What you will be able to do
Compute an exchange ratio and the resulting ownership split.
Show who gains and who loses from a share deal, with and without synergies.
Explain why EPS accretion comes from a P/E gap and why it does not prove value creation.
Build a simple purchase price allocation and see what it does to reported EPS.
Distinguish merger from contribution of shares, and spin-off from split-off.
Judge whether a demerger removes a real discount or only costs money.
1A merger is a swap of ownership, priced by an exchange ratio
What changes hands, and how the ratio is fixed.
Relative weights come from comparing the two firms on several yardsticks
The ratio is first a negotiation about relative size
The relative weight of a company is its share of the combined whole. If Luma Drive's owners end up with 20% of the new Harmony, then 20% is Luma Drive's weight in the combined firm. New shares = weight / (1 − weight) × existing acquirer shares. With 20%, that is 0.20 / 0.80 × 12.5 = 3.125 million.
Each side argues for the yardstick that flatters it. Harmony points to market values and discounted cash flows. Luma Drive points to earnings and book equity. The table shows how far apart the answers are.
| Yardstick | Harmony | Luma Drive | Luma Drive's weight |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net income (€m) | 9.0 | 3.0 | 25.0% |
| Book equity (€m) | 100.0 | 30.0 | 23.1% |
| Market value (€m) | 180.0 | 36.0 | 16.7% |
| Stand-alone DCF value (€m) | 190.0 | 40.0 | 17.4% |
Luma Drive's weight under four yardsticks. Book equity and DCF figures are illustrative.
The negotiated 20% sits inside the range. Earnings favour Luma Drive because its low P/E makes its profits cheap. Market value favours Harmony. No yardstick is correct: the deal is the point where both boards stop arguing.
1.1 A richer offer
Luma Drive's owners ask for 27.00 per Luma Drive share instead of 22.50. Compute the exchange ratio, the number of new Harmony shares, and Luma Drive's owners' share of the combined company. Then say what premium on 18.00 this represents.
Ratio = 27.00 / 14.40 = 1.875. New shares = 2.0 × 1.875 = 3.75 million. Combined shares = 16.25 million, so Luma Drive's owners hold 3.75 / 16.25 = 23.1%. The premium on 18.00 is 50%.
Marta runs a flower shop. Her cousin's firm has just 'merged' with a larger one and she is told he 'sold nothing and bought nothing'. Explain to Marta, in plain words, what her cousin and the other shareholders actually did, and why the number of new shares matters more than the headline price.
Her cousin gave his shares in his old firm and received shares in the bigger one. He is still an owner, now of a larger company. What matters is the slice: the more new shares issued to the sellers, the less is left for the buyer's old owners. The headline price is just that slice valued at the day's share price.
a slider for the offer price per Luma Drive share, from 18.00 to 36.00. It redraws the exchange ratio, the number of new shares, Luma Drive's ownership percentage and the four yardstick weights as horizontal markers. The learner discovers which offer prices fall between the 'market value' and 'earnings' weights and sees how quickly ownership rises with the premium.
1
Harmony trades at 14.40 and offers 22.50 per Luma Drive share. What is the exchange ratio?
That is the number of new shares, in millions.
That is the ratio at Luma Drive's undisturbed price of 18.00.
Right. Offer per target share divided by the acquirer's price.
That divides the wrong way round.
Why does the earnings yardstick give Luma Drive a larger weight than market value?
The yardsticks are stand-alone figures.
Book equity gives 23.1%, a different yardstick.
Luma Drive is listed, at 36.0.
Right. 25% of earnings, but only 16.7% of market value.
What makes paying in shares attractive to an indebted buyer?
The ratio is the price, and it is negotiated.
They give up a slice of the company.
It can lower it.
Right. Those are the two real attractions.
2Who gains depends on the premium, and EPS is a poor guide
Harmony's deal creates value only if the combination is worth more than the sum of the parts. The split of that value, and the EPS arithmetic, are then separate matters.
EPS accretion is arithmetic, not value
The deal raises earnings per share whenever the buyer's P/E is higher than the price it pays
Combined net income is 9.0 + 3.0 = 12.0 million, shared over 15.625 million shares. EPS becomes 0.768, up from 0.72: a gain of 6.7%. Harmony's shareholders have lost 7.2 million of value, yet EPS rose.
