This module teaches debt restructuring from zero, but goes deep enough for a professional
It assumes no prior knowledge of distress or insolvency and builds every idea from its foundations. Yet it goes deep enough to be useful to someone who sits in a bank's workout unit, advises companies or creditors, trades distressed debt, or builds the systems that track a bank's non-performing book.
Wherever a concept is technical, we stop and explain it in plain language before using it again. Wherever a term is jargon, we define it once and then rely on it. French law is used as the main reference, because French procedures have been reshaped since 2021 and illustrate the European framework well; English and US procedures are introduced for comparison.
Two threads run through everything: the business and the technology
The business thread covers why companies become distressed, how lenders and owners negotiate, how a business is valued when its debt exceeds its worth, which legal procedures exist and what they allow, and how banks earn — or lose — money as lenders, new-money providers, advisers and sellers of distressed debt.
The technology thread covers the data a restructuring runs on: the claims register, the valuation and waterfall model, the lock-up and voting tracker, the restricted-information controls, the accounting for modified and converted debt, and the data tapes used to sell non-performing loans.
Where this module sits in the Corporate Banking track
This module continues the Financing block. The lifecycle module described the eighth stage of every loan — watchlist, workout and exit — from inside the bank, as a process with owners and controls. This module looks at the same territory as a business and a market: what a restructuring negotiation is, who sits at the table, what the courts can impose, and where banks play roles other than that of a creditor trying to recover its money.
It builds directly on the previous module. The running case is Vela Packaging, the company bought in a leveraged buyout in Corporate & Leveraged Finance, which now finds that it cannot carry the debt it was given.
How to read this module
Read it as a narrative, not a reference card
Each part assumes you have read the ones before it. If you are short on time, read the section titles and the "In a nutshell" boxes first. The titles are written to carry the argument on their own.
Each coloured box plays a fixed role
Key insight distils the one idea from a section worth remembering. Going deeper adds nuance, often on legal detail. IT & data lens connects the business step to the systems and data beneath it. Worked example grounds a mechanic in numbers. Watch out flags a common trap. In a nutshell closes a section. Common misconception names a plausible wrong answer and dismantles it. Practice sets out calculations and judgement calls. Explain it back asks you to teach the idea to someone outside finance.
One running case, from first warning to new owners
Three years after its buyout, Vela Packaging loses its largest customer and is hit by a spike in energy costs. EBITDA falls from 100 to 60 million euros, its revolving facility is fully drawn, a springing covenant is tested and breached, and cash will run out within a year. You will follow Vela from the first warning signs through a confidential conciliation, a lender-led restructuring plan, an accelerated safeguard procedure with classes of creditors, and a debt-for-equity swap that hands control from the private-equity sponsor to its lenders. Every number attached to Vela is invented to teach a mechanic.
The module is built to be worked, not only read
Practice boxes contain the calculations restructuring professionals actually make: a liquidity runway, a sustainable-debt estimate, a going-concern and a liquidation valuation, a recovery waterfall, a class vote, a best-interest test, the value split in a debt-for-equity swap. Attempt them before looking anything up. Explain it back, Common misconception and Check your understanding boxes work as in the earlier modules, with answers in the Answer Key.
A suggested path through the document
Four sessions work well. Part 1 sets out the economics of distress and the vocabulary. Part 2 follows Vela's restructuring and is the heart of the module. Parts 3 and 4 cover the actors and the systems. Part 5 covers the risks, three landmark French cases — Orpea, Casino and Atos — and the transformation agenda, and is the right moment to return to the practice boxes.
What you will master
You will understand why companies become distressed and how distress unfolds
You will know the difference between a liquidity crisis and a solvency crisis, why the first is often the trigger and the second the real problem, and how the signs appear in covenants, cash and markets.
You will be able to value a distressed business and share the value
You will be able to estimate sustainable debt, compute a going-concern and a liquidation value, and run a recovery waterfall that shows who gets what under each scenario.
You will know the restructuring toolkit
You will understand standstills, waivers, amend-and-extend, new money, haircuts, debt-for-equity swaps and asset sales, and when each fits.
You will understand the legal frameworks
You will know the French amicable and court procedures, how the 2021 reform introduced classes of affected parties and cross-class cram-down, and how the English restructuring plan and US Chapter 11 compare.
You will be able to map the actors and their incentives
You will understand the roles of the company, its owners, the different classes of creditors, the advisers, the court officials and the distressed-debt investors, and why each wants something different.
You will recognise the systems, data, risks and transformation themes
You will know the data a restructuring depends on, how banks account for modified and converted debt, how non-performing loans are sold, and how the market is changing.
1Context and the Big Picture
Before following a restructuring, you need to understand what distress is, why value must be measured and shared, and why the law offers a range of procedures between a friendly renegotiation and a liquidation. This part sets out the economics and the vocabulary.
Distress comes in two forms: liquidity and solvency
Running out of cash is not the same as owing too much
A company can be in trouble in two different ways. It can face a liquidity crisis: it does not have enough cash to pay what falls due in the coming weeks or months, even though its business might be worth more than its debts. Or it can face a solvency crisis: its debts exceed what the business is worth, so that even with unlimited time it could never repay them in full.
The two are often confused because they usually appear together. A liquidity crisis is typically the trigger: the moment when a payment cannot be made, a covenant breaks or a revolving facility is exhausted. A solvency problem is typically the cause: the company carries more debt than its earnings can support. Fixing the first without the second — finding new cash but leaving the debt untouched — simply postpones the next crisis.
The French legal test: cessation des paiements
French law defines insolvency through a liquidity test. A company is in cessation des paiements when it cannot meet its debts that are due and payable from its available assets — cash and immediately available credit lines. The date on which this happens matters greatly: it determines which procedures are open to the company, it triggers an obligation for the managers to file for insolvency within 45 days unless a conciliation is under way, and transactions entered into after that date can later be challenged.
Companies fail for operational and financial reasons
Two families of cause
| Family | Typical causes | Example signs |
|---|---|---|
| Operational | Loss of a major customer, cost inflation, technological change, poor management, failed expansion, fraud | Falling margins, declining market share, delayed accounts |
| Financial | Too much debt, debt maturing at a bad moment, rising interest rates, loss of supplier credit or factoring lines | Covenant pressure, revolving facility fully drawn, widening debt prices |
| External shocks | Pandemic, energy-price spike, sanctions, regulation | Sudden sector-wide deterioration |
Most real cases combine the families. A leveraged buyout financed at seven times EBITDA is financially fragile; an operational setback that would be a bad year for a lightly indebted company becomes a crisis. The restructuring must address both: an operational plan to restore earnings, and a financial plan to bring debt to a level those earnings can carry.
The signs appear in a recognisable order
Distress usually announces itself in sequence. Earnings fall, often first visible in management accounts. Covenant headroom shrinks. The company draws its revolving facility to build cash. Suppliers shorten payment terms or credit insurers cut cover, absorbing more cash. Debt trades below par in the secondary market and rating agencies downgrade. The company hires restructuring advisers. A covenant breaches or a payment is missed. The lifecycle module described how lenders' early-warning systems watch for each of these.
The capital structure decides who bears the loss
Priority is the organising principle
When a company is worth less than its debts, someone must take a loss. Who takes it depends on the ranking of each claim. The ranking comes from three sources.
Security: a creditor secured on specific assets has first claim on the value of those assets. Contractual subordination: some debt agrees in its documents, or in an intercreditor agreement, to rank behind other debt. Structural subordination: a creditor of a holding company ranks, for the assets of the operating subsidiaries, behind the creditors of those subsidiaries, because the holding company owns only shares.
The absolute priority rule
In principle, value flows down the capital structure like water through a series of buckets: each class must be repaid in full before the class below receives anything, and shareholders receive value only if every creditor has been paid. This is the absolute priority rule. In practice, negotiated restructurings often deviate from it — shareholders may keep a small stake to secure their cooperation, junior creditors may receive something to avoid litigation — and modern court procedures allow some deviations under conditions.
The fulcrum security
The class in which the value runs out is called the fulcrum security. Classes above it are repaid in full and are, in restructuring language, in the money. Classes below it receive nothing and are out of the money. The fulcrum class receives part of its claim in value, and usually becomes the new owner of the company, because it is the class with the most to gain from the business's future performance.
