This module teaches treasury and ALM from the corporate banker's side
It assumes no prior knowledge of asset-liability management and builds every idea from its foundations. Yet it goes deep enough to be useful to someone who prices a corporate loan, structures a revolving facility, negotiates deposit rates with a treasurer, defends a deal's profitability in a pricing committee, or builds the tools that compute what a client relationship really earns.
Wherever a concept is technical, we stop and explain it in plain language before using it again. Wherever a term is jargon, we define it once and then rely on it.
How this module differs from the Treasury & Funding module of the CIB series
The CIB series already contains a module on Treasury and Funding that explains the bank's treasury from the inside: how it issues bonds, builds the transfer-pricing curve, manages the liquidity buffer, measures interest rate risk in the banking book and plans loss-absorbing debt, with the failures of Silicon Valley Bank, Credit Suisse and Northern Rock as case studies. This module does not repeat that material. It looks at the same machinery from the corporate bank's side of the desk: what treasury's charges and constraints mean for a term loan, a revolving facility, a trade line or a corporate deposit; how the corporate bank's balance sheet behaves; how a relationship's profitability is measured once every balance-sheet cost is allocated; and how corporate bankers and treasury negotiate when their objectives conflict.
Two threads run through everything: the business and the technology
The business thread covers funds transfer pricing applied to corporate products, the liquidity cost of undrawn commitments, the value of corporate deposits, the interest rate risk created by fixed-rate loans and prepayments, capital consumption under the final Basel III rules, and deal and relationship profitability measures such as RAROC.
The technology thread covers the pricing tools that corporate bankers use before quoting, the FTP and profitability engines that allocate costs to each deal, the data on facility usage and deposit behaviour that feeds behavioural models, and the dashboards through which the corporate bank and treasury steer the balance sheet together.
Where this module sits in the Corporate Banking track
Treasury and ALM sit among the shared enablers of the Corporate Banking track, alongside risk, compliance, legal, operations, finance, data and technology. They touch every product of the Financing and Transaction Banking blocks: the loans of the financing modules, the commitments of the lifecycle and agency modules, the trade lines and deposits of the transaction banking modules. The two enabler modules that follow cover risk, compliance and legal, then operations, finance, data, technology and reporting.
How to read this module
Read it as a narrative, not a reference card
Each part assumes you have read the ones before it. If you are short on time, read the section titles and the "In a nutshell" boxes first.
Each coloured box plays a fixed role
The boxes play the same roles as in the earlier modules: Key insight, Going deeper, IT & data lens, Worked example, Watch out, In a nutshell, Common misconception, Practice and Explain it back.
One running case: what the Helion relationship really earns
Our bank's Corporate Banking division holds about 80 billion euros of corporate loans, 60 billion of corporate deposits and 50 billion of undrawn commitments. Its largest relationships include Helion Industries, for which the bank provides a 100 million euro share of a revolving facility, a new 150 million euro five-year term loan, trade lines, the cash management mandate described in the previous module, and around 300 million euros of deposits. The relationship manager must answer a question from the pricing committee: does the Helion relationship earn its cost of capital, and if not, what would make it do so? Every number is invented to teach a mechanic.
The module is built to be worked, not only read
Practice boxes contain the calculations corporate bankers and ALM analysts actually make: the net margin of a loan after transfer pricing, the liquidity cost of an undrawn facility, the value of operational deposits, the break cost of a fixed-rate prepayment, the interest rate sensitivity of an unhedged loan, the effect of the output floor, and the RAROC of a loan and of a whole relationship.
A suggested path through the document
Four sessions work well: Part 1, the corporate bank's balance sheet and the four costs of a loan; Part 2, pricing loans, commitments and deposits end to end, in two sittings; Parts 3 and 4, the actors, governance and systems; Part 5, two episodes and the transformation agenda.
What you will master
You will understand the four balance-sheet costs of corporate products
You will know how funding, liquidity, interest rate risk and capital each attach a cost to a loan, a commitment or a deposit, and how treasury charges them to the business.
You will be able to price a loan the way the bank does
You will build a loan price from its transfer price, liquidity premium, expected loss, operating cost and capital charge, and compute its RAROC.
You will understand undrawn commitments and deposits
You will know why an undrawn revolving facility costs money even when no one draws it, and why a corporate's operational deposits can be worth more to the bank than its loans.
