What you will be able to do
Explain equity as a call option on the firm's assets and risky debt as risk-free debt minus a put.
Read a credit spread as the price of the shareholders' right to default.
Show with numbers how shareholders can gain at lenders' expense, and how lenders protect themselves.
List the factors managers weigh when choosing leverage and say why no formula settles it.
Compare two financing plans on EPS, leverage and resilience, and propose a target leverage with a stress test.
1The option view: equity is a call, debt is a bond minus a put
Two claims share one set of assets. Seeing each as an option explains the interest rate on debt and the strange behaviour of equity near default.
Equity is an option on the company's assets
Limited liability turns shareholders' claim into a right, not an obligation
Imagine Harmony owes lenders 120 million, due in one year. If the business is then worth more than 120, shareholders repay the lenders and keep the rest. If it is worth less, shareholders hand the keys to the lenders and walk away. They lose their investment but nothing more, because their liability is limited to what they put in.
That payoff has a familiar shape. Shareholders receive the value of the assets minus 120 if that is positive, and zero otherwise. It is a call option on the company's assets, with the debt to be repaid as the strike price. The idea comes from Robert Merton, who applied option pricing to companies in 1974, and it is why it is called the Merton view.
Lenders hold the mirror image: safe debt, minus the shareholders' right to walk away
Lenders receive 120 if the business is worth at least that, and whatever the business is worth if not. Split that into two pieces. The first is a perfectly safe 120. The second is a loss in bad states, which equals the payoff of a put option sold to the shareholders. Risky debt is therefore risk-free debt minus a put.
Equity = call on the assets (strike = debt to repay)
Risky debt = risk-free debt − put on the assets (same strike)
Assets = equity + debt = call + risk-free debt − put
The last line is put–call parity from CF20, applied to a company. The put's price is what lenders give up for the possibility of default. It shows up in the interest rate: the credit spread, meaning the extra yield above the risk-free rate, is the put premium expressed as an annual return.
Real Harmony is far from this. Its gross debt is 40 million against assets of 144, so the put is almost worthless and the spread is small. The stylised version shows the mechanism, which matters for companies that are highly indebted, volatile or in trouble.
Equity has intrinsic value and time value, like any option
When the assets are worth more than the debt, equity has intrinsic value: the gap. When they are worth less, equity may still be worth something, because the assets could recover before the debt falls due. That is time value, and it explains why shares of nearly bankrupt companies do not trade at zero. It is largest for volatile businesses with distant maturities. The option view is most useful for such firms, for example a biotech company or a firm betting on a single large project.
Your uncle Marc is a plumber who owns his van with a bank loan and has no other assets. He says: "If the business fails, the bank takes the van and I lose the van, so we are both exposed equally." Explain to him in everyday terms why the bank and he are not in the same position, using the idea that he can walk away from the part of the loan the van cannot cover.
Uncle Marc. The bank loses if the van is worth less than the loan; Marc loses only what he put in, because he can stop paying. He has the right to walk away, so the bank carries the downside beyond that.
Nadia. A loan due next year must be renewed in an unknown market, and the hospital may not be able to repay if lenders refuse. A loan due in twelve years lets the plant pay for itself first.
1.2 In the worked example, what happens to the put's value, and to the credit spread, if the debt Harmony must repay is only 100 million?
With 100 million of debt, even the bad state (110) covers it in full. The debt is risk-free, the put is worth nothing, and the credit spread is zero. Equity is worth 144 − 100 / 1.03 = 46.91.
1.3 A company's shares have a market value close to zero but it is still trading. Using the option view, give one reason shares can still be worth something.
Time value. The assets may recover before the debt is due, and shareholders keep the upside while the loss is capped. A longer maturity and a higher volatility raise that value.
1.4 Why is the credit spread described as the price of a put?
Lenders give up money in bad states, which is exactly what a put pays out to its buyer. They are compensated through a higher yield, and that yield above the risk-free rate is the premium for the put they have sold.
1.1 A heavier debt load
Keep Harmony's assets at 144 million, with outcomes of 190 or 110 in a year and a 3% risk-free rate. Now suppose Harmony owed a stylised 130 million. Find the value of equity, the value of the debt, the put and the yield lenders earn.
The good state probability is still 0.479. Equity receives 60 or nothing, so it is worth 0.479 × 60 / 1.03 = 27.90. Debt is worth 144 − 27.90 = 116.10. The safe equivalent is 130 / 1.03 = 126.21, so the put is 10.12.
Lenders pay 116.10 for a promise of 130, a yield of 11.97%, or about nine points over the risk-free rate. A bigger debt means a higher put, a lower equity value and a much higher spread.
1
Harmony's assets (144) will be worth 190 or 110 in a year; it owes 120; the risk-free rate is 3%. Equity is worth…
That ignores the right to walk away and the time to maturity.
