depends on the firm, and missing it slightly costs little.
3.2 Why is the value of the permanent shield, t × D, an upper bound for most firms?
It assumes that the firm keeps the debt for ever, pays tax in every year, and can deduct all the interest. Losses, caps and repayment of the debt all make the true shield smaller.
3.3 Name two indirect costs of distress that Harmony would suffer more than a company selling a commodity.
Customers fear for the warranty of a bike built to last for years, and dealers cut orders. Engineers, whose skills are Harmony's main asset, leave. A commodity seller faces less of both.
3.4 The curve of value against debt is flat near the top. What does that mean for a CFO?
A CFO does not need the exact optimum. A broad zone is nearly as good, so flexibility and a safe margin can be bought for little value.
3
In the table, the expected cost of distress at 30 of debt is 0.72. Where is the best debt level?
The expected cost reaches 14.40 there.
30 captures most, but not all, of the gain.
Right. 11.25 − 2.88 = 8.37 of net gain.
That gives up the shield.
The curve of value against debt is flat near the top. For a CFO this means…
Right. 30 to 60 changes value by less than 2.
It matters, but within a wide zone.
Missing it slightly costs little.
Beyond the zone, distress costs bite.
Which firm should borrow less, according to the trade-off theory?
Stable cash flows support debt.
It has profits to shelter.
Tangible assets and stable cash support debt.
Right. It loses most in distress.
4Conflicts and information explain what firms actually do
The trade-off treats the firm as one decision-maker with perfect knowledge. Two further frictions bring in people.
Debt disciplines managers who would otherwise waste cash
Spare cash is tempting to spend badly
Managers do not own all the shares. A firm with a lot of free cash may fund prestige projects or acquisitions that investors would not choose. This is the free cash flow problem. Debt forces the cash out in the form of interest and repayment, which leaves less to waste.
Harmony's interest of 2.0 takes 11% of its EBITDA of 18.0. This is a light discipline. A leveraged buyout, discussed in CF40, takes the idea to the extreme: much of its gain comes from the incentives that heavy debt creates, not from leverage as such. The reverse side is that debt encourages risk-taking against lenders, treated in CF30.
Insiders know more than outsiders, so financing choices send signals
Issuing shares sounds like bad news
Debt is less affected, because lenders are promised fixed payments that depend little on the exact value of the firm. Raising debt therefore sends a weaker bad signal. In 1977 Ross argued that a firm that borrows heavily also sends a good signal, since weak firms cannot afford the promises.
The pecking order puts the cheapest-to-explain money first
Myers and Majluf drew the consequence in 1984. Firms prefer retained profits first, then safe debt, then riskier debt and hybrids, and issue shares last. There is no target ratio in this theory. Leverage just records the history of past funding needs.
A striking prediction: profitable firms should borrow less, because they fund themselves. The trade-off theory predicts the opposite, as such firms have profits to shelter and low risk of failure. Evidence supports each in part, so serious analysis uses both.
Each theory predicts something different
| Theory | Friction | What it predicts for leverage |
|---|---|---|
| Modigliani–Miller | None | Irrelevant |
| Tax shield | Deductible interest | As high as profits allow |
| Trade-off | Shield against failure costs | Interior optimum, lower for intangible firms |
| Agency | Managers' interests | Higher for cash-rich, low-growth firms |
| Signalling | Insiders know more | Debt rather than shares to send good news |
| Pecking order | Cost of information | Profitable firms borrow less |
Modern work adds adjustment costs: firms drift around a target and correct slowly, so a ratio seen today is only a snapshot. It also adds market timing, as firms issue shares when prices are high. With rates positive again since 2022, interest and so the shield are larger, but so is the burden on weak firms.
a decision game. Harmony needs 12.0 million for expansion. The learner chooses retained cash, debt or new shares, under a market that knows little or much about the firm. After each choice, the game shows the price reaction and the effect on leverage. The point to discover: the cheapest-looking source is not the cheapest once information is counted.