You will understand interest rate risk on corporate products
You will know how fixed-rate loans, prepayments and client hedges create interest rate risk, and how break costs and swaps manage it.
You will understand capital allocation and relationship profitability
You will know how the final Basel III rules and the output floor change the capital consumed by corporate loans, and how banks measure the profitability of a whole client relationship.
You will recognise the tensions and the transformation agenda
You will know where corporate banking and treasury disagree, what the negative-rate years and the 2020 dash for cash revealed, and how integrated pricing and balance-sheet tools are changing the dialogue.
1Context and the Big Picture
Before pricing Helion's new loan, you need to see the corporate bank's balance sheet as treasury sees it, understand the four costs that every corporate product carries — funding, liquidity, interest rate risk and capital — and know how the regulatory rules translate each of them into a charge on the corporate bank.
The corporate bank's balance sheet
Three kinds of position
The Corporate Banking division manages three kinds of balance-sheet position, each with its own economics.
| Position | Examples | What it does to the bank |
|---|---|---|
| Funded assets | Term loans, drawn revolving facilities, trade loans, discounted receivables | Consume funding, liquidity and capital; carry credit and interest rate risk |
| Contingent commitments | Undrawn revolving facilities, letters of credit, guarantees | Consume liquidity buffers and capital; can become funded assets at the worst moment |
| Liabilities | Current accounts, term deposits, cash pool balances | Provide funding and liquidity; carry interest rate and outflow risk |
The corporate bank is not self-funded
Our Corporate Banking division lends 80 billion euros but collects only 60 billion of deposits. The gap is funded by treasury — through retail deposits collected elsewhere in the bank, bond issuance and other wholesale funding — and the corporate bank pays treasury for it. Conversely, the deposit-rich cash management business contributes funding that treasury rewards. Without a mechanism to price these internal flows, no one could say whether lending or deposit-taking makes money.
Funds transfer pricing in one page
The internal market
Funds transfer pricing, or FTP, is the internal market through which treasury buys every liability and sells funds for every asset. The CIB Treasury and Funding module explains how treasury builds the FTP curve; here we need only its use. Each corporate loan is charged an internal rate reflecting the cost of funding it for its life; each deposit is credited an internal rate reflecting the funding value it brings. The business keeps the difference between the client rate and the FTP rate: its commercial margin. Treasury keeps the result of managing the gaps between assets and liabilities.
The components that matter to a corporate banker
| Component | What it represents | Example for a five-year floating-rate loan |
|---|---|---|
| Base rate | The market rate for the interest-rate profile of the product, such as Euribor or a swap rate | Six-month Euribor |
| Term liquidity premium | The bank's cost of borrowing for the loan's life over the base rate | 0.55 per cent a year |
| Contingent liquidity charge | Cost of holding liquid assets against possible outflows or drawings | Applied to undrawn commitments and volatile deposits |
| Option costs | Cost of prepayment rights, caps or floors embedded in the product | Applied to fixed-rate loans with free prepayment |
| Other charges | Regulatory or strategic adjustments decided by the ALCO | Rare, and contested |
Matched maturity
FTP is applied on a matched-maturity basis: a five-year loan is charged the five-year liquidity premium, even if treasury happens to fund it with shorter money. This protects the corporate bank from changes in treasury's funding decisions and makes each deal's margin stable over its life.
Cost one: funding and liquidity
Why longer loans cost more
A bank that lends for five years must either borrow for five years, which costs more than borrowing short, or accept the risk of refinancing its funding at unknown future costs. The term liquidity premium charges the corporate bank for that cost. It rises with tenor and with the bank's own credit spread: when the bank's funding costs rise, as they did across European banks in 2011–2012 and briefly in 2020 and 2023, every new loan becomes more expensive.