Consensual or court-supervised
The collective action problem
If every creditor could be persuaded to accept a fair share of the loss, restructurings would be quick and private. They rarely are, because of the collective action problem: each creditor is better off if the others accept losses while it is paid in full. A single holdout can block a consensual deal requiring unanimity, and creditors who rush to enforce their own rights can destroy the going-concern value that all of them share.
What courts add
Court-supervised procedures exist to solve that problem. They can impose a stay — a freeze on enforcement — so that no creditor can seize assets while a plan is negotiated. They can bind dissenting creditors in a class to a plan approved by a qualified majority of that class. And, since the reforms of recent years, they can in some conditions bind entire dissenting classes through a cross-class cram-down, subject to tests that protect them from being treated unfairly. The cost is publicity, time, legal expense and, for the company, a loss of control over the process.
A ladder from private to public
| Rung | Nature | Typical tools |
|---|---|---|
| Bilateral renegotiation | Private, consensual | Waivers, covenant resets, amend-and-extend |
| Multi-creditor consensual deal | Private, needs unanimity or contractual majorities | Standstill, lock-up agreement, new money, debt-for-equity by consent |
| Confidential court-assisted procedure | Private, court-appointed facilitator, no cram-down | In France, mandat ad hoc and conciliation |
| Court restructuring with classes | Public, binds dissenting creditors and classes | In France, accelerated safeguard and safeguard; in England, restructuring plan; in the US, Chapter 11 |
| Insolvency and liquidation | Public, administrator or liquidator controls | In France, redressement and liquidation judiciaires |
The European framework has converged since 2019
The Restructuring Directive
The EU Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks, adopted in 2019, required member states to offer companies in difficulty a procedure available before insolvency, in which the debtor keeps control, a stay can be granted, creditors are grouped into classes according to their interests, and a plan approved by a qualified majority in each class — or by enough classes, with protections for the others — can be imposed on dissenters. It also protects new financing provided to support a restructuring.
France transposed the Directive by an ordinance of September 2021, which rebuilt its safeguard procedures around classes of affected parties, including shareholders, and introduced a cross-class cram-down. Germany introduced its StaRUG framework in 2021, the Netherlands its WHOA scheme, and the United Kingdom, outside the EU, its Part 26A restructuring plan in 2020. The European restructuring landscape is therefore more convergent, and more creditor-powerful, than a decade ago.
Before 2021, French safeguard procedures relied on two creditors' committees — credit institutions and major suppliers — and bondholders' meetings, and shareholders could block a debt-for-equity swap by refusing to vote the necessary capital increase. Several restructurings were shaped by that shareholder veto. The 2021 reform treats shareholders as a class that can be crammed down when they are out of the money, which changed the balance of power decisively in favour of creditors and was tested in the large cases of 2023–2024 described in Part 5.
Banks play five roles in distress
Lender, new-money provider, adviser, trader and seller
A bank can meet a distressed company in five different roles. As an existing lender, it negotiates to protect its recovery, usually through its workout unit. As a new-money provider, it may lend fresh funds to keep the company alive during the restructuring, usually with priority over existing debt. As an adviser, its restructuring advisory team may advise the company or a group of creditors, for fees — though conflicts with its lending role often rule this out, and independent advisory firms dominate the market. As a trader, its distressed-debt desk may buy and sell the company's loans and bonds. And as a seller, it may decide to sell its exposure, alone or in a portfolio of non-performing loans, to an investor who will run the workout instead.
Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.
1.1 Liquidity or solvency
For each company, say whether the main problem is liquidity, solvency or both: a profitable company with net debt of 2x EBITDA whose 300 million euro bond matures next month in a closed market; a company with net debt of 9x EBITDA, 400 million euros of cash and no maturities for four years; a company with net debt of 8x EBITDA whose revolving facility is fully drawn and which has two months of cash.
The profitable company with a maturing bond has a liquidity problem: its leverage is sustainable, and it needs refinancing or a bridge. The company at 9x with ample cash and no maturities has a solvency problem without an immediate liquidity crisis: it has time, but its debt cannot be repaid. The company at 8x with a fully drawn revolver and two months of cash has both, and needs interim liquidity and a debt reduction.
1.2 Fulcrum
A company is worth 600 million euros. Its claims are a 100 million super-senior revolving facility, 400 million of senior secured loans, 200 million of second-lien loans and 150 million of unsecured notes. Identify the fulcrum, its recovery rate, and which classes are out of the money.
Of 600 million: the revolving facility takes 100 in full, leaving 500; the senior secured loans take 400 in full, leaving 100; the second-lien loans receive 100 of 200, a 50 per cent recovery, and are the fulcrum. The unsecured notes and the shareholders are out of the money.
1.3 Going concern or liquidation
In 1.2, liquidation would yield 350 million euros. Recompute each class's recovery, and state the value a restructuring preserves compared with a liquidation.
Of 350 million: the revolving facility takes 100, leaving 250; the senior secured loans receive 250 of 400, 62.5 per cent, and are now the fulcrum; the second-lien loans, the notes and the shareholders receive nothing. A restructuring preserves 600 − 350 = 250 million euros of value compared with a liquidation.
1.4 Sustainable debt
A company's sustainable EBITDA is 80 million euros. Comparable companies trade at 7x EBITDA and lenders consider 3.5x a sustainable leverage. Estimate the enterprise value and the sustainable debt. If the current debt is 520 million, how much must be converted, written off or deferred?
Enterprise value: 7 × 80 = 560 million. Sustainable debt: 3.5 × 80 = 280 million. With 520 million of debt, about 240 million must be converted into equity, written off or deferred into instruments that pay only if the business outperforms.
Explain to a friend who owns a small café why a business can be very valuable and still unable to pay its bills next month — and why the opposite can also be true.
What is the difference between a liquidity crisis and a solvency crisis, and which usually triggers a restructuring?
A liquidity crisis is a lack of cash to pay what falls due; a solvency crisis is debt exceeding the value of the business. Liquidity usually triggers the restructuring.
What is cessation des paiements, and why does its date matter?
The inability to pay due debts from available assets; its date determines available procedures, starts the 45-day filing deadline and exposes later transactions to challenge.
Name the three sources of ranking in a capital structure.
Security, contractual subordination and structural subordination.
What is the fulcrum security, and why does it often become the new owner?
The class in which value runs out; it often becomes the owner because it has the most to gain from future performance.
Why is going-concern value usually higher than liquidation value?
Because a running business keeps its customers, contracts, staff, know-how and brands, which disappear in a liquidation.
What problem do court procedures solve, and with which three tools?
The collective action problem; with stays, class votes and cross-class cram-down.
Name the five roles in which a bank can meet a distressed company.
Lender, new-money provider, adviser, trader and seller.
1
Which crisis usually triggers a restructuring?
Not by itself.
Usually the cash shortage forces action.
Right. A solvency crisis (debt above business value) may exist for a long time before cash runs out.
No.
Why does the date of cessation des paiements matter?
No.
It has several.
Right.
Not necessarily.
Which is NOT a source of ranking in a capital structure?
Right. Ranking comes from security, contractual and structural subordination.
A source.
A source.
A source.
2The End-to-End Flow
This part follows Vela Packaging from the first warning to a new capital structure under new owners. Each step shows what the company, its sponsor and its lenders do, what they calculate, and where the law gives one side leverage over the other.
Hold the whole restructuring in your head before the detail
Ten steps over about nine months
| Step | Vela timeline | Key output |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Warning | Year 3, months 1–2 | Customer loss, energy shock, EBITDA falling to 60 |
| 2. Liquidity first | Month 2 | 13-week cash-flow forecast, runway of about four months |
| 3. Organising the creditors | Months 2–3 | Advisers appointed, coordinating committee, standstill, conciliation opened |
| 4. Business plan and valuation | Months 3–4 | Independent business review, going-concern and liquidation values |
| 5. Competing proposals | Month 4 | Sponsor proposal rejected; lender proposal preferred |
| 6. Lock-up | Month 5 | 85% of term lenders and all RCF lenders signed |
| 7. New money | Month 5 | 50 million euros of super-senior interim financing |
| 8. Court implementation | Months 6–8 | Accelerated safeguard, class votes, cram-down of the sponsor |
| 9. The new Vela | Month 9 | 260 million of debt, lenders own the equity |
| 10. Afterwards | Years 4–6 | New board, operational plan, eventual sale by the new owners |
Step 1 — The warning signs arrive in sequence
A customer, a cost shock and a covenant
In the third year after its buyout, Vela loses its largest customer, a food group that moves its packaging in-house, and is hit by a sharp rise in energy costs that it cannot pass on quickly. Twelve-month EBITDA falls from about 100 million to 60 million euros.