Right. 0.479 × 70 / 1.03: a call on the assets.
That is the payoff in the good state only.
That uses a 50% probability without discounting properly.
Risky debt can be written as…
That is a forward on the assets.
Right. Lenders have sold shareholders the right to default.
Debt is assets minus equity.
The call belongs to shareholders.
Why can shares of a nearly bankrupt company still trade above zero?
A firm near default has little to shelter.
They are paid last.
Right. Largest for volatile firms with distant maturities.
Market prices can fall below nominal value.
2Conflicts between lenders and shareholders
Because equity is an option, the two groups want different things. Their conflict shapes covenants, maturities and the cost of debt.
A mismatch between debt and cash flows creates a refinancing gap
Debt that falls due before the assets pay back must be rolled over
A long-lived plant produces cash for fifteen years. If it is financed with five-year debt, the loan is due long before the plant has paid for itself. The company must refinance: borrow again to repay the first loan. This is a bet on the future price of money and on the lenders' willingness to lend.
The rate rise of 2022 and 2023 showed the risk. Borrowers who had refinanced at 1% found the same loan costing several times more, and weaker borrowers found some lenders gone. Matching maturity to the life of the assets reduces the gap but never closes it.
Your neighbour Nadia manages a hospital and says: "Debt is debt. What matters is the amount, not when it is due." Explain to her why a loan of the same size can be harmless if it falls due in twelve years and dangerous if it falls due next year, using Harmony's plant as the example.
a volatility slider for next year's good and bad asset values, with the debt level fixed at 120. Two bars show the values of equity and debt, and a third shows the yield. As the learner widens the spread of outcomes, equity rises, debt falls, and the sum stays at 144. The learner discovers that risk is a transfer, not a loss, and sees how fast the spread explodes as the bad outcome nears the debt.
2
Harmony switches from outcomes of 190/110 to 220/80, with assets still worth 144 today. What happens?
Right. Risk moves value; it creates none.
Total value is unchanged.
The split changes even if the total does not.
Shareholders gain from volatility.
Which lender protection blocks a large dividend paid just before default?
That does not limit payouts.
That prices risk; it does not block the payout.
A longer maturity raises the put.
Right. Paying out removes assets that backed the loan.
A plant producing for fifteen years is funded with five-year debt. The main danger is…
Interest is not the issue here.
Right. The refinancing gap.
Timing matters as much as the amount.
Depreciation is an accounting matter.
3How financial managers really choose
No formula picks the debt ratio. Managers balance flexibility, lender tolerance, sector, life cycle and control.
There is no optimal debt ratio, so managers weigh a handful of practical factors
Investing well matters more than financing cleverly
A financing choice changes who gets the cash flows and how the risk is shared. An investment decision changes how much cash there is. For a company like Harmony, picking the right projects (CF24) is worth far more than shaving a few basis points off the cost of funds. Financing mistakes matter mainly because they can kill a company that was making good investments.
It is also tempting to match each financing to a project: a loan for the machine, equity for the new product. The company is one pool of cash flows, and all its financing backs all of its projects. The loan on the machine is repaid with money from everywhere. What matters is the mix across the whole company.
Each source of money costs more than it first appears
Debt looks cheap. The 5% interest is the visible cost. The hidden cost is that every euro borrowed raises the risk borne by shareholders, so their required return rises (CF25, CF29).
Retained profit looks free. It is not. It is shareholders' money, and it must earn what they require. A company that retains profit it cannot reinvest at its cost of equity destroys value (CF31).
New equity looks expensive. It costs the cost of equity, but it also carries a signal: markets often read an issue as a sign that management thinks the shares are rich (CF32).
Seven factors decide leverage in practice
Surveys of finance chiefs in the United States and Europe, beginning with Graham and Harvey in 2001, repeatedly find that financial flexibility and credit rating rank above theoretical targets. A realistic list looks like this.
| Factor | How it pushes leverage | Harmony's case |
|---|---|---|
| Financial flexibility | Spare borrowing capacity lets a firm seize opportunities and survive shocks, so it argues for less debt than the maximum | A bike maker facing a supplier shock or a bad season wants room to borrow |
| Rating or lender tolerance | Lenders and rating agencies set limits through ratios such as net debt to EBITDA; crossing a line raises the cost of all debt | Banque du Rhône is the main lender, and its covenants set a ceiling |
| Sector and asset type | Stable cash flows and tangible assets carry more debt than volatile, intangible ones | Seasonal sales and a growing product range favour moderate debt |
| Life cycle | Young firms rely on equity; mature firms borrow and distribute | Harmony has moved from venture capital to a first bank-financed phase |
| Control | Owners who do not want dilution prefer debt | Founders hold 40% and want to keep a blocking position |
| Market conditions | Firms borrow when debt is cheap and issue equity when share prices are high | Not a reason to leverage, but a reason to choose the timing |
| Peers | Firms drift toward the habits of their industry | Velora's leverage is a reference, but its scale and rating differ |
Factors, direction and Harmony
Equity is the biggest insurance policy
Equity cannot be called in, so it can never trigger a default. It is the cushion that must be eaten before lenders lose anything, which is why lenders count it. Spare borrowing capacity works the same way: it looks idle in good years and decides survival in bad ones.
