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Accueil / Corporate Finance / Cycle de vie et opérations / Module 41

41Distress and restructuring

What happens when a company cannot pay, and who gets what

Ce qui se passe quand une entreprise ne peut plus payer, et qui obtient quoi.

Lecture
20 min
Sections
16
Exercices
4
Questions de QCM
15
Simulateurs
3

Le texte de ce module est encore en anglais : la version française arrive. Les outils interactifs, eux, sont déjà en français.

What you will be able to do

  • Tell an operating failure from a financing failure, and say why the cure differs.

  • Explain with numbers why shareholders of a sick firm prefer risk and lenders prefer caution.

  • Compute recoveries by class and find the fulcrum security.

  • Judge a rescue plan by what each party receives.

  • Place a French situation on the ladder from mandat ad hoc to liquidation judiciaire, and explain classes of affected parties.

  • Compare the French regime with US Chapter 11 and the UK plan.

1Why firms fail, and what failure costs

Before any procedure, the diagnosis. Pedalia has a liquidity crisis sitting on a weak business, and a clock that is already running.

Distress starts when cash runs out, not when profit falls

A firm fails when it cannot pay on the due date

A company can make losses for years if shareholders keep funding it. A profitable company can collapse in a week if a loan falls due and nobody will refinance it. The trigger is nearly always liquidity: the cash is not there when the payment is.

A covenant breach means a promise in the loan contract, such as a leverage ceiling, has been broken. Lenders may demand repayment or grant a waiver, usually for a fee. Insolvency means debts cannot be paid as they fall due, or exceed assets. Failure is the legal outcome: a court procedure that freezes claims and decides what happens next.

Pedalia ran out of room in three moves

Pedalia makes mid-range bicycles. Three years ago it sold 110 with an EBITDA margin of 11%. Rivals, Harmony among them, took its dealers. This year sales are 100 and EBITDA is 8.0, a margin of 8%. Its debt was built when profits were higher: a secured bank loan of 30 at 6% and unsecured notes of 20 at 9%. Cash is 2. All amounts are € million.

Pedalia, year N Amount Comment
EBITDA 8.0 8% of sales of 100
Interest (30 × 6% + 20 × 9%) 3.6 paid in cash
Capex 5.0 already cut to the bone
Working capital outflow 2.0 suppliers shortened terms
Cash flow after interest −2.6 8.0 − 5.0 − 2.0 − 3.6
Net debt / EBITDA 6.0× (50 − 2) / 8.0
EBITDA / interest 2.2× 8.0 / 3.6

Cash covers about nine months of burn, but the bank loan of 30 matures in six months and no lender will refinance at 6.0 times EBITDA. Harmony stands at 1.67 times. This is the refinancing wall of CF12.

Economic failure and financial failure need different cures

Ask first whether the business would survive without its debt

Economic failure means the business earns less than the capital in it requires: a shrinking market, a high cost position, a product overtaken. Financial failure means the business is viable but the debt is too heavy or falls due at the wrong time, as in an over-leveraged buy-out (CF40). The first needs an operating turnaround. The second needs debt to be reprofiled or converted.

Pedalia is a mix. Its margin fell from 11% to 8%, which is economic. But debt of 50 against EBITDA of 8.0 is financial: at its old EBITDA of 12.1 the ratio would be 4.1 times, painful but survivable.

Failure is costly, and most of the cost is not the lawyers

Indirect costs are large and grow with delay

Direct costs are fees for lawyers and advisers, usually a small share of value. Indirect costs come from being in trouble: customers doubt warranties, suppliers demand cash on delivery, good staff leave, assets are sold in a hurry.

1.1 A cheaper coupon

Pedalia's noteholders agree to cut their coupon from 9% to 5% for two years, with no other change. Recompute interest, cash flow after interest and months of cash. Does this alone solve the problem?