Liquidity rules turn behaviour into cost
The liquidity coverage ratio requires banks to hold high-quality liquid assets against the outflows a 30-day stress could cause; the net stable funding ratio requires stable funding for assets over a one-year horizon. Both rules apply weights to each corporate product, and those weights become costs.
| Corporate product | LCR treatment (stressed 30-day outflow) | NSFR treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Operational deposits of corporates | 25% outflow | 50% counts as stable funding |
| Non-operational deposits of non-financial corporates | 40% outflow | 50% counts as stable funding if under one year |
| Undrawn committed credit facilities to non-financial corporates | 10% drawn in stress | 5% requires stable funding |
| Undrawn committed liquidity facilities, such as back-up lines for commercial paper | 30% drawn in stress | 5% requires stable funding |
| Corporate loans under one year | Inflows partly counted | 50% requires stable funding |
| Corporate loans over one year | — | 85% requires stable funding, 65% if low risk-weighted |
| Trade finance contingents | Low outflow rates set nationally | Small requirement set nationally |
Holding liquid assets costs money because they yield less than the bank's funding — the negative carry of the liquidity buffer. Treasury passes this cost to the products that create the need: an undrawn revolving facility attracts a contingent liquidity charge; a deposit likely to leave in stress earns less FTP credit than a stable one.
Cost two: interest rate risk
Floating is simple; fixed creates risk
Most corporate loans pay a floating rate, reset every one, three or six months: their interest rate risk is small. A fixed-rate loan — common for mid-sized companies in France and Germany, and for some project and asset finance — creates risk: if market rates rise, the bank is earning a fixed rate below what new loans earn, and the loan's value falls. Treasury removes this risk from the corporate bank by charging a fixed FTP rate for the loan's life, then hedges its own position with interest rate swaps.
Options embedded in loans
Corporate products often contain options. A borrower who can prepay a fixed-rate loan without penalty will do so when rates fall, leaving the bank with funding it no longer needs at a rate it can no longer earn. Loans with a zero floor on Euribor — common during the negative-rate years — protect the bank when rates fall below zero but are costly to hedge. Deposits whose rate the bank can change at will are also options. Treasury prices these options and charges or credits them through FTP.
Cost three: capital
Risk-weighted assets
Every loan and commitment consumes regulatory capital in proportion to its risk-weighted assets. Under the standardised approach, risk weights depend on external ratings — 100 per cent for an unrated corporate, less for well-rated ones. Banks using internal ratings-based models estimate risk weights from their own probability-of-default and loss-given-default estimates, which for investment-grade corporates often produce much lower weights.
The final Basel III rules and the output floor
The final Basel III reforms, implemented in the European Union through the CRR3 package from January 2025, limit how far internal models can reduce capital: a bank's total risk-weighted assets cannot fall below a percentage of what the standardised approach would produce. This output floor is phased in from 50 per cent in 2025 to 72.5 per cent in 2030. Because many large European corporates are unrated, and unrated corporates carry 100 per cent under the standardised approach, the floor could have hit corporate lending hard. The EU therefore allowed a transitional 65 per cent risk weight for unrated corporates assessed as investment grade by the bank's models, until the end of 2032.
Capital has a cost
Capital is expensive because shareholders expect a return — often expressed as a hurdle rate of 10 to 12 per cent after tax for European banks. The capital a loan consumes must earn that return, or the loan destroys value. For large investment-grade corporates, whose loan margins are thin, this test is often hard to pass on the loan alone.
Cost four: credit and operating costs
Expected loss and running costs
Two further costs complete the picture, though they are not treasury's: the expected loss — probability of default times loss given default — which the bank must cover with margin over the cycle, and the operating cost of originating, documenting, servicing and monitoring the loan. Together with the three balance-sheet costs above, they determine whether the loan is profitable.
Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.
1.1 Margin after FTP
A three-year floating-rate loan pays three-month Euribor plus 1.40 per cent. The three-year term liquidity premium is 0.40 per cent. What is the commercial margin? What would it be for a one-year loan to the same client at Euribor plus 0.90 per cent with a one-year premium of 0.15 per cent?
Three-year loan: 1.40 − 0.40 = 1.00 per cent. One-year loan: 0.90 − 0.15 = 0.75 per cent.
1.2 Which cost?
For each product, name the main balance-sheet costs it carries: (a) a five-year fixed-rate loan to a mid-sized company with free prepayment; (b) an undrawn 500 million euro back-up line for a commercial paper programme; (c) a 200 million euro non-operational deposit; (d) a 90-day import letter of credit.
(a) Term liquidity, interest rate risk with a prepayment option, capital. (b) Contingent liquidity at the 30 per cent liquidity-facility rate, stable funding and capital on the commitment. (c) Liquidity: low FTP credit because of the 40 per cent stressed outflow; possibly a cost in low-rate environments. (d) Low capital through a 20 per cent conversion factor, small liquidity cost, short tenor.