The signs follow the sequence described in Part 1. Management accounts show falling margins. Vela draws its 80 million euro revolving facility in full to build a cash buffer. Its credit insurers reduce cover on Vela's receivables, and suppliers shorten payment terms. The term loan, which traded at par a year earlier, falls to around 70 per cent of face value. Rating agencies downgrade Vela to CCC+.
The springing covenant springs
Vela's term loan is covenant-lite, but its revolving facility carries a springing leverage covenant tested when the facility is more than 40 per cent drawn. Fully drawn, the covenant is now tested — and breached.
Step 2 — Liquidity first: how long does the cash last?
The 13-week cash-flow forecast
The first tool in any restructuring is a 13-week cash-flow forecast: a week-by-week projection of receipts and payments, updated every week and compared with actual results. It answers the most urgent question — when does the cash run out? — and becomes the basis for every negotiation about interim financing and standstills. Creditors almost always require one, and require it to be reviewed by an independent financial adviser.
The first liquidity levers
Before the main negotiation, the company pulls every lever that buys time: cutting discretionary capital expenditure, tightening receivables collection, negotiating with key suppliers, selling non-core assets, and asking lenders to defer interest. The lenders, for their part, want to see these levers pulled before they discuss anything else.
Step 3 — Organising the creditors
Advisers on every side
Vela's board appoints a financial adviser — an independent restructuring adviser — and specialised restructuring lawyers. The term-loan lenders, who are mostly CLOs and loan funds, form an ad hoc group of the largest holders, holding together about 60 per cent of the term loan, which appoints its own legal and financial advisers. The revolving-facility banks, including our bank, coordinate through the agent. By market practice, the company pays the creditors' advisers' fees, which can be substantial.
Information, restriction and cleansing
To negotiate, the lenders in the ad hoc group must receive confidential information: the business plan, the cash forecast, the proposals. Receiving it makes them restricted: they may not trade Vela's debt while they hold material non-public information. Many funds prefer to stay unrestricted and trade, so the group's members sign non-disclosure agreements for a defined period, at the end of which the company cleanses them by publishing the key information, allowing them to trade again.
Standstill and conciliation
The lenders agree a standstill: they will not accelerate or enforce for a period, initially two months, while a solution is negotiated, in exchange for information rights and milestones. Vela's managers then ask the president of the commercial court to open a conciliation: a confidential procedure in which a court-appointed conciliator helps the company and its main creditors reach an agreement within a maximum of four months, extendable by one. Conciliation is available to a company that is not in cessation des paiements or has been so for less than 45 days; it is confidential, so customers and suppliers need not learn of the restructuring, and it can lead directly into an accelerated safeguard if a holdout blocks the deal.
French law offers two confidential, amicable procedures. The mandat ad hoc has no time limit and no formal framework; a court-appointed mandataire helps the company negotiate. Conciliation is time-limited and more structured. An agreement reached in conciliation can be either acknowledged by the court president, which keeps it confidential, or approved (homologué) by the court, which makes it public but gives creditors who provided new money during the conciliation a privilege: priority over pre-existing claims if the company later enters a court procedure. That privilege is a key incentive for lenders to provide interim financing.
Step 4 — The business plan and the valuation
An independent business review
The lenders will not negotiate on management's plan alone. An independent business review, prepared by an accounting or consulting firm, tests the plan: the customer pipeline, the cost-reduction programme, the energy-price assumptions, the capital needs. The reviewed plan projects EBITDA recovering to about 75 million euros within two years: lower than the buyout case, but with a credible path.
Valuation and the waterfall
Step 5 — Competing proposals
The sponsor's proposal
Northgate, the sponsor, wants to keep Vela. It proposes to inject 60 million euros of new equity, in exchange for the term-loan lenders writing off 100 million euros, extending maturities by three years, and accepting part of their interest in kind — added to the principal rather than paid in cash — for two years. Northgate would keep 100 per cent of the equity.
The lenders' proposal
The ad hoc group counter-proposes a debt-for-equity swap. The revolving facility would be reinstated and extended. The lenders would provide 50 million euros of new super-senior money. The term loan would be reduced to 130 million of new, reinstated debt, and the remaining 355 million converted into the equity of Vela. Northgate's equity would be cancelled, apart from warrants that pay out only if Vela's value later exceeds twice the plan valuation.
Step 6 — Locking up support
The lock-up agreement
Once the main terms are agreed, the supporting creditors sign a lock-up agreement: a contract in which they commit to support the restructuring, vote for it in any court procedure, and not sell their debt unless the buyer signs up to the same commitment. The company commits to implement the deal by set milestones. Lock-ups often offer a consent fee or an early-bird fee to creditors who sign by a deadline, encouraging others to join.
Vela's lock-up is signed by holders of 85 per cent of the term loan and all the revolving-facility lenders. The remaining 15 per cent of the term loan is held by funds that hope to extract better terms by holding out. Under the loan agreement, a debt-for-equity swap and a reduction of principal require the consent of every affected lender. A consensual deal is therefore impossible. A court procedure is needed.
Step 7 — New money keeps the company alive
Interim financing and its priority
Vela will run out of cash before the restructuring can be implemented. The lenders therefore provide interim financing: 50 million euros of new super-senior money, ranking ahead of all existing debt. In France, new money provided in a conciliation approved by the court, or during a safeguard procedure, benefits from a legal privilege that ranks it ahead of pre-existing claims if the company later fails — the main reason lenders are willing to provide it.
Backstop and participation economics
The new money is offered to all term-loan lenders pro rata. The ad hoc group backstops it: commits to provide any amount that other lenders do not take up, in exchange for a backstop fee. New-money providers also receive a share of the post-restructuring equity. These features make participating in the new money attractive and are a source of tension: lenders who cannot or will not provide new money see their share of the recovery diluted.
Step 8 — Implementing through accelerated safeguard
Why a court procedure
Two obstacles stand in the way of a consensual deal: the 15 per cent holdout in the term loan, and the sponsor, whose shares must be cancelled. Since the 2021 reform, both can be overcome in an accelerated safeguard (sauvegarde accélérée), a short court procedure available to a company in conciliation that has prepared a plan likely to receive sufficient support. It lasts up to two months, extendable by two, and the company remains in control under the supervision of a court-appointed administrator.
Classes of affected parties
The administrator groups the affected parties — those whose rights the plan changes — into classes with a sufficient community of economic interest. For Vela, there are three classes: the revolving-facility lenders, secured and super senior; the term-loan lenders, secured and senior; and the shareholder, Northgate. Trade creditors, employees and others whose rights are not modified are not affected and do not vote.
A class approves the plan if parties holding two-thirds of the votes cast vote in favour. The revolving-facility class approves unanimously. The term-loan class approves with 85 per cent. Northgate's class rejects.
Cross-class cram-down
The court can still approve the plan over the shareholder class's objection if the conditions of cross-class cram-down are met. In outline: the plan must be approved by a majority of classes including at least one class of secured or senior creditors, or by at least one in-the-money class other than shareholders; it must satisfy the best-interest test, meaning that no dissenting party is worse off than in a liquidation or the best alternative; and it must respect the absolute priority rule, so that a dissenting class is paid in full before a junior class receives anything, subject to limited exceptions. Shareholders can be crammed down when the valuation shows they are out of the money.
Step 9 — The new Vela
The capital structure after the plan
| Instrument | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Revolving facility, super senior | 80 (drawn) | 80, extended by three years |
| New money, super senior | — | 50 |
| Term loan | 485 | 130, reinstated |
| Total debt | 565 | 260 |
| Leverage on sustainable EBITDA of 75 | 7.5x | 3.5x |
| Equity owners | Northgate 100% | Term lenders 80%, new-money providers 10% (plus backstop fee), management incentive plan 10%; Northgate warrants only |
What the bank holds now
Our bank held 10 million euros of the term loan and a third of the revolving facility. The revolving facility is reinstated in full and extended. The term-loan holding of 10 million becomes about 2.7 million of new term loan and a small equity stake. For accounting, the change is a substantial modification: the old loan is derecognised and the new loan and the shares are recognised at fair value, with any difference against the carrying amount — net of the provisions already booked in Stage 3 — taken to profit or loss. The equity stake attracts a higher capital charge than a loan, and the bank, which is not a natural owner of packaging companies, will want to sell it when Vela recovers.
