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4Debt Restructuring & Advisory

Watchlist, Workout and Restructuring · From "Will They Pay?" to "How Much Do We Get Back?"

When a company can no longer carry its debt: negotiate, restructure, recover.

Reading time
1 h 10
Sections
50
Exercises
21
Recall questions
31
Quiz questions
15
Its place in Corporate Banking
  1. Origination
  2. Structuring
  3. Credit Analysis & Rating
  4. Approval
  5. Execution & Booking
  6. Servicing
  7. Monitoring
  8. Workout & Exit
  • KYC
  • Compliance
  • Risk
  • Legal
  • Operations
  • Finance
  • Data
  • Technology
  • Reporting
  • Treasury / ALM

Bridges to Capital Markets & Securities Services

This module teaches debt restructuring from zero, but goes deep enough for a professional

It assumes no prior knowledge of distress or insolvency and builds every idea from its foundations. Yet it goes deep enough to be useful to someone who sits in a bank's workout unit, advises companies or creditors, trades distressed debt, or builds the systems that track a bank's non-performing book.

Wherever a concept is technical, we stop and explain it in plain language before using it again. Wherever a term is jargon, we define it once and then rely on it. French law is used as the main reference, because French procedures have been reshaped since 2021 and illustrate the European framework well; English and US procedures are introduced for comparison.

Two threads run through everything: the business and the technology

The business thread covers why companies become distressed, how lenders and owners negotiate, how a business is valued when its debt exceeds its worth, which legal procedures exist and what they allow, and how banks earn — or lose — money as lenders, new-money providers, advisers and sellers of distressed debt.

The technology thread covers the data a restructuring runs on: the claims register, the valuation and waterfall model, the lock-up and voting tracker, the restricted-information controls, the accounting for modified and converted debt, and the data tapes used to sell non-performing loans.

Where this module sits in the Corporate Banking track

This module continues the Financing block. The lifecycle module described the eighth stage of every loan — watchlist, workout and exit — from inside the bank, as a process with owners and controls. This module looks at the same territory as a business and a market: what a restructuring negotiation is, who sits at the table, what the courts can impose, and where banks play roles other than that of a creditor trying to recover its money.

It builds directly on the previous module. The running case is Vela Packaging, the company bought in a leveraged buyout in Corporate & Leveraged Finance, which now finds that it cannot carry the debt it was given.

How to read this module

Read it as a narrative, not a reference card

Each part assumes you have read the ones before it. If you are short on time, read the section titles and the "In a nutshell" boxes first. The titles are written to carry the argument on their own.

Each coloured box plays a fixed role

Key insight distils the one idea from a section worth remembering. Going deeper adds nuance, often on legal detail. IT & data lens connects the business step to the systems and data beneath it. Worked example grounds a mechanic in numbers. Watch out flags a common trap. In a nutshell closes a section. Common misconception names a plausible wrong answer and dismantles it. Practice sets out calculations and judgement calls. Explain it back asks you to teach the idea to someone outside finance.

One running case, from first warning to new owners

Three years after its buyout, Vela Packaging loses its largest customer and is hit by a spike in energy costs. EBITDA falls from 100 to 60 million euros, its revolving facility is fully drawn, a springing covenant is tested and breached, and cash will run out within a year. You will follow Vela from the first warning signs through a confidential conciliation, a lender-led restructuring plan, an accelerated safeguard procedure with classes of creditors, and a debt-for-equity swap that hands control from the private-equity sponsor to its lenders. Every number attached to Vela is invented to teach a mechanic.

The module is built to be worked, not only read

Practice boxes contain the calculations restructuring professionals actually make: a liquidity runway, a sustainable-debt estimate, a going-concern and a liquidation valuation, a recovery waterfall, a class vote, a best-interest test, the value split in a debt-for-equity swap. Attempt them before looking anything up. Explain it back, Common misconception and Check your understanding boxes work as in the earlier modules, with answers in the Answer Key.

A suggested path through the document

Four sessions work well. Part 1 sets out the economics of distress and the vocabulary. Part 2 follows Vela's restructuring and is the heart of the module. Parts 3 and 4 cover the actors and the systems. Part 5 covers the risks, three landmark French cases — Orpea, Casino and Atos — and the transformation agenda, and is the right moment to return to the practice boxes.

What you will master

You will understand why companies become distressed and how distress unfolds

You will know the difference between a liquidity crisis and a solvency crisis, why the first is often the trigger and the second the real problem, and how the signs appear in covenants, cash and markets.

You will be able to value a distressed business and share the value

You will be able to estimate sustainable debt, compute a going-concern and a liquidation value, and run a recovery waterfall that shows who gets what under each scenario.

You will know the restructuring toolkit

You will understand standstills, waivers, amend-and-extend, new money, haircuts, debt-for-equity swaps and asset sales, and when each fits.

You will understand the legal frameworks

You will know the French amicable and court procedures, how the 2021 reform introduced classes of affected parties and cross-class cram-down, and how the English restructuring plan and US Chapter 11 compare.

You will be able to map the actors and their incentives

You will understand the roles of the company, its owners, the different classes of creditors, the advisers, the court officials and the distressed-debt investors, and why each wants something different.

You will recognise the systems, data, risks and transformation themes

You will know the data a restructuring depends on, how banks account for modified and converted debt, how non-performing loans are sold, and how the market is changing.

1Context and the Big Picture

Before following a restructuring, you need to understand what distress is, why value must be measured and shared, and why the law offers a range of procedures between a friendly renegotiation and a liquidation. This part sets out the economics and the vocabulary.

Distress comes in two forms: liquidity and solvency

Running out of cash is not the same as owing too much

A company can be in trouble in two different ways. It can face a liquidity crisis: it does not have enough cash to pay what falls due in the coming weeks or months, even though its business might be worth more than its debts. Or it can face a solvency crisis: its debts exceed what the business is worth, so that even with unlimited time it could never repay them in full.

The two are often confused because they usually appear together. A liquidity crisis is typically the trigger: the moment when a payment cannot be made, a covenant breaks or a revolving facility is exhausted. A solvency problem is typically the cause: the company carries more debt than its earnings can support. Fixing the first without the second — finding new cash but leaving the debt untouched — simply postpones the next crisis.

The French legal test: cessation des paiements

French law defines insolvency through a liquidity test. A company is in cessation des paiements when it cannot meet its debts that are due and payable from its available assets — cash and immediately available credit lines. The date on which this happens matters greatly: it determines which procedures are open to the company, it triggers an obligation for the managers to file for insolvency within 45 days unless a conciliation is under way, and transactions entered into after that date can later be challenged.

Companies fail for operational and financial reasons

Two families of cause

Family Typical causes Example signs
Operational Loss of a major customer, cost inflation, technological change, poor management, failed expansion, fraud Falling margins, declining market share, delayed accounts
Financial Too much debt, debt maturing at a bad moment, rising interest rates, loss of supplier credit or factoring lines Covenant pressure, revolving facility fully drawn, widening debt prices
External shocks Pandemic, energy-price spike, sanctions, regulation Sudden sector-wide deterioration

Most real cases combine the families. A leveraged buyout financed at seven times EBITDA is financially fragile; an operational setback that would be a bad year for a lightly indebted company becomes a crisis. The restructuring must address both: an operational plan to restore earnings, and a financial plan to bring debt to a level those earnings can carry.

The signs appear in a recognisable order

Distress usually announces itself in sequence. Earnings fall, often first visible in management accounts. Covenant headroom shrinks. The company draws its revolving facility to build cash. Suppliers shorten payment terms or credit insurers cut cover, absorbing more cash. Debt trades below par in the secondary market and rating agencies downgrade. The company hires restructuring advisers. A covenant breaches or a payment is missed. The lifecycle module described how lenders' early-warning systems watch for each of these.

The capital structure decides who bears the loss

Priority is the organising principle

When a company is worth less than its debts, someone must take a loss. Who takes it depends on the ranking of each claim. The ranking comes from three sources.

Security: a creditor secured on specific assets has first claim on the value of those assets. Contractual subordination: some debt agrees in its documents, or in an intercreditor agreement, to rank behind other debt. Structural subordination: a creditor of a holding company ranks, for the assets of the operating subsidiaries, behind the creditors of those subsidiaries, because the holding company owns only shares.