1.3 Stable funding
Compute the NSFR stable funding required for a 200 million euro three-year corporate loan with a 100 per cent risk weight, and for a 200 million euro six-month loan. Why does the difference matter to the corporate bank?
Three-year loan: 200 × 85% = 170 million euros. Six-month loan: 200 × 50% = 100 million euros. The longer loan needs 70 million euros more stable funding, which treasury charges through a higher term liquidity premium.
Explain to a friend why a bank that lends a company money at 4 per cent might make less profit on the loan than on the company's current account paying 1 per cent.
Name the three kinds of balance-sheet position in corporate banking.
Funded assets, contingent commitments, liabilities.
What is funds transfer pricing, and what does it leave with the corporate bank?
The internal market in which treasury charges assets and credits liabilities at matched-maturity internal rates; it leaves the commercial margin with the corporate bank.
List the components of an FTP rate.
Base rate, term liquidity premium, contingent liquidity charge, option costs, other ALCO charges.
How do the LCR and NSFR treat undrawn facilities and corporate deposits?
LCR: 10 per cent stressed drawing on committed credit facilities, 30 per cent on liquidity facilities, 25 per cent outflow on operational and 40 per cent on non-operational corporate deposits. NSFR: 5 per cent stable funding for undrawn facilities; 50 per cent of corporate deposits count as stable.
How do fixed-rate loans and prepayment options create interest rate risk?
Fixed-rate loans lose value when rates rise; prepayment options are exercised when rates fall, leaving the bank with unneeded funding or hedges.
What is the output floor, and why did the EU introduce a transitional treatment for unrated corporates?
A minimum on total risk-weighted assets as a percentage of the standardised figure, rising to 72.5 per cent by 2030; the transitional 65 per cent weight prevents unrated investment-grade corporates from being heavily penalised.
1
What does funds transfer pricing leave with the corporate bank?
Treasury takes it.
Right. Treasury charges assets and credits liabilities at matched-maturity internal rates.
It keeps the commercial margin.
Treasury charges for it.
Which is NOT a component of an FTP rate?
A component.
Right. Components: base rate, term liquidity premium, contingent liquidity charge, option costs, ALCO charges.
A component.
A component.
Which is a contingent commitment?
Funded asset.
Right. Funded assets and liabilities are the other two kinds.
Liability.
Liability.
2The End-to-End Flow
This part follows the pricing of the Helion relationship from the client's request to the pricing committee's decision and beyond: the term loan, the revolving facility, the interest rate choice, the capital, the deal RAROC, the deposits, the relationship RAROC, and the monitoring that follows. Each step shows what treasury charges and why.
Pricing a corporate relationship in eight steps
| Step | What happens | Treasury and ALM input |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Client need and structure | Tenor, currency, fixed or floating, commitments, options | Feasibility, product constraints |
| 2. Funding and liquidity charges | FTP on drawn amounts | Term liquidity premium by tenor and currency |
| 3. Commitment costs | Liquidity and capital on undrawn amounts | Contingent liquidity charge, credit conversion factor |
| 4. Interest rate choices | Fixed or floating, prepayment terms, client hedges | Fixed FTP, option costs, break-cost rules |
| 5. Capital | Risk-weighted assets under internal models and the floor | Capital allocation, hurdle rate |
| 6. Deal RAROC and decision | Profitability against hurdle; pricing committee | Approved prices and exceptions |
| 7. Deposits and relationship RAROC | Value of deposits, fees and ancillary business | FTP credit on deposits, operational classification |
| 8. Monitoring and repricing | Utilisation, behaviour, profitability over time | Updated behavioural models and charges |
Step 1 — The client's need and the structure
Choices that change the economics
Helion wants 150 million euros for five years to finance an acquisition, and a renewed 100 million euro share in its revolving facility. Each structural choice changes the bank's costs: a longer tenor raises the liquidity premium; a fixed rate requires hedging; free prepayment creates an option; a facility in dollars needs dollar funding; a commitment that can be drawn at short notice requires a liquidity buffer. The relationship manager checks these choices with the pricing tool before quoting.