The reason is the P/E gap. Harmony pays 45.0 million for 3.0 million of earnings, a P/E of 15. It pays with shares that the market values at 20 times earnings. Harmony gives up shares that carry one euro of earnings for every 20 euros of value, and receives one euro of earnings for every 15 euros it pays, so EPS must rise. This is accretion. If the bidder pays a P/E above its own, EPS falls: dilution.
Accretion if P/E paid < acquirer's P/E (all-share deal, no synergies, no accounting adjustments)
The 'magic chain' works only if the market stops looking
Combined EPS of 0.768 at Harmony's old P/E of 20 would give a price of 15.36, up 6.7%. Some bidders count on this chain: buy cheap earnings, raise EPS, keep the P/E. But the blended P/E of the group is 216.0 / 12.0 = 18.0, not 20. If investors price the group on what it holds, the price is 13.82. A serial acquirer needs endless lower-P/E targets and investors who never adjust.
2.1 A dearer target
Luma Drive's owners instead demand 66.0 million, paid in Harmony shares at 14.40. Compute the new shares issued, the combined EPS and the accretion or dilution against 0.72. At what total price does the deal become EPS-neutral?
New shares = 66.0 / 14.40 = 4.583 million. Total shares 17.083 million. EPS = 12.0 / 17.083 = 0.702, against 0.72: a dilution of 2.4%. The paid P/E is 22, above Harmony's 20. EPS is neutral at a P/E of 20, so a price of 20 × 3.0 = 60.0 million.
A fixed ratio hands price risk to the sellers, a floating ratio to the buyer
The ratio is agreed months before closing. With a fixed ratio, Luma Drive's owners always receive 3.125 million shares, so their value follows Harmony's price. If Harmony falls 10% to 12.96, the package is worth 3.125 × 12.96 = 40.5 million, not 45.0. With a floating ratio, Harmony promises 45.0 million of value and issues more shares if its price falls, which hurts its own owners. A collar fixes the ratio inside a price band and floats it outside.
Jonas is a carpenter. A newspaper says: 'The merger will boost earnings per share by 7%'. His pension fund owns Harmony shares. Explain to him why the headline can be true while his fund is poorer, and what single question he should ask instead.
EPS divides profit by the number of shares. The deal adds profit but also adds shares, and the buyer may have paid too much for the profit it bought. The pension fund is richer only if its shares are worth more afterwards. The question to ask is how much was paid compared with the value of what was bought, including synergies.
a deal simulator with three sliders: offer premium, net synergy and the acquirer's P/E. Two gauges show EPS accretion and the change in value per old Harmony share. The learner discovers that EPS can be positive when value is negative, and finds the premium at which each gauge crosses zero.
2.2 A bidder with a P/E of 12 buys a target at a P/E of 18 in an all-share deal. Is EPS accreted or diluted, and why?
Diluted. The bidder pays 18 times earnings with paper valued at 12 times earnings, so it issues more shares per euro of earnings than the market credits it with.
2.3 In the no-synergy case, why is Luma Drive's gain of 7.2 equal to Harmony's loss of 7.2?
With no synergies, the combined value is fixed at the sum of the parts. The shares are only shared out differently. What Luma Drive's owners gain by holding more of the whole, Harmony's owners lose.
2.4 Under a fixed exchange ratio, who bears the risk that the acquirer's price falls before closing?
The sellers. Their number of shares is fixed, so the value of their package falls when the acquirer's price falls. Under a floating ratio the buyer bears it instead.
2
With no synergies, Harmony's owners lose 7.2 million. Who gains it?
Higher EPS does not make them richer.
The total value is unchanged at 216.0.
Fees are not in this example.
Right. With a fixed total of 216.0, the premium is a pure transfer.
When is an all-share deal accretive to EPS, with no synergies or accounting adjustments?
Size does not decide accretion.
Shares are added too.
Right. Harmony pays 15 with paper valued at 20.
It is the P/E gap, not the premium as such.
Under a fixed exchange ratio, who bears the risk that the acquirer's price falls before closing?
They bear it under a floating ratio.
A collar only fixes the ratio inside a band.
The auditor reports on fairness, not on price moves.
Right. Their number of shares is fixed, so their package loses value.
3Accounting and law shape how the deal looks and who survives
Booking and legal structure change reported earnings, contracts and approvals.