The absolute priority rule

In principle, value flows down the capital structure like water through a series of buckets: each class must be repaid in full before the class below receives anything, and shareholders receive value only if every creditor has been paid. This is the absolute priority rule. In practice, negotiated restructurings often deviate from it — shareholders may keep a small stake to secure their cooperation, junior creditors may receive something to avoid litigation — and modern court procedures allow some deviations under conditions.

The fulcrum security

The class in which the value runs out is called the fulcrum security. Classes above it are repaid in full and are, in restructuring language, in the money. Classes below it receive nothing and are out of the money. The fulcrum class receives part of its claim in value, and usually becomes the new owner of the company, because it is the class with the most to gain from the business's future performance.

Figure 1 Value flows down the capital structure. The class in which it runs out — the fulcrum — usually becomes the new owner of the business.

Value must be measured before it can be shared

Going-concern value versus liquidation value

Every restructuring rests on a valuation, and there are two fundamentally different ones. Going-concern value is what the business is worth if it continues to operate, usually estimated from its sustainable earnings and the multiples paid for comparable businesses, or from discounted cash flows. Liquidation value, or gone-concern value, is what its assets would fetch if it stopped trading and they were sold off separately, net of the costs of the process.

Going-concern value is almost always higher, often much higher: a running business has customers, contracts, employees, know-how and brands that disappear in a liquidation. The gap between the two is the value that a successful restructuring preserves, and it is the main reason why creditors usually prefer a negotiated solution to enforcement.

Valuation is contested by design

Because value decides who gets what, every party has an incentive to argue for the valuation that favours it. Senior creditors, who expect to become owners, tend to argue for a low value, which means junior claims are out of the money and the seniors take the equity. Junior creditors and shareholders argue for a high value, which would put them in the money. The company's plan sits in between. Valuation disputes are therefore at the heart of contested restructurings, and court procedures provide tests — notably the best-interest-of-creditors test — to protect dissenting creditors.

Sustainable debt

The other number every restructuring needs is sustainable debt: how much debt the business can carry on its realistic future earnings, servicing interest and repaying principal without another restructuring. It is usually estimated as a multiple of sustainable EBITDA — for example 3.5x for a stable industrial business — tested against cash-flow projections. Debt above that level must be converted into equity, written off, or deferred into instruments that pay only if the business does well.

Consensual or court-supervised

The collective action problem

If every creditor could be persuaded to accept a fair share of the loss, restructurings would be quick and private. They rarely are, because of the collective action problem: each creditor is better off if the others accept losses while it is paid in full. A single holdout can block a consensual deal requiring unanimity, and creditors who rush to enforce their own rights can destroy the going-concern value that all of them share.

What courts add

Court-supervised procedures exist to solve that problem. They can impose a stay — a freeze on enforcement — so that no creditor can seize assets while a plan is negotiated. They can bind dissenting creditors in a class to a plan approved by a qualified majority of that class. And, since the reforms of recent years, they can in some conditions bind entire dissenting classes through a cross-class cram-down, subject to tests that protect them from being treated unfairly. The cost is publicity, time, legal expense and, for the company, a loss of control over the process.

A ladder from private to public

Rung Nature Typical tools
Bilateral renegotiation Private, consensual Waivers, covenant resets, amend-and-extend
Multi-creditor consensual deal Private, needs unanimity or contractual majorities Standstill, lock-up agreement, new money, debt-for-equity by consent
Confidential court-assisted procedure Private, court-appointed facilitator, no cram-down In France, mandat ad hoc and conciliation
Court restructuring with classes Public, binds dissenting creditors and classes In France, accelerated safeguard and safeguard; in England, restructuring plan; in the US, Chapter 11
Insolvency and liquidation Public, administrator or liquidator controls In France, redressement and liquidation judiciaires
Figure 2 The restructuring ladder. Moving up adds the power to bind dissenters, at the cost of privacy, time and control.

The European framework has converged since 2019

The Restructuring Directive

The EU Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks, adopted in 2019, required member states to offer companies in difficulty a procedure available before insolvency, in which the debtor keeps control, a stay can be granted, creditors are grouped into classes according to their interests, and a plan approved by a qualified majority in each class — or by enough classes, with protections for the others — can be imposed on dissenters. It also protects new financing provided to support a restructuring.

France transposed the Directive by an ordinance of September 2021, which rebuilt its safeguard procedures around classes of affected parties, including shareholders, and introduced a cross-class cram-down. Germany introduced its StaRUG framework in 2021, the Netherlands its WHOA scheme, and the United Kingdom, outside the EU, its Part 26A restructuring plan in 2020. The European restructuring landscape is therefore more convergent, and more creditor-powerful, than a decade ago.

Before 2021, French safeguard procedures relied on two creditors' committees — credit institutions and major suppliers — and bondholders' meetings, and shareholders could block a debt-for-equity swap by refusing to vote the necessary capital increase. Several restructurings were shaped by that shareholder veto. The 2021 reform treats shareholders as a class that can be crammed down when they are out of the money, which changed the balance of power decisively in favour of creditors and was tested in the large cases of 2023–2024 described in Part 5.

Banks play five roles in distress

Lender, new-money provider, adviser, trader and seller

A bank can meet a distressed company in five different roles. As an existing lender, it negotiates to protect its recovery, usually through its workout unit. As a new-money provider, it may lend fresh funds to keep the company alive during the restructuring, usually with priority over existing debt. As an adviser, its restructuring advisory team may advise the company or a group of creditors, for fees — though conflicts with its lending role often rule this out, and independent advisory firms dominate the market. As a trader, its distressed-debt desk may buy and sell the company's loans and bonds. And as a seller, it may decide to sell its exposure, alone or in a portfolio of non-performing loans, to an investor who will run the workout instead.

Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.

1.1 Liquidity or solvency

For each company, say whether the main problem is liquidity, solvency or both: a profitable company with net debt of 2x EBITDA whose 300 million euro bond matures next month in a closed market; a company with net debt of 9x EBITDA, 400 million euros of cash and no maturities for four years; a company with net debt of 8x EBITDA whose revolving facility is fully drawn and which has two months of cash.

The profitable company with a maturing bond has a liquidity problem: its leverage is sustainable, and it needs refinancing or a bridge. The company at 9x with ample cash and no maturities has a solvency problem without an immediate liquidity crisis: it has time, but its debt cannot be repaid. The company at 8x with a fully drawn revolver and two months of cash has both, and needs interim liquidity and a debt reduction.

1.2 Fulcrum

A company is worth 600 million euros. Its claims are a 100 million super-senior revolving facility, 400 million of senior secured loans, 200 million of second-lien loans and 150 million of unsecured notes. Identify the fulcrum, its recovery rate, and which classes are out of the money.

Of 600 million: the revolving facility takes 100 in full, leaving 500; the senior secured loans take 400 in full, leaving 100; the second-lien loans receive 100 of 200, a 50 per cent recovery, and are the fulcrum. The unsecured notes and the shareholders are out of the money.

1.3 Going concern or liquidation

In 1.2, liquidation would yield 350 million euros. Recompute each class's recovery, and state the value a restructuring preserves compared with a liquidation.

Of 350 million: the revolving facility takes 100, leaving 250; the senior secured loans receive 250 of 400, 62.5 per cent, and are now the fulcrum; the second-lien loans, the notes and the shareholders receive nothing. A restructuring preserves 600 − 350 = 250 million euros of value compared with a liquidation.

1.4 Sustainable debt

A company's sustainable EBITDA is 80 million euros. Comparable companies trade at 7x EBITDA and lenders consider 3.5x a sustainable leverage. Estimate the enterprise value and the sustainable debt. If the current debt is 520 million, how much must be converted, written off or deferred?

Enterprise value: 7 × 80 = 560 million. Sustainable debt: 3.5 × 80 = 280 million. With 520 million of debt, about 240 million must be converted into equity, written off or deferred into instruments that pay only if the business outperforms.

Explain to a friend who owns a small café why a business can be very valuable and still unable to pay its bills next month — and why the opposite can also be true.