Step 10 — Afterwards: from lenders to owners
A new board and an exit plan
The new owners — mostly CLOs and loan funds — appoint a new board with independent directors and a restructuring-experienced chair, and implement the operational plan. Lenders are not long-term owners: their funds have limited lives, and CLOs face restrictions on holding equity. Within two to four years, if the plan succeeds, they will sell Vela to a strategic buyer or a new private-equity fund, realising the value they received in the swap. If it fails, a second restructuring — informally called a "Chapter 22" in the US — will follow.
Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.
2.1 Runway
A company has 40 million euros of cash, needs 10 million to operate, and burns 4 million a month before a 12 million interest payment due in month three. When does it run out of usable cash?
Usable cash: 30 million. After month 1: 26. After month 2: 22. Month 3, with the 12 million interest payment: 22 − 4 − 12 = 6. Month 4: 2. The company runs out of usable cash during month 5.
2.2 Waterfall
A company is worth 300 million euros as a going concern and 180 million in liquidation. Its debts are a 50 million super-senior facility, 280 million of senior secured loans and 100 million of unsecured notes. Compute each class's recovery in both scenarios and identify the fulcrum in each.
Going concern, 300: super senior 50 in full, leaving 250; senior 250 of 280, about 89 per cent — the fulcrum; notes nothing. Liquidation, 180: super senior 50 in full, leaving 130; senior 130 of 280, about 46 per cent — the fulcrum; notes nothing.
2.3 Class vote
A class of senior lenders holds claims of 400 million euros. Holders of 300 million vote; 210 million vote in favour. Does the class approve? What if holders of 380 million vote and 240 million vote in favour?
First case: 210 / 300 = 70 per cent of votes cast, above two-thirds: the class approves. Second case: 240 / 380 = 63 per cent: the class rejects.
2.4 Best-interest test
In 2.2, a plan offers the unsecured noteholders 5 per cent of the new equity, worth 4 million euros. Does the plan pass the best-interest test for that class if it dissents? Would cramming them down respect absolute priority if the senior lenders are not paid in full?
The noteholders receive nothing in liquidation and 4 million under the plan, so the best-interest test is met for their class. Absolute priority protects a dissenting class from seeing a junior class receive value; cramming down the notes respects it as long as the shareholders, junior to them, receive nothing. Giving the notes value while the senior class is not paid in full is a deviation from absolute priority that the senior class can accept by approving the plan; if the senior class dissented, it could object to it.
2.5 Equity split
In Vela's plan, a lender holds 5 per cent of the term loan and provides 5 per cent of the new money. Ignoring the backstop fee, what share of Vela's equity does it receive, and what is its total recovery on its original term-loan holding, counting the new-money equity as part of the recovery?
Equity received: 5% of the term lenders' 80 per cent = 4 per cent, plus 5% of the new-money providers' 10 per cent = 0.5 per cent, total 4.5 per cent. On a plan equity value of 230 million, worth about 10.4 million. New term loan: 5% × 130 = 6.5 million. Total recovery on the original holding of 5% × 485 = 24.25 million: (6.5 + 10.4) / 24.25 = about 70 per cent, compared with about 65 per cent for a lender that did not provide new money. Its 2.5 million of new money is repaid separately as super-senior debt.
Explain to a friend who co-owns a flat with a large mortgage why, if the flat is worth less than the mortgage and the co-owners cannot pay, it makes sense for the bank to become the owner — and why the co-owners might still be offered something to leave without a fight.
What does a 13-week cash-flow forecast answer, and why is it the first tool?
When the cash runs out, week by week; without that answer nothing else can be negotiated.
Why do lenders in an ad hoc group become restricted, and how are they cleansed?
Because they receive material non-public information; at the end of the restricted period the company publishes it in a cleansing announcement.
What is the difference between an acknowledged and an approved conciliation agreement in France?
An acknowledged agreement stays confidential; an approved (homologué) agreement is public but gives new money provided in the conciliation a privilege.
What does a lock-up agreement commit its signatories to do?
To support and vote for the restructuring, and not to transfer their debt unless the buyer accedes to the agreement.
Why do lenders provide new money, and what protects it?
Because the company would otherwise run out of cash and value would be destroyed; it is protected by super-senior ranking and, in France, by the new-money privilege.
How does a class approve a plan in French accelerated safeguard?
By holders of two-thirds of the votes cast in the class voting in favour.
Name the main conditions for a cross-class cram-down.
Approval by a majority of classes including a secured or senior class, or by an in-the-money class other than shareholders; the best-interest test; and the absolute priority rule, subject to limited exceptions.
2
Why is the 13-week cash-flow forecast the first tool?
No.
That is the claims register.
Right.
That is the valuation model.
How are restricted lenders in an ad hoc group “cleansed”?
No.
Right.
No.
Not the mechanism.
What does an approved (homologué) conciliation agreement give that an acknowledged one does not?
That is the acknowledged agreement.
No.
Right.
No.
3Roles, Actors, and Interactions
Distress brings together people who never met when the loan was made: restructuring advisers, distressed-debt funds, court-appointed officials, valuation experts. This part names every actor at the table, explains what each one wants, and shows how their incentives shape the outcome.
The company and its owners
Management and the board
The company's managers run the business and, in most European procedures, remain in control during a restructuring — the debtor-in-possession principle adopted by the EU Directive. But their duties shift. As the company approaches insolvency, directors must increasingly take creditors' interests into account; in France, managers who delay filing beyond the legal deadline, or who worsen the deficit through mismanagement, may be held personally liable for the shortfall. Boards in distress often appoint a chief restructuring officer, an interim executive experienced in turnarounds, to run the process alongside management.
The shareholders
For a sponsor-owned company, the shareholder is a professional investor with a portfolio view. Its options are to inject new equity and fight to keep the company, to negotiate a small stake or warrants in exchange for cooperation, or to walk away. Its leverage comes from time — delay costs everyone money — and, in jurisdictions where shareholder consent is still needed, from its vote. In listed companies, shareholders are numerous and dispersed, and their protection in a restructuring is often a political as well as a legal issue, as the French cases in Part 5 show.
Creditors are not one group
The creditor map
| Creditor | Typical position | What it wants |
|---|---|---|
| Super-senior and RCF banks | First-ranking, often relationship lenders | Full recovery, reinstatement, minimal new commitments |
| Senior secured lenders (banks, CLOs, funds) | Usually the fulcrum | The equity, governance, a business plan they believe |
| Second-lien and high-yield bondholders | Often out of the money or at the fulcrum | A share of the equity, a high valuation |
| Unsecured creditors and bondholders | Usually out of the money | Something rather than nothing |
| Trade creditors and suppliers | Unsecured, essential to operations | To be paid and keep trading |
| Employees and pension schemes | Protected by law in part | Jobs and wages |
| Tax and social-security authorities | Often privileged | Payment; in France, special rules on public creditors |
| Credit insurers | Behind suppliers and receivables | To cut or restore cover |
| Lessors and landlords | Contracts essential to operations | Payment of rent and lease obligations |
Original lenders and distressed investors behave differently
The lenders around the table in a restructuring are often not those who made the loan. As a company's debt falls in price, original lenders — banks, CLOs constrained by ratings — sell, and distressed-debt investors buy. These funds buy debt at a discount with a specific strategy: some to be repaid at a higher value, some to convert their debt into control of the company — a loan-to-own strategy — and some to extract value as holdouts. A bank that negotiates alongside such investors must understand that their purchase price, not the face value, drives their behaviour.
Coordinating committees and ad hoc groups
Organising many creditors
When creditors are numerous, they organise. In bank-led syndicated loans, a coordinating committee of the largest banks negotiates on behalf of the syndicate. In loan and bond markets dominated by institutional investors, an ad hoc group of the largest holders forms and appoints its own advisers. Members commit to confidentiality and accept trading restrictions; in return, they shape the deal and often receive economic benefits such as backstop fees. Creditors outside the group — sometimes called the crossover or minority holders — may form their own group, particularly if they fear being disadvantaged.
Cooperation and competition
Creditors cooperate to preserve value and compete over its distribution. The tension shows up in valuation — seniors argue low, juniors argue high — in the allocation of new money and fees, and in liability-management attempts in which one group seeks priority over another, as the Corporate & Leveraged Finance module described. Agreement among creditors is often harder to reach than agreement between creditors and the company.