The legal route decides contracts, approvals and who survives
A merger absorbs, a contribution of shares keeps both companies alive
In a merger by absorption, Luma Drive transfers all its assets and liabilities to Harmony by universal succession and ceases to exist. Its owners receive Harmony shares. In a contribution of shares, Luma Drive's owners transfer their shares to Harmony and Luma Drive continues as a subsidiary. The second route leaves licences, permits and supplier contracts in the same legal entity, so nothing has to be transferred or re-issued. Neither route escapes change-of-control clauses, meaning rights to terminate if the owner changes: a contract holder can invoke them whenever Luma Drive's owner changes.
The smaller or unlisted company usually disappears into the larger or listed one. But tax losses, licences or double-voting rights can justify the reverse, so the legal direction can differ from the economic one.
3.2 Why does goodwill appear on the balance sheet of the buyer and not of the target?
Goodwill is created by a purchase: it is the excess of the price paid over the fair value of net assets. Only the buyer pays a price, so only the buyer records it. The target's own books carry no such item.
3.3 Why might a buyer choose a contribution of shares instead of a merger?
It keeps the target alive as a legal entity, so permits, licences and contracts stay where they are and need not be transferred, which usually means fewer consents. Contracts with change-of-control clauses still need checking, since the change of owner can trigger them either way.
3.4 Amortising patents lowers EPS but not cash flow. Why is the cost still informative?
It shows that part of the price paid bought assets that wear out. It is non-cash, but ignoring it makes the deal look better than the price justified.
3
Under IFRS 3, what is goodwill?
Goodwill is an accounting residual, not a synergy estimate.
Right. 45.0 − 37.5 = 7.5 for Luma Drive.
Assets are first remeasured at fair value.
Goodwill is tested for impairment, not amortised.
Why might Harmony choose a contribution of shares rather than a merger by absorption?
Shareholder approvals are still required.
Right. Fewer transfers and consents are needed.
New Harmony shares are still issued to the sellers.
Those can still be triggered when the owner changes.
In a French fusion, what does the commissaire à la fusion do?
Creditor objections follow the publication of the plan.
Right. It is court-appointed for that purpose.
The extraordinary meetings still vote.
The boards negotiate; the auditor reports.
4Demergers undo combinations that no longer pay
A group is worth more than its parts only while it adds something. When it does not, splitting it up can release value.
Splitting a group frees its parts from the group's discount
Three forms of demerger differ in what shareholders hold afterwards
Spin-off: the parent distributes the shares of a subsidiary to its own shareholders in proportion to their holdings. They now hold both companies.
Split-off: shareholders may exchange parent shares for subsidiary shares. Some end up with only one of the two.
Split-up: the parent is divided into two or more new companies and disappears.
The case for a demerger rests on a conglomerate discount
A conglomerate discount is the gap between what a group is worth and the sum of what its units would be worth alone. Causes include capital sent to weak units, investors who cannot judge a mixed business, and head-office costs. A demerger gives each part its own management, peers and shareholders.
4.1 Is separation worth it?
A unit is worth 30.0 million on peer multiples, and the market prices it inside the group at a 10% discount. Separation costs 4.0 million. Compute the net gain or loss, and say how large the discount must be for the demerger to break even.
Value inside the group is 30.0 × 0.90 = 27.0, so the gain is 3.0. After costs of 4.0 the net result is −1.0 million. Break-even needs a gain of 4.0, which is 4.0 / 30.0 = 13.3%.
A demerger has limits and a long preparation
A small spun-off company may be too small for index funds and analysts, so its shares can trade at a discount. Holders who do not want it may sell at once. Lenders will want to know who keeps the debt, since a demerger can move assets away from creditors. Loan documents often allow lenders to demand early repayment unless they agree. Preparation takes six months or more.
Tax-neutral regimes make reorganisations possible
Neutrality postpones tax and does not remove it. Tax falls due when assets or new shares are sold, so anti-abuse rules watch demergers followed by quick sales.
Zoé is a primary school teacher who owns shares in a group of 'cycling and charging'. The group announces it will spin off its charging business. Explain what she receives, why the group says shareholders will be better off, and what has to be true for that claim to hold.