Interest on the notes falls from 1.8 to 20 × 5% = 1.0, so total interest is 1.8 + 1.0 = 2.8. Cash flow after interest is 8.0 − 5.0 − 2.0 − 2.8 = −1.8. Cash of 2.0 lasts 2.0 / 1.8 × 12, about 13 months.

It does not solve the problem. Cash still falls, the bank loan of 30 still matures in six months, and leverage is still 6.0 times. It buys time, not a refinancing.

Your neighbour Nadia runs a hair salon that is profitable, but a bank loan falls due next month and the bank will not renew it. She asks: I make money, so how can I be failing? Explain the difference between being profitable and being able to pay.

      Nadia. Profit builds up over a year, but the loan is due on one day. If the bank will not renew and the cash is not there, she cannot pay and may have to stop, even though the salon earns money.

      Uncle Marc. A rushed sale fetches far less than the business is worth running. A lender who takes shares joins in the recovery.

      1

      1. What nearly always triggers a company's failure?

      2. Pedalia's margin fell from 11% to 8% and its debt is 6.0× EBITDA. What kind of failure is it?

      3. Rumour drives away 8% of Pedalia's sales and cuts its value from 44.0 to 30.8. What kind of cost is this?

      2Lenders and shareholders pull in opposite directions

      Once debt is at risk the parties no longer share an interest. The option view of equity explains each conflict with a few numbers.

      Shareholders of a sick firm prefer risk, lenders prefer safety

      Equity is a call option, so shareholders gain from risk

      CF30 showed that shareholders hold a call on the firm's assets, with the debt as the strike price. A call gains from volatility: the downside stops at zero, the upside is unlimited. Lenders hold the opposite position. They are paid a fixed sum at best, so luck gives them nothing and bad luck costs them.

      In a healthy firm the conflict is mild. Near default shareholders have little to lose, so they favour the riskier project even if it is worth no more. This is risk shifting, also called asset substitution.

      Lenders know this. Covenants, security and short maturities exist to limit it.

      Distress produces four standard conflicts

      Each party's best move hurts the firm as a whole

      Risk shifting, above, is the first. Three more follow.

      • Debt overhang. Shareholders refuse a good project because its gains go to lenders first. If Pedalia's shareholders put in 3 to add 4 of value, the whole 4 would go first to the noteholders, who are not paid in full. The firm gains 1 net, but shareholders lose their 3, so they will not fund it.

      • Delay. Managers and shareholders wait and hope. The 13.2 lost to rumour is the price of waiting.

      • Holdout. In a pool of lenders, each hopes the others will accept a loss while it is paid in full. If all reason this way, no deal is reached. Laws that bind a minority exist to defeat holdouts.

      Creditors also fight each other, because the secured bank, unsecured funds and suppliers rank differently (Part 3). Limited liability has limits too: owners give personal guarantees, and managers who traded on while the firm was plainly failing can be made liable, as in France (Part 4).

      2.1 A bigger gamble

      The same firm owes 40. A third project gives 90 or 10 with equal chances. Compute the expected payout to shareholders and to lenders, and compare with the safe project of 50. How much moves from lenders to shareholders?

      Shareholders receive 50 or 0, so 25 on average. Lenders receive 40 or 10, so 0.5 × 40 + 0.5 × 10 = 25. With the safe project shareholders get 10 and lenders 40, so 15 moves from lenders to shareholders. The firm's expected value is 50 in both cases.

      a project chooser for a firm with debt of 40. The learner picks the safe or the risky project, widens the risk with a slider, and sees bars for shareholders and lenders. Discovery: the wider the spread, the more shareholders gain at lenders' expense, although the firm's expected value never changes.

      2

      1. Why do shareholders of a firm near default prefer risky projects?

      2. Pedalia's shareholders could put in 3 to add 4 of value, but refuse. Why?

      3. What do insolvency laws do against holdouts?

      3Valuing a failing company: who owns the value that is left

      The arithmetic of a shortfall is simple. The skill lies in choosing the valuation, reading the ranking and designing a plan every class prefers to the alternative.