Advisers are paid to restructure
Financial advisers
Independent restructuring advisers — specialised firms and the restructuring teams of investment banks — advise the company or creditor groups. For the company, they run the process, build the cash forecast and plan, design the new capital structure and negotiate. For creditors, they analyse the plan, value the business and negotiate the allocation. Fees are typically a monthly retainer plus a success fee on completion.
In France, the market is led by specialist independent firms and the restructuring teams of advisory boutiques; universal banks often avoid company-side mandates because of conflicts with their lending books, while their workout teams sit on the creditor side.
Legal, accounting and valuation advisers
Restructuring lawyers structure the deal, draft the lock-up and plan, and run the court procedure. Accounting and consulting firms prepare independent business reviews, liquidity reviews and, sometimes, the role of chief restructuring officer. Valuation experts provide the valuations on which class formation, best-interest tests and cram-downs depend, and in contested cases on both sides.
Court officials and the judge
The French court cast
| Official | Appointed by | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Mandataire ad hoc | President of the commercial court | Facilitates confidential negotiation, no time limit |
| Conciliator | President of the commercial court | Facilitates confidential negotiation within four to five months |
| Administrateur judiciaire | Court, in safeguard or redressement | Supervises or assists management, forms classes, organises votes |
| Mandataire judiciaire | Court | Represents creditors' collective interest, verifies claims |
| Juge-commissaire | Court | Supervises the procedure, decides on claims and certain transactions |
| Commercial court | — | Opens procedures, approves or rejects plans, applies cram-down |
| Public prosecutor | — | May intervene, notably on public-interest and employment issues |
The commercial courts, whose judges are elected business people, handle restructurings; the largest cases are concentrated in courts with specialised chambers. Since 2025, a number of courts have been piloting a renamed tribunal des activités économiques with a wider jurisdiction, as part of a broader reform of commercial justice.
Other jurisdictions in brief
In England, restructuring plans and schemes of arrangement are sanctioned by the High Court, with the company typically in control, and administration is run by insolvency practitioners. In the United States, Chapter 11 is run by the debtor-in-possession before a bankruptcy judge, with a statutory committee of unsecured creditors and the US Trustee overseeing the process.
Banks inside the bank
Workout, legal, finance and trading
Inside a lending bank, a restructuring involves the workout unit, which owns the negotiation; legal, which reviews rights and documents; finance, which sets provisions and accounts for the outcome; risk, which approves the bank's position through the workout or NPL committee; and, if the bank decides to sell, the loan sales or distressed trading desk. The lifecycle module described these roles; here, the point is that the bank's negotiator must constantly reconcile the institution's capital, accounting and reputational constraints with the economic best answer.
A bank's choices are shaped by accounting and capital. Selling a non-performing loan at 60 per cent crystallises a loss but releases capital and ends the cost of the workout. Converting debt into equity creates an equity exposure with a high capital charge. Providing new money increases exposure to a distressed borrower. Agreeing to forbearance keeps the loan flagged and subject to probation periods. A bank's workout negotiator who ignores these constraints will find the institution unwilling to sign the deal the negotiator has agreed.
Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.
3.1 Map the incentives
For Vela's plan, state the likely position of: the revolving-facility banks, the ad hoc group of term lenders, a holdout fund that bought at 55, Northgate, Vela's main supplier and its employees.
The revolving-facility banks want full recovery, reinstatement and limited new exposure, and will support a plan that achieves it. The ad hoc group wants the equity and governance, and drove the plan. The holdout fund, having bought at 55, gains from a 65 per cent recovery but may hold out for a better price. Northgate wants to keep its equity or extract value for its cooperation. The main supplier wants to keep being paid and trading. The employees want their jobs protected, and their representatives will be consulted.
3.2 The restricted lender
A CLO manager is invited to join Vela's ad hoc group. Explain what it gains and gives up, and what the company must do at the end of the restricted period.
It gains influence over the deal and access to economic benefits such as backstop fees; it gives up the ability to trade the debt while restricted. At the end of the period the company must cleanse it by publishing all material non-public information shared.
3.3 Bank constraints
Our bank's workout negotiator agrees in principle to provide 5 million euros of new money and accept equity. List three internal approvals or checks needed before the bank can sign.
Approval of the new money and equity by the workout or NPL committee within the bank's delegated authorities; finance's assessment of the accounting and provisioning impact, including derecognition; risk and capital review of the new exposure and the capital charge on the equity; legal review of the documents; compliance review of information barriers.
3.4 Choose the adviser
Vela's board considers appointing as financial adviser the restructuring team of one of its revolving-facility banks. What conflicts arise, and what would you recommend?
The bank would advise the company in negotiations against its own lending book, and its restructuring team would have access to information relevant to the bank's credit position and trading. Recommendation: appoint an independent adviser with no lending exposure, and keep the bank's role confined to that of a creditor.
Explain to a friend why two people who are owed exactly the same amount by the same company can want completely different outcomes from its restructuring.
What is the debtor-in-possession principle?
Management remains in control of the company during the restructuring, under supervision.
Name four types of creditor and what each typically wants.
For example: super-senior banks want full recovery; senior lenders at the fulcrum want the equity and governance; unsecured creditors want something rather than nothing; suppliers want to keep being paid and trading.
What is a loan-to-own strategy?
Buying debt at a discount with the intention of converting it into ownership of the company.
What is the difference between a coordinating committee and an ad hoc group?
A coordinating committee represents a bank syndicate, usually its largest banks; an ad hoc group is formed by the largest holders, often institutional investors, and appoints its own advisers.
What does an independent business review do?
It independently tests the company's business plan and its assumptions.
Name three French court officials and their roles.
For example: the conciliator facilitates confidential negotiation; the administrateur judiciaire supervises management and organises classes; the mandataire judiciaire represents creditors and verifies claims.
3
What is the debtor-in-possession principle?
Not by default.
Right.
No.
No.
What is a loan-to-own strategy?
No.
No.
Right.
No.
What do senior lenders at the fulcrum typically want?
Suppliers.
No.
Right. Super-seniors want full recovery; unsecured creditors want something rather than nothing.
Closer to super-senior banks.
4Systems, Data, and IT
A restructuring is fought with numbers and documents. This part opens the models, registers and controls a restructuring depends on: the cash forecast, the valuation and waterfall, the claims register, the holder and voting data, the information barriers, the accounting for modified and converted debt, and the data tapes used to sell non-performing loans.
The restructuring runs on six data objects
What every party needs to know
| Data object | Question it answers | Typical owner |
|---|---|---|
| Liquidity model | How long does the cash last, week by week? | Company's financial adviser |
| Business plan model | What can the business earn, under which assumptions? | Company, tested by the independent business review |
| Valuation and waterfall model | What is the business worth, and who recovers what? | Advisers on each side; valuation experts |
| Claims register | Who is owed how much, with what ranking and security? | Agent, administrator, mandataire judiciaire |
| Holder, lock-up and voting tracker | Who holds the debt now, who has signed, how will each class vote? | Company's advisers, information agent |
| Restricted list and data room log | Who has received what confidential information, and when? | Each institution's compliance; data-room provider |
The liquidity model is updated weekly and trusted by no one until tested
From forecast to variance report
The 13-week cash-flow forecast is not a one-off document. Each week the company compares actual receipts and payments with the forecast, explains the variances, and rolls the forecast forward. Lenders' advisers review every variance report. Standstill and new-money agreements typically include liquidity covenants — minimum cash balances, maximum negative variances — tested on these reports. The forecast therefore becomes a contractual instrument as well as a management tool.
Data quality is the first battle
Distressed companies often discover that they cannot produce a reliable weekly cash view: bank accounts spread across many banks and countries, payments decided locally, receivables financed through factoring programmes whose flows are hard to trace. Building a credible liquidity model frequently starts with consolidating bank-account data across the group — a cash-management problem as much as a restructuring one.
Valuation and waterfall models must be defensible in court
Inputs, scenarios and audit trail
The valuation and waterfall model takes the business plan, applies valuation methods — comparable multiples, discounted cash flows, precedent transactions, and liquidation analysis — and runs value through the capital structure under several scenarios. In a negotiated deal, it supports the allocation. In a contested court procedure, it becomes evidence. Its assumptions, sources and versions must therefore be documented and traceable, and the model must be able to show, for each class, the recovery under the plan and under the best alternative.