      1. What is the difference between a liquidity crisis and a solvency crisis, and which usually triggers a restructuring?

      2. What is cessation des paiements, and why does its date matter?

      3. Name the three sources of ranking in a capital structure.

      4. What is the fulcrum security, and why does it often become the new owner?

      5. Why is going-concern value usually higher than liquidation value?

      6. What problem do court procedures solve, and with which three tools?

      7. Name the five roles in which a bank can meet a distressed company.

      1

      1. Which crisis usually triggers a restructuring?

      2. Why does the date of cessation des paiements matter?

      3. Which is NOT a source of ranking in a capital structure?

      2The End-to-End Flow

      This part follows Vela Packaging from the first warning to a new capital structure under new owners. Each step shows what the company, its sponsor and its lenders do, what they calculate, and where the law gives one side leverage over the other.

      Hold the whole restructuring in your head before the detail

      Ten steps over about nine months

      Step Vela timeline Key output
      1. Warning Year 3, months 1–2 Customer loss, energy shock, EBITDA falling to 60
      2. Liquidity first Month 2 13-week cash-flow forecast, runway of about four months
      3. Organising the creditors Months 2–3 Advisers appointed, coordinating committee, standstill, conciliation opened
      4. Business plan and valuation Months 3–4 Independent business review, going-concern and liquidation values
      5. Competing proposals Month 4 Sponsor proposal rejected; lender proposal preferred
      6. Lock-up Month 5 85% of term lenders and all RCF lenders signed
      7. New money Month 5 50 million euros of super-senior interim financing
      8. Court implementation Months 6–8 Accelerated safeguard, class votes, cram-down of the sponsor
      9. The new Vela Month 9 260 million of debt, lenders own the equity
      10. Afterwards Years 4–6 New board, operational plan, eventual sale by the new owners
      Figure 3 Vela's restructuring timeline. The first months are about cash and organisation; the plan itself takes shape only once both are under control.

      Step 1 — The warning signs arrive in sequence

      A customer, a cost shock and a covenant

      In the third year after its buyout, Vela loses its largest customer, a food group that moves its packaging in-house, and is hit by a sharp rise in energy costs that it cannot pass on quickly. Twelve-month EBITDA falls from about 100 million to 60 million euros.

      The signs follow the sequence described in Part 1. Management accounts show falling margins. Vela draws its 80 million euro revolving facility in full to build a cash buffer. Its credit insurers reduce cover on Vela's receivables, and suppliers shorten payment terms. The term loan, which traded at par a year earlier, falls to around 70 per cent of face value. Rating agencies downgrade Vela to CCC+.

      The springing covenant springs

      Vela's term loan is covenant-lite, but its revolving facility carries a springing leverage covenant tested when the facility is more than 40 per cent drawn. Fully drawn, the covenant is now tested — and breached.

      Step 2 — Liquidity first: how long does the cash last?

      The 13-week cash-flow forecast

      The first tool in any restructuring is a 13-week cash-flow forecast: a week-by-week projection of receipts and payments, updated every week and compared with actual results. It answers the most urgent question — when does the cash run out? — and becomes the basis for every negotiation about interim financing and standstills. Creditors almost always require one, and require it to be reviewed by an independent financial adviser.

      Figure 4 Vela's cash runway. The usable cash line crosses the minimum operating level in under five months; the quarterly interest payment brings the crisis forward.

      The first liquidity levers

      Before the main negotiation, the company pulls every lever that buys time: cutting discretionary capital expenditure, tightening receivables collection, negotiating with key suppliers, selling non-core assets, and asking lenders to defer interest. The lenders, for their part, want to see these levers pulled before they discuss anything else.

      Step 3 — Organising the creditors

      Advisers on every side

      Vela's board appoints a financial adviser — an independent restructuring adviser — and specialised restructuring lawyers. The term-loan lenders, who are mostly CLOs and loan funds, form an ad hoc group of the largest holders, holding together about 60 per cent of the term loan, which appoints its own legal and financial advisers. The revolving-facility banks, including our bank, coordinate through the agent. By market practice, the company pays the creditors' advisers' fees, which can be substantial.

      Information, restriction and cleansing

      To negotiate, the lenders in the ad hoc group must receive confidential information: the business plan, the cash forecast, the proposals. Receiving it makes them restricted: they may not trade Vela's debt while they hold material non-public information. Many funds prefer to stay unrestricted and trade, so the group's members sign non-disclosure agreements for a defined period, at the end of which the company cleanses them by publishing the key information, allowing them to trade again.

      Standstill and conciliation

      The lenders agree a standstill: they will not accelerate or enforce for a period, initially two months, while a solution is negotiated, in exchange for information rights and milestones. Vela's managers then ask the president of the commercial court to open a conciliation: a confidential procedure in which a court-appointed conciliator helps the company and its main creditors reach an agreement within a maximum of four months, extendable by one. Conciliation is available to a company that is not in cessation des paiements or has been so for less than 45 days; it is confidential, so customers and suppliers need not learn of the restructuring, and it can lead directly into an accelerated safeguard if a holdout blocks the deal.

      French law offers two confidential, amicable procedures. The mandat ad hoc has no time limit and no formal framework; a court-appointed mandataire helps the company negotiate. Conciliation is time-limited and more structured. An agreement reached in conciliation can be either acknowledged by the court president, which keeps it confidential, or approved (homologué) by the court, which makes it public but gives creditors who provided new money during the conciliation a privilege: priority over pre-existing claims if the company later enters a court procedure. That privilege is a key incentive for lenders to provide interim financing.

      Step 4 — The business plan and the valuation

      An independent business review

      The lenders will not negotiate on management's plan alone. An independent business review, prepared by an accounting or consulting firm, tests the plan: the customer pipeline, the cost-reduction programme, the energy-price assumptions, the capital needs. The reviewed plan projects EBITDA recovering to about 75 million euros within two years: lower than the buyout case, but with a credible path.

      Valuation and the waterfall

      Figure 5 Vela's recovery waterfall. Under both valuations the shareholders are out of the money and the term loan is the fulcrum; the gap between the two is the value a restructuring preserves.

      Step 5 — Competing proposals

      The sponsor's proposal

      Northgate, the sponsor, wants to keep Vela. It proposes to inject 60 million euros of new equity, in exchange for the term-loan lenders writing off 100 million euros, extending maturities by three years, and accepting part of their interest in kind — added to the principal rather than paid in cash — for two years. Northgate would keep 100 per cent of the equity.

      The lenders' proposal

      The ad hoc group counter-proposes a debt-for-equity swap. The revolving facility would be reinstated and extended. The lenders would provide 50 million euros of new super-senior money. The term loan would be reduced to 130 million of new, reinstated debt, and the remaining 355 million converted into the equity of Vela. Northgate's equity would be cancelled, apart from warrants that pay out only if Vela's value later exceeds twice the plan valuation.

      Step 6 — Locking up support

      The lock-up agreement

      Once the main terms are agreed, the supporting creditors sign a lock-up agreement: a contract in which they commit to support the restructuring, vote for it in any court procedure, and not sell their debt unless the buyer signs up to the same commitment. The company commits to implement the deal by set milestones. Lock-ups often offer a consent fee or an early-bird fee to creditors who sign by a deadline, encouraging others to join.

      Vela's lock-up is signed by holders of 85 per cent of the term loan and all the revolving-facility lenders. The remaining 15 per cent of the term loan is held by funds that hope to extract better terms by holding out. Under the loan agreement, a debt-for-equity swap and a reduction of principal require the consent of every affected lender. A consensual deal is therefore impossible. A court procedure is needed.

      Figure 6 Support for Vela's plan by creditor group. A contractual amendment needs every lender; a court class vote needs two-thirds of the votes cast in each class.

      Step 7 — New money keeps the company alive

      Interim financing and its priority

      Vela will run out of cash before the restructuring can be implemented. The lenders therefore provide interim financing: 50 million euros of new super-senior money, ranking ahead of all existing debt. In France, new money provided in a conciliation approved by the court, or during a safeguard procedure, benefits from a legal privilege that ranks it ahead of pre-existing claims if the company later fails — the main reason lenders are willing to provide it.