      Two values bound the answer: running the business and selling it

      Going concern value against liquidation value

      The going concern value is what the business is worth if it keeps trading, the discounted cash flows of CF27. The liquidation value is what the assets fetch if everything is sold, after costs.

      Pedalia's going concern value is 5.5 times EBITDA of 8.0, or 44.0. Pedalia's last 2 of cash will have gone on losses by the time any plan or sale closes, so the value available is the operating value alone. A liquidation realises 24.0: stock at a discount, machinery at auction, and a brand that is worth nothing once dealers have gone. The gap of 20 is what a rescue can save and a liquidation destroys.

      Claims are paid in order, and the order decides who has a voice

      Value goes first to the highest-ranking claims, and a class is paid in full before the next receives anything. This is absolute priority. Pedalia has the secured bank loan of 30, then the unsecured notes of 20, then shareholders.

      Value available Senior bank (30) Junior notes (20) Shareholders
      Going concern 44.0 30.0 (100%) 14.0 (70%) 0
      After rumour 30.8 30.0 (100%) 0.8 (4%) 0
      Liquidation 24.0 24.0 (80%) 0 (0%) 0

      Recoveries by class in three situations

      As value falls from 44.0 to 30.8 the noteholders lose almost everything, while the bank is untouched. In a liquidation even the bank loses 20%.

      The fulcrum security is the class that decides the plan

      It is the first class that is not paid in full

      Working down the ranking, the fulcrum security is the class where value runs out. Classes above it are paid in full and have little reason to object. Classes below it get nothing under strict priority and have little to bargain with. The fulcrum class is partly paid and partly lost, so its holders are the economic owners of the business.

      At 44.0 Pedalia's fulcrum is the notes. At the liquidation value of 24.0 it is the bank, which is why the bank leans towards a sale and the noteholders towards a rescue. The fulcrum moves with the valuation, so valuation is the main battle in any restructuring. Junior holders argue for a high value, senior holders for a low one, so the parties commission independent valuations and, in court, the judge decides between them.

      A rescue plan trades claims for time, cash and ownership

      Five tools, each with a price

      • Extension and moratorium: maturities move later. It fixes nothing if the debt is too large.

      • Haircut: part of the claim is written off, a certain loss for the lender.

      • Debt-for-equity swap: a claim becomes shares. Interest falls, the creditor takes the upside and the risk, and old shareholders are diluted.

      • New money: fresh cash funds the turnaround. Lenders provide it only if it ranks ahead of existing claims, a priority many laws grant by statute.

      • Warrants and recovery clauses: old holders receive options on future upside, bridging disagreement about value.

      A plan that mends the balance sheet but not the business only delays the next crisis, so operational restructuring (closing loss-making lines, selling surplus sites) matters too. When many firms sell assets at once they push down the prices they depend on. This fire-sale spiral is why a controlled sale beats a forced one.

      3.1 A lower valuation

      A rival bidder values Pedalia at only 36.0. Compute the recovery of each class. Which class is the fulcrum?

      At 36.0 the bank receives 30 (100%), the notes receive 6 of 20 (30%) and shareholders nothing. The fulcrum is still the notes, but they are worth much less than at 44.0, so their bargaining position weakens.

      [object Object]

      a waterfall with a slider for firm value from 0 to 60. Bars show senior, junior and shareholder recoveries, and the fulcrum class is highlighted. A second control adds new money and a swap ratio. Discovery: the fulcrum moves as value falls.

      3

      1. Pedalia is worth 44.0; the bank is owed 30 and the notes 20. What is the fulcrum security?

      2. Why does valuation become the main battle in a restructuring?

      3. In Pedalia's plan, why does the bank's new money of 6 rank first?

      4France: a ladder of procedures from confidential to collective

      France has a detailed toolkit for every stage of distress. The right rung depends on whether payments have stopped, whether lenders can agree, and whether someone has to be bound.