She keeps her shares in the cycling group and also receives shares in the new charging company, in proportion to what she holds. The group says each part will be run and valued on its own. That holds only if the market was undervaluing the combined group and the cost of separation is smaller than the gain.
a sum-of-the-parts calculator. The learner sets the size of the conglomerate discount and the separation cost, and watches the net gain turn from negative to positive. The learner discovers the break-even discount for each unit size and why small units need a large discount to justify the costs.
4.2 What is the difference between a spin-off and a split-off?
In a spin-off every shareholder receives the subsidiary's shares and keeps the parent's. In a split-off shareholders exchange parent shares for subsidiary shares, so they can end up holding only one.
4.3 Name two reasons a spun-off small company may trade below its fair value.
The shares may be too small or illiquid for index funds and analysts to follow. Existing holders who do not want the new shares may also sell at once.
4.4 What should a lender check before agreeing to a demerger of its borrower?
Which company keeps the debt, whether the assets that backed the loan stay with the borrower, and whether the loan documents let the lender demand repayment or require consent.
4
What is the difference between a spin-off and a split-off?
Tax treatment is not the defining difference.
Right. Split-off holders can end up with only one company.
They leave shareholders with different holdings.
That is a split-up.
A unit worth 24.0 alone is valued at 20.0 inside the group, and separation costs 1.5. What is the net gain if the discount closes?
Right. 4.0 of discount removed less 1.5 of cost.
That forgets the separation cost.
That assumes the discount never closes.
The unit already belongs to shareholders.
Why should a lender examine a planned demerger of its borrower?
Loans stay unless documents allow repayment.
Rates are set by contract.
They can move assets away from creditors.
Right. It should check who keeps the debt and its consent rights.
Summary and cheat sheet
Les formules du module
Touchez un terme pour voir ce qu’il veut dire et sa valeur chez Harmony.
Parité d’échange
= /
Actions nouvelles à partir d’un poids
= / (1 − w) ×
Condition de relution du BPA
<
Opération tout en actions, sans synergie ni retraitement : le BPA passe de 0,72 à 0,768.
Écart d’acquisition
= −
| Idea | What to remember |
|---|---|
| Exchange ratio | Offer per target share divided by the acquirer's share price. |
| Relative weight | Target's share of the combined firm. New shares = weight / (1 − weight) × acquirer shares. |
| No synergies | Gains of one side equal losses of the other. The premium is a transfer. |
| Synergy | Value that exists only through the combination. The premium decides who keeps it. |
| Negotiation range | From the target's stand-alone value to stand-alone value plus all net synergy. |
| EPS accretion | Occurs when P/E paid is below the acquirer's P/E. It is arithmetic, not value. |
| Magic chain | Works only if the market keeps paying the old P/E for a blended business. |
| Fixed vs floating ratio | Fixed leaves price risk with sellers. Floating leaves it with the buyer. A collar splits it. |
| Purchase price allocation | Price minus fair value of net identifiable assets is goodwill, tested not amortised. |
| Merger vs contribution | Merger absorbs the target. Contribution of shares keeps it alive as a subsidiary. |
| Demerger | Spin-off, split-off, split-up. Pays only if the discount removed exceeds the cost. |
The one-sentence version
In a share deal, what matters is the slice of the combined company that the sellers receive, and EPS is only a by-product of the P/E gap.
Key terms
| Term | Plain-language meaning |
|---|---|
| Exchange ratio | Number of acquirer shares given for one target share. |
| Accretion / dilution | Rise or fall in the acquirer's EPS after a deal. |
| Synergy | Extra value that exists only when two firms are combined. |
| Purchase price allocation | Spreading the price over the target's assets at fair value. |
| Goodwill | Price paid above the fair value of the target's net identifiable assets. |
| Collar | Band around the acquirer's price within which the ratio is fixed. |
| Spin-off | Shares of a subsidiary distributed to the parent's shareholders. |
| Conglomerate discount | Gap between a group's value and the sum of its units' stand-alone values. |
| Commissaire à la fusion | French court-appointed auditor of a merger's exchange ratio. |
Going further
Vernimmen, Quiry, Le Fur — Finance d'entreprise (Dalloz), chapter on mergers and demergers.
Brealey, Myers, Allen — Principles of Corporate Finance, chapters on mergers, acquisitions and corporate control.
IASB — IFRS 3 Business Combinations.
Independent educational material. Not investment, legal or tax advice. All companies and figures in the running case are fictional.