a drag-and-drop game with eight company cards (hotel group, software firm, utility, airline, supermarket, biotech, shipbuilder, a mature consumer-goods brand) to place on a leverage ladder from low to high. After each placement the game shows the sector's typical net debt to EBITDA range and the reason. The learner discovers that asset tangibility and cash-flow stability, not profitability, set the ordering.
3
Why is retained profit not a free source of funds?
No bank is involved.
There is no such tax in the argument.
Its cost is invisible, not zero.
Right. 10.4% for Harmony.
Surveys of finance chiefs since Graham and Harvey (2001) find that the top factors in choosing leverage are…
EPS is a reported figure, not a goal.
Right. They rank above theoretical targets.
It matters, but ranks below flexibility.
The firm is one pool of cash flows.
Which statement about the leverage ladder is right?
They usually hold net cash.
A profitable software firm often has net cash.
Peers are a reference, not a rule.
Right. Utilities borrow more than software firms.
4Designing Harmony's target leverage
With the theory and the factors in hand, Claire turns them into a plan for a 24 million expansion.
Compare financing plans on EPS, leverage and resilience before choosing
Harmony needs 24 million: debt, equity or a mix?
Harmony plans a plant extension costing 24 million. It will add 4.8 million of EBITDA and 1.2 million of depreciation, so 3.6 million of operating profit (EBIT). After tax at 25%, that is 2.7 million on 24 million invested, a return on capital of 11.25%. Financing is open. Debt costs 5% before tax. New shares would be issued at today's value of 11.40. Year N shows 10 million shares, EBIT of 12.0, interest of 2.0, net income of 7.5 and an EPS of 0.75.
Debt lifts EPS when the project earns more than it costs, but that is not value creation
A simple test follows from the example. A debt-financed project raises EPS when its after-tax return on capital exceeds the after-tax cost of debt, here 3.75%. An equity-financed project raises EPS when that return exceeds 1 divided by the price-earnings ratio, here 0.75 / 11.40 = 6.6%, the earnings yield on the new shares. Debt is easier to pass because it is cheaper than equity in earnings terms, so almost any project passes.
There is also a level of EBIT above which debt gives the higher EPS. Setting the two EPS formulas equal gives total EBIT of 8.9 million. Harmony's expected EBIT after the project is 15.6, well above. The chart of EPS against EBIT shows two lines that cross at 8.9, with the debt line steeper. Debt magnifies good years and bad ones.
A target leverage comes from a stress test, not from an average
Claire's board sets a policy in three steps. First, decide the worst year it wants to survive. Second, set the highest net debt to EBITDA acceptable in that year. Third, work back to the borrowing that stays under that line. Harmony's board chooses: EBITDA falls by 30% in a bad year, and net debt to EBITDA must not go above 3.0×. These are Harmony's choices for illustration, not market norms.
After the project, EBITDA is 22.8. In the bad year it is 0.7 × 22.8 = 15.96. The ceiling of 3.0× allows net debt of 47.9, so Harmony can add at most 17.9 of debt to the existing 30. Borrowing the whole 24 gives 54 / 15.96 = 3.38× in the bad year, which breaks the ceiling. Raising 12 of debt and 12 of equity gives net debt of 42, which is 1.84× in a normal year and 2.63× in the bad year, with headroom of about 6.
Policy for Harmony: net debt to EBITDA of 1.5× to 2.0× in normal years, never above 3.0× after a 30% drop, reviewed yearly with Banque du Rhône's covenants.
4.1 The smaller project
A smaller project costs Harmony 12 million and adds 1.5 million of EBIT. Debt costs 5% and new shares are issued at 11.40. Using the year N figures (10 million shares, EBIT 12.0, interest 2.0, tax 25%), compute the EPS under all-debt and all-equity funding, and the project's return on capital after tax.
All debt: interest 2.6, profit before tax 12.0 + 1.5 − 2.6 = 10.9, net income 8.175, EPS 0.8175.
All equity: 12 / 11.40 = 1.0526 million new shares, 11.0526 million in total. Net income (12.0 + 1.5 − 2.0) × 0.75 = 8.625. EPS 0.780.
The return on capital after tax is 1.5 × 0.75 / 12 = 9.4%, above both hurdles (3.75% and 6.6%).
a slider for the share of the 24 million raised in debt, from 0 to 100%. A chart plots EPS against EBIT for the chosen mix, with a shaded band for a 30% EBITDA fall and a marker where net debt to EBITDA crosses the 3.0× ceiling. The learner discovers that EPS keeps rising with debt while the safety margin shrinks, and that the breaking point comes well before all debt.