      Backstop and participation economics

      The new money is offered to all term-loan lenders pro rata. The ad hoc group backstops it: commits to provide any amount that other lenders do not take up, in exchange for a backstop fee. New-money providers also receive a share of the post-restructuring equity. These features make participating in the new money attractive and are a source of tension: lenders who cannot or will not provide new money see their share of the recovery diluted.

      Step 8 — Implementing through accelerated safeguard

      Why a court procedure

      Two obstacles stand in the way of a consensual deal: the 15 per cent holdout in the term loan, and the sponsor, whose shares must be cancelled. Since the 2021 reform, both can be overcome in an accelerated safeguard (sauvegarde accélérée), a short court procedure available to a company in conciliation that has prepared a plan likely to receive sufficient support. It lasts up to two months, extendable by two, and the company remains in control under the supervision of a court-appointed administrator.

      Classes of affected parties

      The administrator groups the affected parties — those whose rights the plan changes — into classes with a sufficient community of economic interest. For Vela, there are three classes: the revolving-facility lenders, secured and super senior; the term-loan lenders, secured and senior; and the shareholder, Northgate. Trade creditors, employees and others whose rights are not modified are not affected and do not vote.

      A class approves the plan if parties holding two-thirds of the votes cast vote in favour. The revolving-facility class approves unanimously. The term-loan class approves with 85 per cent. Northgate's class rejects.

      Cross-class cram-down

      The court can still approve the plan over the shareholder class's objection if the conditions of cross-class cram-down are met. In outline: the plan must be approved by a majority of classes including at least one class of secured or senior creditors, or by at least one in-the-money class other than shareholders; it must satisfy the best-interest test, meaning that no dissenting party is worse off than in a liquidation or the best alternative; and it must respect the absolute priority rule, so that a dissenting class is paid in full before a junior class receives anything, subject to limited exceptions. Shareholders can be crammed down when the valuation shows they are out of the money.

      Figure 7 Class voting and cross-class cram-down. Two of three classes approve; the dissenting shareholder class is out of the money under every valuation and is crammed down.

      Step 9 — The new Vela

      The capital structure after the plan

      Instrument Before After
      Revolving facility, super senior 80 (drawn) 80, extended by three years
      New money, super senior — 50
      Term loan 485 130, reinstated
      Total debt 565 260
      Leverage on sustainable EBITDA of 75 7.5x 3.5x
      Equity owners Northgate 100% Term lenders 80%, new-money providers 10% (plus backstop fee), management incentive plan 10%; Northgate warrants only
      Figure 8 Vela's capital structure before and after. Debt is cut by more than half; the term-loan lenders swap most of their claim for ownership.

      What the bank holds now

      Our bank held 10 million euros of the term loan and a third of the revolving facility. The revolving facility is reinstated in full and extended. The term-loan holding of 10 million becomes about 2.7 million of new term loan and a small equity stake. For accounting, the change is a substantial modification: the old loan is derecognised and the new loan and the shares are recognised at fair value, with any difference against the carrying amount — net of the provisions already booked in Stage 3 — taken to profit or loss. The equity stake attracts a higher capital charge than a loan, and the bank, which is not a natural owner of packaging companies, will want to sell it when Vela recovers.

      Step 10 — Afterwards: from lenders to owners

      A new board and an exit plan

      The new owners — mostly CLOs and loan funds — appoint a new board with independent directors and a restructuring-experienced chair, and implement the operational plan. Lenders are not long-term owners: their funds have limited lives, and CLOs face restrictions on holding equity. Within two to four years, if the plan succeeds, they will sell Vela to a strategic buyer or a new private-equity fund, realising the value they received in the swap. If it fails, a second restructuring — informally called a "Chapter 22" in the US — will follow.

      Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.

      2.1 Runway

      A company has 40 million euros of cash, needs 10 million to operate, and burns 4 million a month before a 12 million interest payment due in month three. When does it run out of usable cash?

      Usable cash: 30 million. After month 1: 26. After month 2: 22. Month 3, with the 12 million interest payment: 22 − 4 − 12 = 6. Month 4: 2. The company runs out of usable cash during month 5.

      2.2 Waterfall

      A company is worth 300 million euros as a going concern and 180 million in liquidation. Its debts are a 50 million super-senior facility, 280 million of senior secured loans and 100 million of unsecured notes. Compute each class's recovery in both scenarios and identify the fulcrum in each.

      Going concern, 300: super senior 50 in full, leaving 250; senior 250 of 280, about 89 per cent — the fulcrum; notes nothing. Liquidation, 180: super senior 50 in full, leaving 130; senior 130 of 280, about 46 per cent — the fulcrum; notes nothing.

      2.3 Class vote

      A class of senior lenders holds claims of 400 million euros. Holders of 300 million vote; 210 million vote in favour. Does the class approve? What if holders of 380 million vote and 240 million vote in favour?

      First case: 210 / 300 = 70 per cent of votes cast, above two-thirds: the class approves. Second case: 240 / 380 = 63 per cent: the class rejects.

      2.4 Best-interest test

      In 2.2, a plan offers the unsecured noteholders 5 per cent of the new equity, worth 4 million euros. Does the plan pass the best-interest test for that class if it dissents? Would cramming them down respect absolute priority if the senior lenders are not paid in full?

      The noteholders receive nothing in liquidation and 4 million under the plan, so the best-interest test is met for their class. Absolute priority protects a dissenting class from seeing a junior class receive value; cramming down the notes respects it as long as the shareholders, junior to them, receive nothing. Giving the notes value while the senior class is not paid in full is a deviation from absolute priority that the senior class can accept by approving the plan; if the senior class dissented, it could object to it.

      2.5 Equity split

      In Vela's plan, a lender holds 5 per cent of the term loan and provides 5 per cent of the new money. Ignoring the backstop fee, what share of Vela's equity does it receive, and what is its total recovery on its original term-loan holding, counting the new-money equity as part of the recovery?

      Equity received: 5% of the term lenders' 80 per cent = 4 per cent, plus 5% of the new-money providers' 10 per cent = 0.5 per cent, total 4.5 per cent. On a plan equity value of 230 million, worth about 10.4 million. New term loan: 5% × 130 = 6.5 million. Total recovery on the original holding of 5% × 485 = 24.25 million: (6.5 + 10.4) / 24.25 = about 70 per cent, compared with about 65 per cent for a lender that did not provide new money. Its 2.5 million of new money is repaid separately as super-senior debt.

      Explain to a friend who co-owns a flat with a large mortgage why, if the flat is worth less than the mortgage and the co-owners cannot pay, it makes sense for the bank to become the owner — and why the co-owners might still be offered something to leave without a fight.

          1. What does a 13-week cash-flow forecast answer, and why is it the first tool?

          2. Why do lenders in an ad hoc group become restricted, and how are they cleansed?

          3. What is the difference between an acknowledged and an approved conciliation agreement in France?

          4. What does a lock-up agreement commit its signatories to do?

          5. Why do lenders provide new money, and what protects it?

          6. How does a class approve a plan in French accelerated safeguard?

          7. Name the main conditions for a cross-class cram-down.

          2

          1. Why is the 13-week cash-flow forecast the first tool?

          2. How are restricted lenders in an ad hoc group “cleansed”?

          3. What does an approved (homologué) conciliation agreement give that an acknowledged one does not?

          3Roles, Actors, and Interactions

          Distress brings together people who never met when the loan was made: restructuring advisers, distressed-debt funds, court-appointed officials, valuation experts. This part names every actor at the table, explains what each one wants, and shows how their incentives shape the outcome.

          The company and its owners

          Management and the board

          The company's managers run the business and, in most European procedures, remain in control during a restructuring — the debtor-in-possession principle adopted by the EU Directive. But their duties shift. As the company approaches insolvency, directors must increasingly take creditors' interests into account; in France, managers who delay filing beyond the legal deadline, or who worsen the deficit through mismanagement, may be held personally liable for the shortfall. Boards in distress often appoint a chief restructuring officer, an interim executive experienced in turnarounds, to run the process alongside management.