The claims register is the legal record of who is owed what
Claims in French procedures
When a safeguard, redressement or liquidation procedure opens, the judgment is published in the official commercial gazette, the BODACC. Creditors must then declare their claims to the mandataire judiciaire, generally within two months of publication, stating the amount, its nature and any security. The mandataire verifies each claim, and the juge-commissaire admits or rejects it. The resulting list is the legal basis for distributions and votes.
Reconciling the register with the market
For syndicated loans and bonds, the claims register must reconcile with the records of the agent bank, which keeps the register of lenders of record, and with the bond trustee or paying agent. Trading continues during a restructuring, so the holders change; the register must reflect who holds the debt at the record date set for voting. Discrepancies — trades not yet settled, sub-participations in which the economic holder is not the lender of record, claims declared twice — are common and must be resolved before a vote.
Loan-market trades settle slowly, and in a distressed name they are slower still. A fund that has bought a claim may not yet be the lender of record on the agent's register when votes are counted, and the seller may be obliged to vote on the buyer's instructions under the trade documentation. Accurate voting therefore depends on linking three datasets — the agent's register, pending trades and lock-up signatures — that live in different organisations' systems.
Holder, lock-up and voting data decide whether a deal can be done
Who holds the debt?
At the start of a restructuring, the company often does not know who owns its debt. Bondholders are hidden behind custodians and clearing systems; loan holders change daily as the debt trades. Advisers use the agent's register, bondholder identification exercises and market intelligence to map the holders and estimate how a vote might go.
Tracking support
Once a lock-up is launched, an information agent or the company's advisers track signatures: who has signed, for how much, under which class, by which deadline for early-bird fees. The tracker shows in real time whether the thresholds for a consensual deal or for class approval in court are within reach, and which holders to call.
Information barriers protect the market and the bank
Restricted lists, wall-crossings and cleansing
Creditors who receive confidential information must not trade on it. Each institution's compliance function maintains a restricted list of names its traders may not deal in, and records every wall-crossing — the moment an individual is given inside information. Data rooms log who downloaded which document and when. At the end of a restricted period, the company publishes a cleansing announcement containing the material information shared, so that recipients can trade again.
For a bank with a workout team on the creditor committee and a trading desk in the same name, these controls are essential: the Market Abuse Regulation applies to loans whose borrower has listed securities, and to bonds directly.
The accounting follows the legal outcome
For the lender: modification or derecognition
Under IFRS 9, when a loan's terms are renegotiated, the lender must decide whether the change is a modification of the same asset or a substantial modification that requires the old loan to be derecognised and a new one recognised. A debt-for-equity swap is clearly substantial: the lender now holds a different instrument. The bank derecognises the old loan, recognises the new loan and the shares at fair value, and records the difference against the loan's net carrying amount in profit or loss. For a modification that is not substantial, the gross carrying amount is recalculated by discounting the new cash flows at the original effective interest rate, and the difference is a modification gain or loss.
For the borrower: gains on extinguishment
On the borrower's side, debt extinguished by issuing shares is accounted for under IFRIC 19: the shares are measured at fair value and the difference with the carrying amount of the debt extinguished is a gain in profit or loss. Debt write-offs can also have tax consequences that the restructuring must plan for.
Regulatory flags travel with the exposure
The restructured exposure carries its history: the forbearance flag, the non-performing status and its cure period, the Stage 3 classification until the cure is complete. The new instruments must be linked in the bank's systems to the old ones, so that reporting on forborne and non-performing exposures, and the probation periods, continue correctly.
Non-performing loan sales run on data tapes
Selling distressed exposures
A bank that prefers not to work out a loan itself can sell it, individually or in a portfolio. Portfolio sales are run as auctions: the bank prepares a data tape — loan-by-loan data on balances, borrowers, collateral, payment history, legal status and recovery actions — and investors price the portfolio from it. The quality of the tape largely determines the price: missing collateral data, unclear legal status or inconsistent balances lead investors to discount for uncertainty.
Standardised templates
To deepen the European market for non-performing loans, the EBA published standardised NPL data templates, and the EU Directive on credit servicers and credit purchasers, transposed by the end of 2023, made standardised information requirements part of the legal framework for sales. Banks with clean, template-ready data on their non-performing books can sell faster and at better prices.
The fields required for an NPL data tape are largely the fields the lifecycle module said the bank should already hold: the facility hierarchy, collateral and valuations, guarantees, the forbearance and default history, the legal procedure and the recovery cash flows. A bank that maintains these as structured data while a loan is performing can prepare a sale in weeks; a bank that must reconstruct them from files and emails needs months and accepts a lower price.
Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.
4.1 Votes
A class has claims of 600 million euros. Lock-up signatories hold 380 million. Holders of 520 million vote, all signatories in favour. Does the class approve? How much additional support, in claims voting in favour, would be needed if holders of 580 million voted and only signatories voted in favour?
First case: 380 / 520 = 73 per cent: the class approves. Second case: two-thirds of 580 is about 386.7 million, so about 6.7 million of additional claims voting in favour would be needed.
4.2 Register reconciliation
List three reasons why the agent's register of lenders of record might differ from the list of economic holders on the record date.
Trades agreed but not yet settled; sub-participations, in which the lender of record passes the economics to another party; and transfers that need consents not yet obtained. Duplicate or erroneous claim declarations can add further differences with the claims register.
4.3 Modification or derecognition
For each change, say whether IFRS 9 is likely to treat it as a modification or a substantial modification: a two-year maturity extension with a 0.25 per cent margin increase; conversion of 70 per cent of the loan into shares; replacement of a cash-pay loan by a payment-in-kind instrument with equity warrants.
The maturity extension with a small margin increase is likely a modification, with a modification gain or loss. The conversion of 70 per cent into shares is a substantial modification, leading to derecognition. The replacement by a payment-in-kind instrument with warrants is likely substantial, because the nature of the instrument changes; the conclusion depends on the facts and the quantitative and qualitative tests.
4.4 Data tape
Name eight fields an NPL buyer would expect for each corporate loan, and explain why missing collateral data lowers the price.
Borrower identifiers; outstanding principal and accrued interest; facility type and currency; origination and maturity dates; collateral type, value and valuation date; guarantees; ranking and security; payment history and days past due; forbearance history; legal status and procedure; recovery cash flows to date. Missing collateral data forces buyers to assume the worst about the second way out, so they discount the price for the uncertainty.
Explain to a friend why selling a pile of bad loans is a little like selling a used car without its service history — and what the bank could have done years earlier to get a better price.
Name the six data objects a restructuring depends on.
The liquidity model, the business plan model, the valuation and waterfall model, the claims register, the holder, lock-up and voting tracker, and the restricted list and data-room log.
How does the 13-week forecast become a contractual instrument?
Standstill and new-money agreements include liquidity covenants tested on the weekly forecast and variance reports.
What is the claims register, and who keeps it in a French procedure?
The legal record of admitted claims; it is prepared by the mandataire judiciaire and decided by the juge-commissaire.
What is a cleansing announcement, and why must it be complete?
A public disclosure of the material non-public information shared with creditors; if incomplete, creditors may still hold inside information and cannot trade.
How does a lender account for a debt-for-equity swap under IFRS 9?
It derecognises the old loan and recognises the new loan and the shares at fair value, taking the difference against the net carrying amount to profit or loss.
Why does the quality of a data tape determine the price of an NPL portfolio?
Because buyers price uncertainty; missing or inconsistent data leads them to assume worse outcomes.
4
Who prepares the claims register in a French procedure?
Right.
No.
No.
No.
How does the 13-week forecast become contractual?
No.
It does.
Right.
No.
Which is NOT one of the six data objects of a restructuring?
One of the six.
One of the six.
One of the six.
Right. Objects: liquidity model, business plan, valuation and waterfall, claims register, holder and voting tracker, restricted list and data-room log.
5Risks, Pain Points, and Transformation
Restructurings fail in characteristic ways: they start too late, they fix liquidity but not solvency, they become valuation wars, or the creditors fight each other instead of the problem. This part maps those risks, studies three landmark French cases that applied the 2021 reform at scale, and sets out how the restructuring market is changing.