Step 2 — Funding and liquidity charges on the term loan
The drawn loan
As Part 1 showed, treasury charges the five-year floating-rate loan Euribor plus a 0.55 per cent term liquidity premium, leaving a commercial margin of 0.65 per cent on a client margin of 1.20 per cent. A ten-year loan would carry a higher premium; a one-year loan a much lower one. Currency matters too: a dollar loan funded by a euro-based bank may cost more if the bank must swap euros into dollars, paying the cross-currency basis.
Step 4 — Interest rate choices
Fixed or floating
Helion asks whether it could borrow at a fixed rate instead. The bank can offer a fixed rate equal to the five-year swap rate plus the liquidity premium plus the margin: if the swap rate is 2.40 per cent, a fixed rate of 2.40 + 0.55 + 1.20 = 4.15 per cent. Treasury charges the corporate bank a fixed FTP of 2.95 per cent and hedges its position by paying fixed on a swap. The corporate bank's margin stays at 1.20 − 0.55 = 0.65 per cent, whatever rates do.
Prepayment and break costs
A fixed-rate loan prepaid early leaves treasury with a hedge it no longer needs. If rates have fallen, unwinding it costs money. Loan agreements for fixed-rate corporate loans therefore usually contain break costs or make-whole clauses that charge the borrower the bank's loss on prepayment.
Client hedges
Many floating-rate borrowers — especially leveraged borrowers such as Vela Packaging in the earlier modules — are required by their lenders to hedge part of their interest rate risk with swaps or caps, often bought from the lending banks. These derivatives create counterparty risk for the bank, which consumes capital and attracts credit valuation adjustment charges, but also bring revenue and strengthen the relationship.
Step 5 — Capital
Risk-weighted assets under internal models
Our bank uses internal models for large corporates. For Helion, with a probability of default of 0.25 per cent and a loss given default of 40 per cent, the model gives a risk weight of about 60 per cent: 90 million euros of risk-weighted assets for the 150 million euro loan. At a CET1 capital target of 11.5 per cent, the loan consumes 10.35 million euros of capital.
The output floor
Under the standardised approach, Helion — unrated — would carry 100 per cent, or 150 million euros of risk-weighted assets. At the fully phased 72.5 per cent floor, the floor would be 108.75 million, above the internal model's 90 million: the floor would bind. Under the EU's transitional 65 per cent weight for unrated investment-grade corporates, the standardised figure is 97.5 million and the floor 70.7 million, below 90 million: the floor does not bind. The floor applies to the bank's total risk-weighted assets, not to each loan, but banks increasingly allocate its impact to the businesses whose portfolios cause it, so that pricing reflects it.
Step 6 — Deal RAROC and the pricing decision
Risk-adjusted return on capital
RAROC measures a deal's after-tax profit, adjusted for expected loss, against the capital it consumes. Banks compare it with their hurdle rate.
The pricing committee
A deal below hurdle goes to the pricing committee, which includes the corporate bank's management, finance and often treasury. It can ask for a higher margin, accept the deal as part of a wider relationship, or decline. For large investment-grade corporates, the answer is almost always to look at the whole relationship.
Step 7 — Deposits and relationship RAROC
Valuing Helion's deposits
Helion keeps about 300 million euros with our bank: 200 million classified as operational, because they support the cash management mandate, and 100 million of non-operational excess cash. Treasury models operational corporate deposits with a replicating portfolio — a mix of maturities representing how long the balances stay and how slowly their rate follows market rates — and credits them a blended FTP rate of 2.20 per cent. Helion is paid 1.00 per cent. The non-operational deposits are credited a shorter-term rate of 1.90 per cent, reflecting their 40 per cent stressed outflow, and paid 1.50 per cent.
The relationship view
Step 8 — Monitoring and repricing
Behaviour changes
After the deal, the bank tracks the relationship: utilisation of the revolving facility, deposit balances and their classification, fee income, credit quality. Treasury updates its behavioural models — how deposits react to rate changes, how facilities are drawn — and its FTP curve. At each annual review or refinancing, the relationship manager revisits prices and the mix of business, using the evidence rather than the promises.
Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.
2.1 Undrawn facility
A bank provides an undrawn 200 million euro committed credit facility to an investment-grade corporate. Negative carry on liquid assets is 0.50 per cent, and the term premium on stable funding is 0.70 per cent. Compute the annual liquidity cost and compare it with a commitment fee of 30 per cent of a 0.90 per cent margin.