          The shareholders

          For a sponsor-owned company, the shareholder is a professional investor with a portfolio view. Its options are to inject new equity and fight to keep the company, to negotiate a small stake or warrants in exchange for cooperation, or to walk away. Its leverage comes from time — delay costs everyone money — and, in jurisdictions where shareholder consent is still needed, from its vote. In listed companies, shareholders are numerous and dispersed, and their protection in a restructuring is often a political as well as a legal issue, as the French cases in Part 5 show.

          Creditors are not one group

          The creditor map

          Creditor Typical position What it wants
          Super-senior and RCF banks First-ranking, often relationship lenders Full recovery, reinstatement, minimal new commitments
          Senior secured lenders (banks, CLOs, funds) Usually the fulcrum The equity, governance, a business plan they believe
          Second-lien and high-yield bondholders Often out of the money or at the fulcrum A share of the equity, a high valuation
          Unsecured creditors and bondholders Usually out of the money Something rather than nothing
          Trade creditors and suppliers Unsecured, essential to operations To be paid and keep trading
          Employees and pension schemes Protected by law in part Jobs and wages
          Tax and social-security authorities Often privileged Payment; in France, special rules on public creditors
          Credit insurers Behind suppliers and receivables To cut or restore cover
          Lessors and landlords Contracts essential to operations Payment of rent and lease obligations

          Original lenders and distressed investors behave differently

          The lenders around the table in a restructuring are often not those who made the loan. As a company's debt falls in price, original lenders — banks, CLOs constrained by ratings — sell, and distressed-debt investors buy. These funds buy debt at a discount with a specific strategy: some to be repaid at a higher value, some to convert their debt into control of the company — a loan-to-own strategy — and some to extract value as holdouts. A bank that negotiates alongside such investors must understand that their purchase price, not the face value, drives their behaviour.

          Coordinating committees and ad hoc groups

          Organising many creditors

          When creditors are numerous, they organise. In bank-led syndicated loans, a coordinating committee of the largest banks negotiates on behalf of the syndicate. In loan and bond markets dominated by institutional investors, an ad hoc group of the largest holders forms and appoints its own advisers. Members commit to confidentiality and accept trading restrictions; in return, they shape the deal and often receive economic benefits such as backstop fees. Creditors outside the group — sometimes called the crossover or minority holders — may form their own group, particularly if they fear being disadvantaged.

          Cooperation and competition

          Creditors cooperate to preserve value and compete over its distribution. The tension shows up in valuation — seniors argue low, juniors argue high — in the allocation of new money and fees, and in liability-management attempts in which one group seeks priority over another, as the Corporate & Leveraged Finance module described. Agreement among creditors is often harder to reach than agreement between creditors and the company.

          Advisers are paid to restructure

          Financial advisers

          Independent restructuring advisers — specialised firms and the restructuring teams of investment banks — advise the company or creditor groups. For the company, they run the process, build the cash forecast and plan, design the new capital structure and negotiate. For creditors, they analyse the plan, value the business and negotiate the allocation. Fees are typically a monthly retainer plus a success fee on completion.

          In France, the market is led by specialist independent firms and the restructuring teams of advisory boutiques; universal banks often avoid company-side mandates because of conflicts with their lending books, while their workout teams sit on the creditor side.

          Legal, accounting and valuation advisers

          Restructuring lawyers structure the deal, draft the lock-up and plan, and run the court procedure. Accounting and consulting firms prepare independent business reviews, liquidity reviews and, sometimes, the role of chief restructuring officer. Valuation experts provide the valuations on which class formation, best-interest tests and cram-downs depend, and in contested cases on both sides.

          Court officials and the judge

          The French court cast

          Official Appointed by Role
          Mandataire ad hoc President of the commercial court Facilitates confidential negotiation, no time limit
          Conciliator President of the commercial court Facilitates confidential negotiation within four to five months
          Administrateur judiciaire Court, in safeguard or redressement Supervises or assists management, forms classes, organises votes
          Mandataire judiciaire Court Represents creditors' collective interest, verifies claims
          Juge-commissaire Court Supervises the procedure, decides on claims and certain transactions
          Commercial court — Opens procedures, approves or rejects plans, applies cram-down
          Public prosecutor — May intervene, notably on public-interest and employment issues

          The commercial courts, whose judges are elected business people, handle restructurings; the largest cases are concentrated in courts with specialised chambers. Since 2025, a number of courts have been piloting a renamed tribunal des activités économiques with a wider jurisdiction, as part of a broader reform of commercial justice.

          Other jurisdictions in brief

          In England, restructuring plans and schemes of arrangement are sanctioned by the High Court, with the company typically in control, and administration is run by insolvency practitioners. In the United States, Chapter 11 is run by the debtor-in-possession before a bankruptcy judge, with a statutory committee of unsecured creditors and the US Trustee overseeing the process.

          Banks inside the bank

          Workout, legal, finance and trading

          Inside a lending bank, a restructuring involves the workout unit, which owns the negotiation; legal, which reviews rights and documents; finance, which sets provisions and accounts for the outcome; risk, which approves the bank's position through the workout or NPL committee; and, if the bank decides to sell, the loan sales or distressed trading desk. The lifecycle module described these roles; here, the point is that the bank's negotiator must constantly reconcile the institution's capital, accounting and reputational constraints with the economic best answer.

          A bank's choices are shaped by accounting and capital. Selling a non-performing loan at 60 per cent crystallises a loss but releases capital and ends the cost of the workout. Converting debt into equity creates an equity exposure with a high capital charge. Providing new money increases exposure to a distressed borrower. Agreeing to forbearance keeps the loan flagged and subject to probation periods. A bank's workout negotiator who ignores these constraints will find the institution unwilling to sign the deal the negotiator has agreed.

          Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.

          3.1 Map the incentives

          For Vela's plan, state the likely position of: the revolving-facility banks, the ad hoc group of term lenders, a holdout fund that bought at 55, Northgate, Vela's main supplier and its employees.

          The revolving-facility banks want full recovery, reinstatement and limited new exposure, and will support a plan that achieves it. The ad hoc group wants the equity and governance, and drove the plan. The holdout fund, having bought at 55, gains from a 65 per cent recovery but may hold out for a better price. Northgate wants to keep its equity or extract value for its cooperation. The main supplier wants to keep being paid and trading. The employees want their jobs protected, and their representatives will be consulted.

          3.2 The restricted lender

          A CLO manager is invited to join Vela's ad hoc group. Explain what it gains and gives up, and what the company must do at the end of the restricted period.

          It gains influence over the deal and access to economic benefits such as backstop fees; it gives up the ability to trade the debt while restricted. At the end of the period the company must cleanse it by publishing all material non-public information shared.

          3.3 Bank constraints

          Our bank's workout negotiator agrees in principle to provide 5 million euros of new money and accept equity. List three internal approvals or checks needed before the bank can sign.

          Approval of the new money and equity by the workout or NPL committee within the bank's delegated authorities; finance's assessment of the accounting and provisioning impact, including derecognition; risk and capital review of the new exposure and the capital charge on the equity; legal review of the documents; compliance review of information barriers.

          3.4 Choose the adviser

          Vela's board considers appointing as financial adviser the restructuring team of one of its revolving-facility banks. What conflicts arise, and what would you recommend?

          The bank would advise the company in negotiations against its own lending book, and its restructuring team would have access to information relevant to the bank's credit position and trading. Recommendation: appoint an independent adviser with no lending exposure, and keep the bank's role confined to that of a creditor.

          Explain to a friend why two people who are owed exactly the same amount by the same company can want completely different outcomes from its restructuring.

              1. What is the debtor-in-possession principle?

              2. Name four types of creditor and what each typically wants.

              3. What is a loan-to-own strategy?

              4. What is the difference between a coordinating committee and an ad hoc group?

              5. What does an independent business review do?

              6. Name three French court officials and their roles.

              3

              1. What is the debtor-in-possession principle?

              2. What is a loan-to-own strategy?

              3. What do senior lenders at the fulcrum typically want?

              4Systems, Data, and IT

              A restructuring is fought with numbers and documents. This part opens the models, registers and controls a restructuring depends on: the cash forecast, the valuation and waterfall, the claims register, the holder and voting data, the information barriers, the accounting for modified and converted debt, and the data tapes used to sell non-performing loans.