A MECE map of restructuring risk
Seven ways a restructuring destroys value
| Risk | What goes wrong | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Late action | Negotiation starts when cash is almost gone | Fewer options, forced sales, insolvency |
| Liquidity-only fix | New money without debt reduction | Second restructuring within a few years |
| Valuation dispute | Parties cannot agree on value | Delay, litigation, contested cram-down |
| Intercreditor conflict | Creditor groups fight over priority and allocation | Holdouts, liability-management manoeuvres, value leakage |
| Operational erosion | Customers, suppliers and staff leave during the uncertainty | Going-concern value falls while the parties negotiate |
| Execution and legal risk | Plan rejected, challenged or not recognised abroad | Delay, return to square one |
| Social and political risk | Jobs, public services or strategic activities at stake | Public intervention, conditions on the plan |
The cost of delay is the central risk
Almost every risk in the table is worsened by time. Advisers' fees accumulate, management is distracted, customers hedge by moving business to competitors, suppliers demand cash on delivery, and key employees leave. The value of the business that is being negotiated over falls while the negotiation continues. The design of modern procedures — short accelerated safeguards, stays, cram-downs — is an attempt to compress the time between recognising the problem and implementing the solution.
Three French cases tested the new framework
Orpea, Casino and Atos
Between 2023 and 2024, three of the largest French corporate restructurings in decades used the procedures introduced by the 2021 reform, each with classes of affected parties and the cram-down of existing shareholders. They are drawn here from public reporting and court decisions; figures are approximate and should be checked at source before reuse.
Orpea, 2022–2023 — when a reputational crisis became a solvency crisis
What happened
Orpea, a listed operator of nursing homes and clinics, was hit in early 2022 by public allegations about the treatment of residents and its management practices. Its share price collapsed, investigations followed, and a review of its accounts led to large write-downs. With debts of several billion euros, it opened a conciliation in late 2022 and reached an agreement in early 2023 with a consortium led by the Caisse des Dépôts and with a group of its unsecured creditors.
The plan was implemented through an accelerated safeguard. It converted around 3.8 billion euros of unsecured debt into equity and raised about 1.5 billion euros of new equity, mainly from the consortium, which became the controlling shareholder. The shareholders' class rejected the plan; the specialised commercial court of Nanterre approved it in mid-2023 using cross-class cram-down, and existing shareholders were diluted to a fraction of one per cent.
Root cause
An operational and reputational crisis exposed a business model that carried very high debt, much of it tied to a large real-estate portfolio. Once confidence in the business and its accounts collapsed, refinancing became impossible and the debt was unsustainable.
The lesson
The reform's shareholder cram-down was tested at scale on a listed company. The case showed that out-of-the-money shareholders could no longer block a debt-for-equity swap, and that the valuation supporting the cram-down would be scrutinised in court and by the public.
Casino, 2023–2024 — when a long refinancing struggle ended in a change of control
What happened
Groupe Casino, a French food retailer with a complex holding structure controlled by its long-time chairman, had spent years selling assets and refinancing a heavy debt load. In 2023 its liquidity deteriorated and it opened a conciliation. The resulting plan, backed by a consortium including investors led by Daniel Křetínský, involved a large new equity investment and the conversion or write-off of several billion euros of debt. It was implemented through an accelerated safeguard, approved by the Paris commercial court in early 2024. The historic controlling shareholder lost control, and existing shareholders were heavily diluted.
Root cause
High leverage at both the operating company and its holding structure, a weakening competitive position and repeated refinancing rather than a decisive reduction of debt.
The lesson
A succession of liquidity fixes — asset sales, short-term refinancing — can delay but not avoid a solvency problem. The longer the delay, the more of the value passes from the original owners to the new money and the creditors.
Atos, 2024 — when creditors took control of a strategic company
What happened
Atos, a French IT services group with activities considered strategic by the state, including supercomputing and defence-related work, faced a liquidity crisis in 2024 after losses, failed disposal plans and approaching debt maturities. After a conciliation in which competing offers from industrial and financial investors were considered, a plan led by its banks and bondholders was chosen. It reduced the group's debt by several billion euros through conversion into equity, provided new money from creditors, and was implemented through an accelerated safeguard approved by the specialised commercial court of Nanterre in late 2024. Creditors became the main shareholders, and existing shareholders were heavily diluted. The French state obtained specific rights over certain sensitive activities.
Root cause
A business in transition, with declining legacy activities, high debt, and a strategy that changed several times while the balance sheet weakened.
The lesson
Creditor-led restructurings can be applied to strategically sensitive companies, but the state's interests become part of the negotiation. For banks, the case illustrated the full range of roles in one file: lender, new-money provider and, eventually, shareholder.
In the English and US systems, similar outcomes are reached through different tools. The English restructuring plan, introduced in 2020, allows cross-class cram-down with a "no worse off" test against the relevant alternative, and the courts have developed extensive case law on how value should be shared. US Chapter 11 offers the debtor-in-possession, debtor-in-possession financing with super-priority, sales of assets free of liabilities, and plans confirmed over dissenting classes subject to the absolute priority rule. Large European groups with English-law or New York-law debt sometimes use these procedures, alone or alongside a French one, which raises questions of cross-border recognition.
Six transformation themes
What is changing in restructuring
| Theme | What it means | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Earlier intervention | Early-warning systems and pre-insolvency procedures used sooner | Preserves more going-concern value |
| Creditor-led ownership | Lenders and funds routinely becoming owners through swaps | Changes the role of banks and the skills they need |
| Deeper NPL markets | Standardised data, regulated credit servicers, more buyers | Banks can choose to sell rather than work out |
| Data and analytics in workout | Recovery prediction, strategy choice based on historical outcomes | Better and faster decisions, better LGD models |
| Digital process infrastructure | Electronic claims declaration, voting platforms, digital data rooms | Faster, more accurate votes and registers |
| Social and ESG considerations | Employment, public services, strategic autonomy in the plan | Plans must be acceptable beyond the creditors |
Using the bank's own recovery data
Banks hold years of data on what happened to their distressed exposures: which strategies were chosen, how long they took, what was recovered and at what cost. Analysed systematically, this data can predict which approach is likely to maximise recovery for a given profile of borrower and collateral, sharpen LGD models and provisions, and show which early-warning signals preceded the largest losses. Few banks yet use it fully, because it lives in case files rather than structured data — the same message as in every module of the track.
Banks' changing role
As creditor-led restructurings become the norm, banks increasingly find themselves as temporary shareholders, new-money providers and members of ad hoc groups alongside funds with different horizons. The skills required — valuation, negotiation, governance, exit planning — are closer to those of an investor than of a lender. Banks that build these skills in their workout units, or that sell their exposures early to those who have them, protect their recoveries; those that do neither tend to be the creditors who are crammed down or diluted.
Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.
5.1 Name the risk
For each, name the risk from the table in this part: a plan provides 100 million euros of new money but leaves leverage at 8x; two creditor groups spend six months litigating over priority; during a nine-month negotiation, the company loses two major customers; a plan is approved in France but not recognised in a jurisdiction where key assets sit.
New money leaving leverage at 8x: liquidity-only fix. Six months of priority litigation: intercreditor conflict. Losing customers during negotiation: operational erosion. Non-recognition abroad: execution and legal risk.
5.2 Cost of delay
A company's going-concern value is 500 million euros and falls by 2 per cent a month while creditors negotiate; advisers' fees are 3 million a month. Compare the value available to creditors after a three-month and a nine-month negotiation.
After three months: 500 × 0.98³ = about 470.6 million, minus 9 million of fees: about 462 million. After nine months: 500 × 0.98⁹ = about 416.8 million, minus 27 million: about 390 million. Six extra months of negotiation cost about 72 million euros of value.
5.3 Lessons from the cases
For each of Orpea, Casino and Atos, name one idea from Parts 1 to 4 of this module that the case illustrates.
Orpea: the cram-down of out-of-the-money shareholders under the 2021 reform, and the importance of the valuation behind it. Casino: liquidity-only fixes delaying a solvency solution. Atos: competing proposals and the role of creditors as new-money providers and new owners, with the state's interests in the negotiation.
5.4 Sell or work out
A bank holds a 40 million euro exposure to a distressed company. A buyer offers 55 per cent today. The bank's workout team estimates a 65 per cent recovery in two years, with costs of 1 million, and the bank's cost of capital is 10 per cent a year. Compare the two options in present-value terms and name two non-financial considerations.
Sale: 55% × 40 = 22 million today. Workout: 65% × 40 = 26 million in two years, less 1 million of costs, 25 million, discounted at 10 per cent for two years: 25 / 1.21 = about 20.7 million. The sale is better in present-value terms. Non-financial considerations: the relationship with the company and its other lenders, the reputational effect of selling to an aggressive buyer, the capital and provisioning impact, and the uncertainty of the 65 per cent estimate.