      French law ranks saving the business first and paying creditors last

      The objectives come in a fixed order

      A French collective procedure aims, in order, to preserve the business, to preserve jobs, and only then to pay creditors. A court can impose a plan that creditors dislike if it saves the business.

      The procedures form a ladder from confidential to collective

      Procedure When Who is bound Public?
      Mandat ad hoc Any difficulty, even before cash is short Nobody, voluntary No
      Conciliation No stoppage, or one under 45 days Only those who sign No, unless homologated
      Sauvegarde Difficulties it cannot overcome, no stoppage All, through a plan Yes
      Sauvegarde accélérée After a conciliation, plan likely to pass Affected parties, by class Yes, short
      Redressement judiciaire Payments stopped, recovery possible All, through a plan Yes
      Liquidation judiciaire Payments stopped, no recovery possible All Yes

      The French ladder

      Confidential tools work when lenders can still agree

      A mandat ad hoc is a mediator, a conciliation is a deal

      In a mandat ad hoc (ad hoc mandate), the president of the commercial court names a mediator at the debtor's request. It is confidential, creates no stay of claims and binds nobody who does not agree. It suits a company that wants to open talks with key lenders or suppliers before anything is visible.

      A conciliation lasts a few months, and the conciliator helps the debtor reach an agreement with its main creditors. The court can record it, which keeps it confidential, or homologate it (formally approve it), which makes it public and shields it from later challenge.

      The limit is consent: neither tool can force a holdout to accept a haircut.

      Court procedures bind the minority, and classes since 2021 shape the vote

      Sauvegarde protects a company before it stops paying

      In a sauvegarde (safeguard), claims arising before the filing are frozen and the debtor normally stays in charge, sometimes with an administrator. During an observation period it prepares a plan, which creditors vote on and the court approves. Plans can spread payments over many years. The accelerated sauvegarde suits companies that negotiated in conciliation and need a court to bind dissenters. Since 2021 the plan can be confined to the creditors it affects, for example only the lenders and bondholders, much like a US pre-packaged plan. The former separate sauvegarde financière accélérée was folded into it.

      Redressement judiciaire starts once payments stop

      In a redressement judiciaire the business keeps trading under court supervision, and the court then chooses a continuation plan (plan de redressement), a sale plan (plan de cession) to a buyer, or liquidation. In a sale the court weighs price, jobs kept and creditors' interests, and the debtor's managers and their relatives may not, in principle, bid. A suspect period (période suspecte) lets the court cancel acts made shortly before the stoppage, such as gifts or payments to favoured creditors.

      Classes of affected parties arrived with the 2021 reform

      A reform of 2021, transposing the EU preventive restructuring directive, introduced classes of affected parties (classes de parties affectées). Creditors are grouped by common economic interest (secured, unsecured, subordinated), and in larger companies shareholders form a class. Each class votes, and a class approves the plan with two-thirds of the votes cast, measured by value.

      The reform also created cross-class cram-down: a court can impose a plan on a dissenting class if conditions are met. Dissenters must receive at least what they would get in a liquidation, a sale or the best alternative if the plan failed. The plan must be approved by a majority of classes including a secured class, or failing that by at least one class, other than shareholders, that would be paid something on a going-concern valuation. Ranking must be respected, with limited exceptions. Above size thresholds, shareholders can be diluted over their objection.

      4.1 Choose the rung

      Choose the French procedure for each case and say why. (a) A firm expects a covenant breach in six months and wants no publicity. (b) A firm has agreed a plan with its banks, but one fund holds out. (c) A firm stopped paying wages a week ago and no lender will advance cash.

      (a) Mandat ad hoc or conciliation: no stoppage, confidentiality wanted. (b) A conciliation, then an accelerated sauvegarde opened from it, where a class vote binds the holdout. (c) Redressement judiciaire, or liquidation judiciaire if nothing can be saved: payments have stopped.