              The restructuring runs on six data objects

              What every party needs to know

              Data object Question it answers Typical owner
              Liquidity model How long does the cash last, week by week? Company's financial adviser
              Business plan model What can the business earn, under which assumptions? Company, tested by the independent business review
              Valuation and waterfall model What is the business worth, and who recovers what? Advisers on each side; valuation experts
              Claims register Who is owed how much, with what ranking and security? Agent, administrator, mandataire judiciaire
              Holder, lock-up and voting tracker Who holds the debt now, who has signed, how will each class vote? Company's advisers, information agent
              Restricted list and data room log Who has received what confidential information, and when? Each institution's compliance; data-room provider
              Figure 9 The restructuring data objects. Each feeds the negotiation, and each must be reconciled with the others before a court will approve a plan.

              The liquidity model is updated weekly and trusted by no one until tested

              From forecast to variance report

              The 13-week cash-flow forecast is not a one-off document. Each week the company compares actual receipts and payments with the forecast, explains the variances, and rolls the forecast forward. Lenders' advisers review every variance report. Standstill and new-money agreements typically include liquidity covenants — minimum cash balances, maximum negative variances — tested on these reports. The forecast therefore becomes a contractual instrument as well as a management tool.

              Data quality is the first battle

              Distressed companies often discover that they cannot produce a reliable weekly cash view: bank accounts spread across many banks and countries, payments decided locally, receivables financed through factoring programmes whose flows are hard to trace. Building a credible liquidity model frequently starts with consolidating bank-account data across the group — a cash-management problem as much as a restructuring one.

              Valuation and waterfall models must be defensible in court

              Inputs, scenarios and audit trail

              The valuation and waterfall model takes the business plan, applies valuation methods — comparable multiples, discounted cash flows, precedent transactions, and liquidation analysis — and runs value through the capital structure under several scenarios. In a negotiated deal, it supports the allocation. In a contested court procedure, it becomes evidence. Its assumptions, sources and versions must therefore be documented and traceable, and the model must be able to show, for each class, the recovery under the plan and under the best alternative.

              Holder, lock-up and voting data decide whether a deal can be done

              Who holds the debt?

              At the start of a restructuring, the company often does not know who owns its debt. Bondholders are hidden behind custodians and clearing systems; loan holders change daily as the debt trades. Advisers use the agent's register, bondholder identification exercises and market intelligence to map the holders and estimate how a vote might go.

              Tracking support

              Once a lock-up is launched, an information agent or the company's advisers track signatures: who has signed, for how much, under which class, by which deadline for early-bird fees. The tracker shows in real time whether the thresholds for a consensual deal or for class approval in court are within reach, and which holders to call.

              Information barriers protect the market and the bank

              Restricted lists, wall-crossings and cleansing

              Creditors who receive confidential information must not trade on it. Each institution's compliance function maintains a restricted list of names its traders may not deal in, and records every wall-crossing — the moment an individual is given inside information. Data rooms log who downloaded which document and when. At the end of a restricted period, the company publishes a cleansing announcement containing the material information shared, so that recipients can trade again.

              For a bank with a workout team on the creditor committee and a trading desk in the same name, these controls are essential: the Market Abuse Regulation applies to loans whose borrower has listed securities, and to bonds directly.

              Non-performing loan sales run on data tapes

              Selling distressed exposures

              A bank that prefers not to work out a loan itself can sell it, individually or in a portfolio. Portfolio sales are run as auctions: the bank prepares a data tape — loan-by-loan data on balances, borrowers, collateral, payment history, legal status and recovery actions — and investors price the portfolio from it. The quality of the tape largely determines the price: missing collateral data, unclear legal status or inconsistent balances lead investors to discount for uncertainty.

              Standardised templates

              To deepen the European market for non-performing loans, the EBA published standardised NPL data templates, and the EU Directive on credit servicers and credit purchasers, transposed by the end of 2023, made standardised information requirements part of the legal framework for sales. Banks with clean, template-ready data on their non-performing books can sell faster and at better prices.

              The fields required for an NPL data tape are largely the fields the lifecycle module said the bank should already hold: the facility hierarchy, collateral and valuations, guarantees, the forbearance and default history, the legal procedure and the recovery cash flows. A bank that maintains these as structured data while a loan is performing can prepare a sale in weeks; a bank that must reconstruct them from files and emails needs months and accepts a lower price.

              Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.

              4.1 Votes

              A class has claims of 600 million euros. Lock-up signatories hold 380 million. Holders of 520 million vote, all signatories in favour. Does the class approve? How much additional support, in claims voting in favour, would be needed if holders of 580 million voted and only signatories voted in favour?

              First case: 380 / 520 = 73 per cent: the class approves. Second case: two-thirds of 580 is about 386.7 million, so about 6.7 million of additional claims voting in favour would be needed.

              4.2 Register reconciliation

              List three reasons why the agent's register of lenders of record might differ from the list of economic holders on the record date.

              Trades agreed but not yet settled; sub-participations, in which the lender of record passes the economics to another party; and transfers that need consents not yet obtained. Duplicate or erroneous claim declarations can add further differences with the claims register.

              4.3 Modification or derecognition

              For each change, say whether IFRS 9 is likely to treat it as a modification or a substantial modification: a two-year maturity extension with a 0.25 per cent margin increase; conversion of 70 per cent of the loan into shares; replacement of a cash-pay loan by a payment-in-kind instrument with equity warrants.

              The maturity extension with a small margin increase is likely a modification, with a modification gain or loss. The conversion of 70 per cent into shares is a substantial modification, leading to derecognition. The replacement by a payment-in-kind instrument with warrants is likely substantial, because the nature of the instrument changes; the conclusion depends on the facts and the quantitative and qualitative tests.

              4.4 Data tape

              Name eight fields an NPL buyer would expect for each corporate loan, and explain why missing collateral data lowers the price.

              Borrower identifiers; outstanding principal and accrued interest; facility type and currency; origination and maturity dates; collateral type, value and valuation date; guarantees; ranking and security; payment history and days past due; forbearance history; legal status and procedure; recovery cash flows to date. Missing collateral data forces buyers to assume the worst about the second way out, so they discount the price for the uncertainty.

              Explain to a friend why selling a pile of bad loans is a little like selling a used car without its service history — and what the bank could have done years earlier to get a better price.

                  1. Name the six data objects a restructuring depends on.

                  2. How does the 13-week forecast become a contractual instrument?

                  3. What is the claims register, and who keeps it in a French procedure?

                  4. What is a cleansing announcement, and why must it be complete?

                  5. How does a lender account for a debt-for-equity swap under IFRS 9?

                  6. Why does the quality of a data tape determine the price of an NPL portfolio?

                  4

                  1. Who prepares the claims register in a French procedure?

                  2. How does the 13-week forecast become contractual?

                  3. Which is NOT one of the six data objects of a restructuring?

                  5Risks, Pain Points, and Transformation

                  Restructurings fail in characteristic ways: they start too late, they fix liquidity but not solvency, they become valuation wars, or the creditors fight each other instead of the problem. This part maps those risks, studies three landmark French cases that applied the 2021 reform at scale, and sets out how the restructuring market is changing.

                  A MECE map of restructuring risk

                  Seven ways a restructuring destroys value

                  Risk What goes wrong Consequence
                  Late action Negotiation starts when cash is almost gone Fewer options, forced sales, insolvency
                  Liquidity-only fix New money without debt reduction Second restructuring within a few years
                  Valuation dispute Parties cannot agree on value Delay, litigation, contested cram-down
                  Intercreditor conflict Creditor groups fight over priority and allocation Holdouts, liability-management manoeuvres, value leakage
                  Operational erosion Customers, suppliers and staff leave during the uncertainty Going-concern value falls while the parties negotiate
                  Execution and legal risk Plan rejected, challenged or not recognised abroad Delay, return to square one
                  Social and political risk Jobs, public services or strategic activities at stake Public intervention, conditions on the plan
                  Figure 10 Restructuring risks by when they bite. Late action and operational erosion compound each other: every month of delay reduces the value there is to share.