Explain to a relative why, when a large well-known French company was restructured, its shareholders ended up owning almost nothing while its lenders became the owners — and why the court allowed it.
Why is delay the central risk in a restructuring?
Because the value being negotiated over falls with every month of uncertainty, while costs accumulate.
What pattern do the Orpea, Casino and Atos cases share?
An operational or strategic problem, unsustainable debt, conciliation, accelerated safeguard, and the cram-down of existing shareholders with creditors or new investors taking control.
What did the cases show about the effect of the 2021 reform?
That out-of-the-money shareholders can no longer block a debt-for-equity swap, shifting power towards creditors and new-money providers.
Name four transformation themes in restructuring.
For example: earlier intervention, creditor-led ownership, deeper NPL markets, data and analytics in workout, digital process infrastructure, and social and ESG considerations.
Why do banks increasingly need investor skills in their workout units?
Because they increasingly become temporary owners and new-money providers, roles that require valuation, governance and exit skills.
5
Why is delay the central risk in a restructuring?
No.
Right.
It is.
Not the core reason.
What changed with the 2021 French reform, as the cases showed?
The opposite.
No.
Right. Power shifted to creditors and new-money providers.
No.
What pattern do Orpea, Casino and Atos share?
No.
Right.
No.
Not the shared pattern.
Module Summary — The Six Ideas That Matter Most
If you retain only a handful of things, retain these. Each compresses a part of the module into a single, load-bearing idea.
Liquidity decides when; solvency decides what
A liquidity crisis usually triggers a restructuring; a solvency problem is usually its cause. Adding cash without reducing debt to a sustainable level postpones the next crisis. The 13-week cash forecast and the sustainable-debt estimate are the first two numbers of every case, and in France the date of cessation des paiements governs which procedures are open.
Value flows down by priority until it runs out at the fulcrum
Security, contractual subordination and structural subordination rank the claims. The class where value runs out — the fulcrum — usually becomes the new owner. Going-concern value usually exceeds liquidation value, and the gap is what a restructuring preserves; valuation is contested because it decides who is in and out of the money.
The toolkit runs from waivers to debt-for-equity
Standstills buy time; waivers and amend-and-extend fix timing problems; new money keeps the company alive and is protected by priority; haircuts and debt-for-equity swaps fix solvency. Lock-up agreements, backstops and consent fees organise support, and their economics are themselves contested.
Courts solve the collective action problem
Stays stop the race to enforce; class votes bind minorities within a class; cross-class cram-down binds dissenting classes subject to the best-interest test and absolute priority. In France, conciliation leads into accelerated safeguard, with classes of affected parties including shareholders since the 2021 reform; England and the US offer comparable tools.
The actors want different things, even with identical claims
Management stays in control under new duties; sponsors use time and leverage; creditors range from super-senior banks to unsecured suppliers, and distressed investors who bought at a discount behave differently from original lenders. Ad hoc groups, advisers, court officials and, inside each bank, workout, legal, finance and risk teams all shape the outcome.
Restructurings run on data, and delay destroys value
Liquidity models, valuations, claims registers, holder and voting trackers, restricted lists and NPL data tapes decide whether a plan can be done, approved and sold. Orpea, Casino and Atos showed the new French framework at scale, with creditors taking control. Earlier action, better data and investor skills are what protect a bank's recovery.
Process Cheat Sheet — A Restructuring on One Page
A single reference for a lender-led restructuring under French law. Everything below is developed in full in Part 2.
| Step | Core activity | Key output | Lead |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Warning | Earnings fall, revolver drawn, covenant tested | Covenant breach or near-miss | Company; lenders' monitoring |
| 2. Liquidity | 13-week forecast, cash levers | Runway, interim measures | Company's financial adviser |
| 3. Organisation | Advisers, ad hoc group, NDAs, standstill, conciliation | Negotiating framework | Company, creditors, conciliator |
| 4. Plan and value | Independent business review, valuation, waterfall | Sustainable debt, fulcrum | Advisers, valuation experts |
| 5. Proposals | Sponsor and creditor proposals compared | Preferred structure | Company, creditors, sponsor |
| 6. Lock-up | Signatures, consent fees | Support thresholds | Company's advisers, information agent |
| 7. New money | Interim financing, backstop | Liquidity to completion | Supporting creditors |
| 8. Court | Accelerated safeguard, classes, votes, cram-down | Approved plan | Administrator, court |
| 9. New structure | Debt reduced, swap implemented | New owners, sustainable debt | Company, new board |
| 10. Afterwards | Turnaround, governance, eventual sale | Value realised | New owners |
Key numbers to remember
| Metric | Rule of thumb |
|---|---|
| French filing deadline after cessation des paiements | 45 days, unless in conciliation |
| Conciliation duration | Up to 4 months, extendable by 1 |
| Accelerated safeguard duration | Up to 2 months, extendable by 2 |
| Class approval in French procedures | Two-thirds of votes cast in the class |
| Claim declaration deadline in France | Generally 2 months after publication of the opening judgment |
| Typical sustainable leverage for a stable industrial business | About 3x to 4x EBITDA |
| Cash-forecast horizon | 13 weeks, updated weekly |
| Forbearance probation, performing | At least 2 years |
| Cure period for forborne non-performing exposures | At least 1 year |
The one-sentence version
A restructuring shares a loss that has already happened: it measures what the business is worth, cuts its debt to what it can carry, gives the remaining value to the creditors in order of priority — usually making the fulcrum class the new owners — and uses the courts to bind those who would rather hold out, all before the delay itself destroys the value being shared.
Sources and further reading
Legal positions and market facts stated in this module reflect sources available in mid-2026. Insolvency law and its interpretation by courts change, so treat every rule below as a fact with a shelf life and check it before relying on it in client work.
How to read this section
The legal descriptions in this module are simplified for learning and are not legal advice. Where the module states a legal rule, the instrument is named below so it can be checked at source. Figures flagged as illustrative — the Vela case throughout and all worked examples — are invented to teach a mechanic. Facts about the Orpea, Casino and Atos cases are drawn from public reporting and court decisions; amounts are approximate.
Primary instruments referenced
| Short name used in the module | Instrument | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Restructuring Directive | Directive (EU) 2019/1023 | Preventive restructuring frameworks, classes, cram-down, new-financing protection |
| French reform | Ordinance No 2021-1193 of 15 September 2021 and implementing decree | Classes of affected parties, cross-class cram-down, reshaped safeguard procedures |
| French Commercial Code, Book VI | Code de commerce, articles L611-1 and following | Mandat ad hoc, conciliation, safeguard, redressement, liquidation |
| Credit servicers directive | Directive (EU) 2021/2167 | Sale and servicing of non-performing loans |
| CRR NPL backstop | Regulation (EU) 2019/630 | Minimum coverage of non-performing exposures |
| IFRS 9 and IFRIC 19 | IASB standards | Modification and derecognition; extinguishment of debt with equity |
| Market Abuse Regulation | Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 | Inside information, cleansing, wall-crossing |
| UK restructuring plan | Companies Act 2006, Part 26A, introduced in 2020 | English comparison |
| US Chapter 11 | US Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 | US comparison |
Dated facts and where they come from
The French reform transposing the Restructuring Directive applied to procedures opened from 1 October 2021. The pilot of the tribunal des activités économiques in a number of French courts began in 2025 under the 2023 justice programming law.
Orpea: public allegations in early 2022; conciliation in late 2022; accelerated safeguard in 2023; plan approved by the specialised commercial court of Nanterre in 2023, converting around 3.8 billion euros of unsecured debt into equity and raising around 1.5 billion euros of new equity. Casino: conciliation in 2023; plan approved by the Paris commercial court in early 2024, with a large new equity investment and several billion euros of debt converted or written off. Atos: conciliation and accelerated safeguard in 2024; plan approved by the specialised commercial court of Nanterre in late 2024, reducing debt by several billion euros. These figures are drawn from public reporting and should be checked against company announcements and court decisions before reuse.
Where to go deeper
For French law, the Commercial Code's Book VI and the commentaries published after the 2021 reform are the starting point, together with the judgments in the large cases of 2023–2024. For European comparison, the Restructuring Directive and national transpositions — the German StaRUG, the Dutch WHOA — show the range of implementations. For market practice, the publications of the professional associations of restructuring advisers and insolvency practitioners, and the Loan Market Association's materials on distressed trading, explain how the process works in practice. For non-performing loans, the EBA's NPL data templates and the ECB's guidance on NPLs set out supervisory expectations.