4.1 A cash-rich firm borrows almost nothing. Which theory explains this and which one contradicts it?
The pecking order explains it: the firm funds itself. The trade-off theory contradicts it, since such a firm would have profits to shelter and a low risk of failure.
4.2 Why does the announcement of a share issue move the price more than a loan does?
The value of shares depends heavily on what insiders know about the firm, so selling them signals that it is overvalued. A loan's payments are fixed, so its terms depend less on that knowledge.
4.3 A young firm with intangible assets and uncertain profits is deciding how much to borrow. Which frictions should weigh most?
Distress costs are high because the value of intangible assets disappears in failure, profits are uncertain so a shield is not sure, and information gaps are wide. All three point to little debt.
4
Why does the announcement of a share issue move the price more than a new loan?
Size is not the mechanism.
Right. A loan's fixed payments depend less on that knowledge.
Cost is not the reason for the signal.
Loans are disclosed too.
A cash-rich, profitable firm borrows almost nothing. Which theory explains this?
It predicts profitable firms borrow more, to shelter profits.
It argues for more debt to discipline cash-rich managers.
It says the mix is irrelevant, not that firms avoid debt.
Right. The trade-off theory would predict more debt.
Harmony's interest of 2.0 takes about 11% of its EBITDA of 18.0. As a discipline on managers, this is…
The cap would be 5.4.
Debt service does force some cash out.
A buyout commits much more of the cash.
Right. A leveraged buyout takes the idea to the extreme.
Summary and cheat sheet
The module’s formulas
Tap a term to see what it means and its value at Harmony.
The cost of equity rises with debt
= + (ρ − ) ×
Without tax the WACC stays at ρ = 10.0% whatever D.
Value with a permanent tax shield
= +
It is an upper bound: it assumes taxable profit every year and fully deductible interest.
Trade-off theory
= V unlevered + −
The top is wide: between 30 and 60 of debt, value changes by less than 2.
Asset beta
= ×
The other way: 1.06 × (1 + 30/114) = 1.34, with debt assumed riskless.
| Idea | What to remember |
|---|---|
| Capital structure | The mix of debt and equity that funds the firm. |
| Proposition without frictions | Value comes from assets. Mix is irrelevant in a perfect market. |
| Cost of equity and debt | kE = ρ + (ρ − kD) × D/E. Rises with debt. |
| WACC without tax | Constant. Cheap debt is offset by dearer equity. |
| EPS illusion | Leverage raises EPS and risk together, with no gain in value. |
| Tax shield | t × D for permanent debt. Harmony: 25% × 30 = 7.5. |
| Limits of the shield | Needs profits. Capped by law. Offset by personal taxes. |
| Trade-off theory | Value = unlevered + shield − expected distress cost. |
| Agency | Debt disciplines managers, but creates conflicts with lenders. |
| Pecking order | Cash, then debt, then shares. Issuing shares signals bad news. |
The one-sentence version
In a perfect market the mix of debt and equity changes nothing, so choosing it well means weighing taxes, the cost of failure, conflicts and information for the firm in question.
Key terms
| Term | Plain-language meaning |
|---|---|
| Capital structure | The proportions of debt and equity that finance a firm. |
| Perfect market | A market with no taxes, no failure costs, equal information and equal borrowing terms. |
| Homemade leverage | An investor borrowing personally to copy what a levered firm would do. |
| Tax shield | The tax saved because interest is deductible. |
| Financial distress | The state of a firm struggling to meet debt payments. |
| Underinvestment | Refusing a good project because lenders would capture the gain. |
| Free cash flow problem | Managers wasting spare cash on poor projects. |
| Pecking order | The preference for retained profits, then debt, then shares. |
Going further
Vernimmen, Quiry, Le Fur — Finance d'entreprise (Dalloz), chapters on capital structure and equilibrium-market theory, and on capital structure, taxation and organisation theory.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) — The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment, American Economic Review; and the 1963 correction for taxes.
Myers (1984) — The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance.
Brealey, Myers, Allen — Principles of Corporate Finance, chapters on debt policy.
Independent educational material. Not investment, legal or tax advice. All companies and figures in the running case are fictional.