      [object Object]

      a decision game. A company card shows cash, debts, lenders, whether payments have stopped and whether confidentiality matters. The learner drags it onto a rung and gets feedback. Discovery: the choice turns on whether payments have stopped, whether key lenders can agree, and whether a holdout must be bound.

      4

      1. A firm stopped paying its debts 50 days ago. What must its managers do under French law?

      2. What can a conciliation not do?

      3. Since 2021, when can a French court impose a plan on a dissenting class?

      5Elsewhere, modern tactics and Pedalia's ending

      The French ladder is one design among several. This part compares it with others, looks at how creditors fight today, and closes Pedalia's story.

      Other countries reach the same goals by different routes

      Modern distress is fought with contracts as much as with courts

      Since rates rose, many leveraged loans and private credit deals have come under strain. Specialist investors buy distressed debt cheaply, hoping to take the equity (loan to own). Borrowers and favoured lenders agree liability management exercises, such as moving assets out of other lenders' reach or lifting some lenders above others in exchange for new money. The lesson is that loan documentation matters before distress (CF33).

      Pedalia's ending shows that a rescue competes with a sale

      If Pedalia's margin can be repaired, the rescue gives creditors more. If its decline cannot be reversed, a sale to a stronger owner may preserve more than a rescue that fails in two years.

      Your uncle Marc, a retired plumber, says: if a firm cannot pay its debts, shut it and pay the creditors from whatever is there. Explain why a lender might prefer to lose some of its money and take shares in the business instead.

          5

          1. What does US Chapter 11 call management staying in charge during the case?

          2. Harmony offers 28.0 for Pedalia's assets. What does the bank recover?

          3. What is a liability management exercise?

          Summary and cheat sheet

          Les formules du module

          Touchez un terme pour voir ce qu’il veut dire et sa valeur chez Harmony.

          Levier et couverture

          = ( − ) /

          Recouvrement en priorité absolue

          = min( ; max(0 ; − ))

          Les actions comme option d’achat

          = max(0 ; − )

          Valeur du capital après le plan

          = + −

          Les porteurs d’obligations en reçoivent 90 % : 12,6, soit 63 % de leurs 20.

          Idea What to remember
          Trigger of failure Cash, not profit: a payment falls due and cannot be met or refinanced.
          Economic vs financial failure Economic: the business earns too little. Financial: the debt is too heavy. The cures differ.
          Risk shifting Near default, shareholders prefer risk because lenders bear the downside.
          Two bounding values Going concern and liquidation. The gap is what a rescue can save.
          Absolute priority Senior classes are paid in full before junior ones receive anything.
          Fulcrum security First class not paid in full. Its holders are the economic owners and shape the plan.
          French objectives Preserve the business, then jobs, then creditors.
          French ladder Mandat ad hoc, conciliation, sauvegarde (and accelerated forms), redressement, liquidation.
          Classes and cram-down Since 2021 classes vote, and a court can bind a dissenting class if conditions are met.

          The one-sentence version

          Diagnose whether the business or the balance sheet has failed, value the firm both running and sold, pay the classes in order to find the one whose holders now own the business, and give them a plan that beats the alternative before delay erodes the value.

          Key terms

          Term Plain-language meaning
          Covenant A promise in a loan contract, such as a leverage ceiling.
          Haircut A write-off of part of a creditor's claim.
          Debt-for-equity swap Exchanging a claim for shares in the same company.
          Fulcrum security The class in the ranking where value runs out.
          Absolute priority Senior classes are paid in full before junior ones receive anything.
          New money Fresh cash lent in a rescue, usually with priority over old claims.
          Cram-down Imposing a plan on a class that voted against it.

          Going further

          • Vernimmen, Quiry, Le Fur — Finance d'entreprise (Dalloz), chapter on bankruptcies and restructurings.

          • Brealey, Myers, Allen — Principles of Corporate Finance, chapters on financial distress and the capital structure choice.

          • Altman (1968) — Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy, Journal of Finance.

          Independent educational material. Not investment, legal or tax advice. All companies and figures in the running case are fictional.