4.2 Why does the board test leverage against a 30% EBITDA fall instead of against expected EBITDA?
Defaults and covenant breaches happen in bad years. A plan that works only at expected EBITDA fails exactly when it matters. The stress test sets the leverage that the company can carry in a downturn without losing flexibility.
4.3 If the project earned only 3% after tax on capital, would all-debt financing still raise EPS? Would it be a good project?
No. A 3% return after tax is below the 3.75% after-tax cost of debt, so all-debt financing would lower EPS slightly. The project is poor either way: 3% is far below Harmony's 9% cost of capital, so its NPV is negative. EPS tests tell you about reported results, and NPV tells you about value.
4.4 Rates rise by two points on Harmony's new debt. Which of the figures in the mixed plan change, and which do not?
Interest on the new 12 of debt rises by 0.24 per year, so profit before tax, net income, EPS and interest cover change. Net debt, EBITDA and net debt to EBITDA do not. Existing fixed-rate debt would be unaffected, while floating-rate debt would reprice.
4
Funding the 24 million all by debt gives an EPS of 0.93 and 3.38× net debt to EBITDA in the bad year. The board should…
The stress test is about a bad year, not rates.
EPS ignores resilience.
Right. The extra EPS is paid for with risk.
A mix can pass the test with more EPS.
Above what total EBIT does all-debt funding give a higher EPS than all-equity?
That is the project's EBIT alone.
That is Harmony's expected EBIT after the project.
That is today's EBIT.
Right. The two EPS lines cross there.
An equity-funded project raises EPS when its after-tax return exceeds…
Right. A lower bar than the cost of capital.
The EPS test uses the earnings yield.
That is the value test, not the EPS test.
That is the hurdle for debt funding.
Summary and cheat sheet
The module’s formulas
Tap a term to see what it means and its value at Harmony.
Equity as a call on the assets
= × max( − ; 0) / (1 + )
Risky debt as safe debt minus a put
= −
The lender receives 120 for 111.45: 7.67%, a credit spread of 4.7 points.
The two EPS tests
> ; >
Passing these tests says nothing about value: only the 9% WACC does.
Maximum debt under the stress test
= × (1 − ) ×
Harmony can add at most 17.9 of debt to the existing 30.
| Idea | What to remember |
|---|---|
| Equity as a call | Shareholders receive assets minus debt if positive, otherwise zero. Limited liability is the option. |
| Risky debt | Risk-free debt minus a put sold to shareholders. The credit spread is the put premium. |
| Intrinsic and time value | Equity may be worth something below the debt level because the assets could recover. Largest for volatile, long-dated cases. |
| Risk shifting | Shareholders gain when volatility rises and lenders lose. Harmony example: equity +14.83, debt −14.83. |
| Value transfers | More debt, large payouts, riskier assets and longer maturities all raise the put. |
| Refinancing gap | Debt due before the assets have paid back must be rolled over at an uncertain price. |
| Real cost of funds | Debt is not as cheap as its rate, retained profit is not free, equity is not cheap but carries a signal. |
| Factors | Flexibility, lender limits, sector, life cycle, control, market conditions, peers. |
| EPS tests | Debt lifts EPS if after-tax return on capital exceeds after-tax cost of debt. Equity does if it exceeds the earnings yield, 1 / (P/E). |
| Target leverage | Pick the bad year, set the ceiling, work back to the borrowing. Harmony: 12 of debt, 12 of equity. |
The one-sentence version
Shareholders hold an option on the company's assets, which makes them gain from risk and lenders lose from it, so a sound capital structure is one that keeps the company flexible and able to survive a bad year, tested against a stress scenario rather than an average.
Key terms
| Term | Plain-language meaning |
|---|---|
| Limited liability | Shareholders cannot lose more than they invested. |
| Credit spread | The extra yield on risky debt over the risk-free rate. |
| Risk shifting | Switching to riskier assets to the benefit of shareholders and the cost of lenders. |
| Covenant | A promise in a loan contract that limits what the borrower may do. |
| Refinancing | Borrowing again to repay an earlier loan that has fallen due. |
| Net debt to EBITDA | Net debt divided by yearly operating cash earnings; years of earnings needed to repay. |
| Stress test | Checking whether a plan holds in a deliberately bad scenario. |
Going further
Vernimmen, Quiry, Le Fur — Finance d'entreprise (Dalloz), chapters on debt, equity and option theory and on choosing a capital structure.
Merton (1974) — On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates, Journal of Finance.
Graham and Harvey (2001) — The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field, Journal of Financial Economics.
Independent educational material. Not investment, legal or tax advice. All companies and figures in the running case are fictional.