                  The cost of delay is the central risk

                  Almost every risk in the table is worsened by time. Advisers' fees accumulate, management is distracted, customers hedge by moving business to competitors, suppliers demand cash on delivery, and key employees leave. The value of the business that is being negotiated over falls while the negotiation continues. The design of modern procedures — short accelerated safeguards, stays, cram-downs — is an attempt to compress the time between recognising the problem and implementing the solution.

                  Three French cases tested the new framework

                  Orpea, Casino and Atos

                  Between 2023 and 2024, three of the largest French corporate restructurings in decades used the procedures introduced by the 2021 reform, each with classes of affected parties and the cram-down of existing shareholders. They are drawn here from public reporting and court decisions; figures are approximate and should be checked at source before reuse.

                  Orpea, 2022–2023 — when a reputational crisis became a solvency crisis

                  What happened

                  Orpea, a listed operator of nursing homes and clinics, was hit in early 2022 by public allegations about the treatment of residents and its management practices. Its share price collapsed, investigations followed, and a review of its accounts led to large write-downs. With debts of several billion euros, it opened a conciliation in late 2022 and reached an agreement in early 2023 with a consortium led by the Caisse des Dépôts and with a group of its unsecured creditors.

                  The plan was implemented through an accelerated safeguard. It converted around 3.8 billion euros of unsecured debt into equity and raised about 1.5 billion euros of new equity, mainly from the consortium, which became the controlling shareholder. The shareholders' class rejected the plan; the specialised commercial court of Nanterre approved it in mid-2023 using cross-class cram-down, and existing shareholders were diluted to a fraction of one per cent.

                  Root cause

                  An operational and reputational crisis exposed a business model that carried very high debt, much of it tied to a large real-estate portfolio. Once confidence in the business and its accounts collapsed, refinancing became impossible and the debt was unsustainable.

                  The lesson

                  The reform's shareholder cram-down was tested at scale on a listed company. The case showed that out-of-the-money shareholders could no longer block a debt-for-equity swap, and that the valuation supporting the cram-down would be scrutinised in court and by the public.

                  Casino, 2023–2024 — when a long refinancing struggle ended in a change of control

                  What happened

                  Groupe Casino, a French food retailer with a complex holding structure controlled by its long-time chairman, had spent years selling assets and refinancing a heavy debt load. In 2023 its liquidity deteriorated and it opened a conciliation. The resulting plan, backed by a consortium including investors led by Daniel Křetínský, involved a large new equity investment and the conversion or write-off of several billion euros of debt. It was implemented through an accelerated safeguard, approved by the Paris commercial court in early 2024. The historic controlling shareholder lost control, and existing shareholders were heavily diluted.

                  Root cause

                  High leverage at both the operating company and its holding structure, a weakening competitive position and repeated refinancing rather than a decisive reduction of debt.

                  The lesson

                  A succession of liquidity fixes — asset sales, short-term refinancing — can delay but not avoid a solvency problem. The longer the delay, the more of the value passes from the original owners to the new money and the creditors.

                  Atos, 2024 — when creditors took control of a strategic company

                  What happened

                  Atos, a French IT services group with activities considered strategic by the state, including supercomputing and defence-related work, faced a liquidity crisis in 2024 after losses, failed disposal plans and approaching debt maturities. After a conciliation in which competing offers from industrial and financial investors were considered, a plan led by its banks and bondholders was chosen. It reduced the group's debt by several billion euros through conversion into equity, provided new money from creditors, and was implemented through an accelerated safeguard approved by the specialised commercial court of Nanterre in late 2024. Creditors became the main shareholders, and existing shareholders were heavily diluted. The French state obtained specific rights over certain sensitive activities.

                  Root cause

                  A business in transition, with declining legacy activities, high debt, and a strategy that changed several times while the balance sheet weakened.

                  The lesson

                  Creditor-led restructurings can be applied to strategically sensitive companies, but the state's interests become part of the negotiation. For banks, the case illustrated the full range of roles in one file: lender, new-money provider and, eventually, shareholder.

                  In the English and US systems, similar outcomes are reached through different tools. The English restructuring plan, introduced in 2020, allows cross-class cram-down with a "no worse off" test against the relevant alternative, and the courts have developed extensive case law on how value should be shared. US Chapter 11 offers the debtor-in-possession, debtor-in-possession financing with super-priority, sales of assets free of liabilities, and plans confirmed over dissenting classes subject to the absolute priority rule. Large European groups with English-law or New York-law debt sometimes use these procedures, alone or alongside a French one, which raises questions of cross-border recognition.

                  Six transformation themes

                  What is changing in restructuring

                  Theme What it means Why it matters
                  Earlier intervention Early-warning systems and pre-insolvency procedures used sooner Preserves more going-concern value
                  Creditor-led ownership Lenders and funds routinely becoming owners through swaps Changes the role of banks and the skills they need
                  Deeper NPL markets Standardised data, regulated credit servicers, more buyers Banks can choose to sell rather than work out
                  Data and analytics in workout Recovery prediction, strategy choice based on historical outcomes Better and faster decisions, better LGD models
                  Digital process infrastructure Electronic claims declaration, voting platforms, digital data rooms Faster, more accurate votes and registers
                  Social and ESG considerations Employment, public services, strategic autonomy in the plan Plans must be acceptable beyond the creditors

                  Using the bank's own recovery data

                  Banks hold years of data on what happened to their distressed exposures: which strategies were chosen, how long they took, what was recovered and at what cost. Analysed systematically, this data can predict which approach is likely to maximise recovery for a given profile of borrower and collateral, sharpen LGD models and provisions, and show which early-warning signals preceded the largest losses. Few banks yet use it fully, because it lives in case files rather than structured data — the same message as in every module of the track.

                  Banks' changing role

                  As creditor-led restructurings become the norm, banks increasingly find themselves as temporary shareholders, new-money providers and members of ad hoc groups alongside funds with different horizons. The skills required — valuation, negotiation, governance, exit planning — are closer to those of an investor than of a lender. Banks that build these skills in their workout units, or that sell their exposures early to those who have them, protect their recoveries; those that do neither tend to be the creditors who are crammed down or diluted.

                  Figure 11 Building restructuring capability in three phases: data on the distressed book, then process and market access, then analytics and investor skills.

                  Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.

                  5.1 Name the risk

                  For each, name the risk from the table in this part: a plan provides 100 million euros of new money but leaves leverage at 8x; two creditor groups spend six months litigating over priority; during a nine-month negotiation, the company loses two major customers; a plan is approved in France but not recognised in a jurisdiction where key assets sit.

                  New money leaving leverage at 8x: liquidity-only fix. Six months of priority litigation: intercreditor conflict. Losing customers during negotiation: operational erosion. Non-recognition abroad: execution and legal risk.

                  5.2 Cost of delay

                  A company's going-concern value is 500 million euros and falls by 2 per cent a month while creditors negotiate; advisers' fees are 3 million a month. Compare the value available to creditors after a three-month and a nine-month negotiation.

                  After three months: 500 × 0.98³ = about 470.6 million, minus 9 million of fees: about 462 million. After nine months: 500 × 0.98⁹ = about 416.8 million, minus 27 million: about 390 million. Six extra months of negotiation cost about 72 million euros of value.

                  5.3 Lessons from the cases

                  For each of Orpea, Casino and Atos, name one idea from Parts 1 to 4 of this module that the case illustrates.

                  Orpea: the cram-down of out-of-the-money shareholders under the 2021 reform, and the importance of the valuation behind it. Casino: liquidity-only fixes delaying a solvency solution. Atos: competing proposals and the role of creditors as new-money providers and new owners, with the state's interests in the negotiation.

                  5.4 Sell or work out

                  A bank holds a 40 million euro exposure to a distressed company. A buyer offers 55 per cent today. The bank's workout team estimates a 65 per cent recovery in two years, with costs of 1 million, and the bank's cost of capital is 10 per cent a year. Compare the two options in present-value terms and name two non-financial considerations.

                  Sale: 55% × 40 = 22 million today. Workout: 65% × 40 = 26 million in two years, less 1 million of costs, 25 million, discounted at 10 per cent for two years: 25 / 1.21 = about 20.7 million. The sale is better in present-value terms. Non-financial considerations: the relationship with the company and its other lenders, the reputational effect of selling to an aggressive buyer, the capital and provisioning impact, and the uncertainty of the 65 per cent estimate.

                  Explain to a relative why, when a large well-known French company was restructured, its shareholders ended up owning almost nothing while its lenders became the owners — and why the court allowed it.

                      1. Why is delay the central risk in a restructuring?

                      2. What pattern do the Orpea, Casino and Atos cases share?

                      3. What did the cases show about the effect of the 2021 reform?

                      4. Name four transformation themes in restructuring.

                      5. Why do banks increasingly need investor skills in their workout units?

                      5

                      1. Why is delay the central risk in a restructuring?

                      2. What changed with the 2021 French reform, as the cases showed?

                      3. What pattern do Orpea, Casino and Atos share?

                      Module Summary — The Six Ideas That Matter Most

                      If you retain only a handful of things, retain these. Each compresses a part of the module into a single, load-bearing idea.

                      Liquidity decides when; solvency decides what

                      A liquidity crisis usually triggers a restructuring; a solvency problem is usually its cause. Adding cash without reducing debt to a sustainable level postpones the next crisis. The 13-week cash forecast and the sustainable-debt estimate are the first two numbers of every case, and in France the date of cessation des paiements governs which procedures are open.

                      Value flows down by priority until it runs out at the fulcrum

                      Security, contractual subordination and structural subordination rank the claims. The class where value runs out — the fulcrum — usually becomes the new owner. Going-concern value usually exceeds liquidation value, and the gap is what a restructuring preserves; valuation is contested because it decides who is in and out of the money.

                      The toolkit runs from waivers to debt-for-equity

                      Standstills buy time; waivers and amend-and-extend fix timing problems; new money keeps the company alive and is protected by priority; haircuts and debt-for-equity swaps fix solvency. Lock-up agreements, backstops and consent fees organise support, and their economics are themselves contested.

                      Courts solve the collective action problem

                      Stays stop the race to enforce; class votes bind minorities within a class; cross-class cram-down binds dissenting classes subject to the best-interest test and absolute priority. In France, conciliation leads into accelerated safeguard, with classes of affected parties including shareholders since the 2021 reform; England and the US offer comparable tools.

                      The actors want different things, even with identical claims

                      Management stays in control under new duties; sponsors use time and leverage; creditors range from super-senior banks to unsecured suppliers, and distressed investors who bought at a discount behave differently from original lenders. Ad hoc groups, advisers, court officials and, inside each bank, workout, legal, finance and risk teams all shape the outcome.

                      Restructurings run on data, and delay destroys value

                      Liquidity models, valuations, claims registers, holder and voting trackers, restricted lists and NPL data tapes decide whether a plan can be done, approved and sold. Orpea, Casino and Atos showed the new French framework at scale, with creditors taking control. Earlier action, better data and investor skills are what protect a bank's recovery.

                      Process Cheat Sheet — A Restructuring on One Page

                      A single reference for a lender-led restructuring under French law. Everything below is developed in full in Part 2.

                      Step Core activity Key output Lead
                      1. Warning Earnings fall, revolver drawn, covenant tested Covenant breach or near-miss Company; lenders' monitoring
                      2. Liquidity 13-week forecast, cash levers Runway, interim measures Company's financial adviser
                      3. Organisation Advisers, ad hoc group, NDAs, standstill, conciliation Negotiating framework Company, creditors, conciliator
                      4. Plan and value Independent business review, valuation, waterfall Sustainable debt, fulcrum Advisers, valuation experts
                      5. Proposals Sponsor and creditor proposals compared Preferred structure Company, creditors, sponsor
                      6. Lock-up Signatures, consent fees Support thresholds Company's advisers, information agent
                      7. New money Interim financing, backstop Liquidity to completion Supporting creditors
                      8. Court Accelerated safeguard, classes, votes, cram-down Approved plan Administrator, court
                      9. New structure Debt reduced, swap implemented New owners, sustainable debt Company, new board
                      10. Afterwards Turnaround, governance, eventual sale Value realised New owners

                      Key numbers to remember

                      Metric Rule of thumb
                      French filing deadline after cessation des paiements 45 days, unless in conciliation
                      Conciliation duration Up to 4 months, extendable by 1
                      Accelerated safeguard duration Up to 2 months, extendable by 2
                      Class approval in French procedures Two-thirds of votes cast in the class
                      Claim declaration deadline in France Generally 2 months after publication of the opening judgment
                      Typical sustainable leverage for a stable industrial business About 3x to 4x EBITDA
                      Cash-forecast horizon 13 weeks, updated weekly
                      Forbearance probation, performing At least 2 years
                      Cure period for forborne non-performing exposures At least 1 year

                      The one-sentence version

                      A restructuring shares a loss that has already happened: it measures what the business is worth, cuts its debt to what it can carry, gives the remaining value to the creditors in order of priority — usually making the fulcrum class the new owners — and uses the courts to bind those who would rather hold out, all before the delay itself destroys the value being shared.

                      Sources and further reading

                      Legal positions and market facts stated in this module reflect sources available in mid-2026. Insolvency law and its interpretation by courts change, so treat every rule below as a fact with a shelf life and check it before relying on it in client work.

                      How to read this section

                      The legal descriptions in this module are simplified for learning and are not legal advice. Where the module states a legal rule, the instrument is named below so it can be checked at source. Figures flagged as illustrative — the Vela case throughout and all worked examples — are invented to teach a mechanic. Facts about the Orpea, Casino and Atos cases are drawn from public reporting and court decisions; amounts are approximate.

                      Primary instruments referenced

                      Short name used in the module Instrument Relevance
                      Restructuring Directive Directive (EU) 2019/1023 Preventive restructuring frameworks, classes, cram-down, new-financing protection
                      French reform Ordinance No 2021-1193 of 15 September 2021 and implementing decree Classes of affected parties, cross-class cram-down, reshaped safeguard procedures
                      French Commercial Code, Book VI Code de commerce, articles L611-1 and following Mandat ad hoc, conciliation, safeguard, redressement, liquidation
                      Credit servicers directive Directive (EU) 2021/2167 Sale and servicing of non-performing loans
                      CRR NPL backstop Regulation (EU) 2019/630 Minimum coverage of non-performing exposures
                      IFRS 9 and IFRIC 19 IASB standards Modification and derecognition; extinguishment of debt with equity
                      Market Abuse Regulation Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 Inside information, cleansing, wall-crossing
                      UK restructuring plan Companies Act 2006, Part 26A, introduced in 2020 English comparison
                      US Chapter 11 US Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 US comparison

                      Dated facts and where they come from

                      The French reform transposing the Restructuring Directive applied to procedures opened from 1 October 2021. The pilot of the tribunal des activités économiques in a number of French courts began in 2025 under the 2023 justice programming law.

                      Orpea: public allegations in early 2022; conciliation in late 2022; accelerated safeguard in 2023; plan approved by the specialised commercial court of Nanterre in 2023, converting around 3.8 billion euros of unsecured debt into equity and raising around 1.5 billion euros of new equity. Casino: conciliation in 2023; plan approved by the Paris commercial court in early 2024, with a large new equity investment and several billion euros of debt converted or written off. Atos: conciliation and accelerated safeguard in 2024; plan approved by the specialised commercial court of Nanterre in late 2024, reducing debt by several billion euros. These figures are drawn from public reporting and should be checked against company announcements and court decisions before reuse.

                      Where to go deeper

                      For French law, the Commercial Code's Book VI and the commentaries published after the 2021 reform are the starting point, together with the judgments in the large cases of 2023–2024. For European comparison, the Restructuring Directive and national transpositions — the German StaRUG, the Dutch WHOA — show the range of implementations. For market practice, the publications of the professional associations of restructuring advisers and insolvency practitioners, and the Loan Market Association's materials on distressed trading, explain how the process works in practice. For non-performing loans, the EBA's NPL data templates and the ECB's guidance on NPLs set out supervisory expectations.