LCR: 200 × 10% × 0.50% = 100,000 euros. NSFR: 200 × 5% × 0.70% = 70,000 euros. Total 170,000 euros, 0.085 per cent. Commitment fee: 0.30 × 0.90% = 0.27 per cent, 540,000 euros, which covers the liquidity cost but must also remunerate capital.
2.2 Break cost
A 50 million euro fixed-rate loan with four years remaining is prepaid after the four-year swap rate has fallen by 1.50 per cent. Using a discount rate of 2.00 per cent, estimate the break cost.
Loss: 50 million × 1.50% = 750,000 euros a year for four years. Annuity factor at 2.00 per cent: 3.808. Break cost: about 2.86 million euros.
2.3 Deal RAROC
A 100 million euro loan pays a 1.00 per cent margin, with no fee. Term liquidity premium 0.40 per cent, operating cost 0.15 per cent, expected loss 0.12 per cent. Risk weight 70 per cent, capital ratio 11.5 per cent, risk-free rate 2.40 per cent, tax 25 per cent. Compute the RAROC.
Net margin: 1.00 − 0.40 − 0.15 − 0.12 = 0.33 per cent: 330,000 euros. RWA: 70 million; capital: 8.05 million. Return on capital: 193,200 euros. Pre-tax: 523,200; after tax: 392,400 euros. RAROC: 4.9 per cent.
2.4 Deposit value
A client keeps 100 million euros of operational deposits credited at an FTP rate of 2.10 per cent and paid 0.75 per cent. What is their annual value? What if they were reclassified as non-operational and credited 1.80 per cent?
Operational: 100 × (2.10 − 0.75)% = 1.35 million euros a year. Non-operational: 100 × (1.80 − 0.75)% = 1.05 million euros.
2.5 Output floor
A portfolio of loans to unrated corporates has 1 billion euros of internally modelled risk-weighted assets and 2 billion euros of exposure. Compute the floor at 72.5 per cent with a 100 per cent standardised risk weight, and with the 65 per cent transitional weight. Does the floor bind in each case?
At 100 per cent: standardised RWA 2 billion; floor 1.45 billion, above 1 billion — the floor binds. At 65 per cent: standardised 1.3 billion; floor 0.9425 billion, below 1 billion — it does not bind.
Explain to a relative why a bank might happily lend to a big company at a rate that barely covers its costs, as long as the company also keeps its current accounts with the bank.
Name the eight steps of pricing a corporate relationship.
Structure, funding and liquidity charges, commitment costs, interest rate choices, capital, deal RAROC and decision, deposits and relationship RAROC, monitoring and repricing.
Why does an undrawn revolving facility have a liquidity cost?
Because the bank must hold liquid assets and stable funding against the possibility that it is drawn, especially in stress.
How does treasury protect the corporate bank from interest rate risk on a fixed-rate loan, and what is a break cost?
By charging a fixed FTP rate for the loan's life and hedging with swaps; a break cost charges the borrower the bank's loss when a fixed-rate loan is prepaid after rates fall.
How does the output floor affect corporate lending?
It limits the capital benefit of internal models; for unrated corporates it could raise capital sharply, mitigated by the transitional 65 per cent weight.
How is RAROC calculated?
After-tax profit, after FTP, operating cost and expected loss, plus return on capital, divided by the capital consumed.
How are operational deposits valued, and why do they matter to relationship RAROC?
With replicating portfolios that credit a blended FTP rate reflecting their stability; their spread over the client rate often makes the relationship profitable.
2
Why does an undrawn revolver have a liquidity cost?
Right.
It has one.
Undrawn lines don't.
Not the reason.
What is a break cost?
Right.
No.
No.
No.
How is a relationship judged after deal RAROC?
It is.
Right.
No.
No.
3Roles, Actors, and Interactions
Balance-sheet decisions in corporate banking involve relationship managers, product and pricing teams, treasury and ALM, finance, risk, committees and supervisors — and, on the other side of the table, corporate treasurers who understand the bank's economics better than many bankers think. This part maps the cast, explains how resources are allocated, and shows where the corporate bank and treasury disagree.
The cast of balance-sheet decisions
| Party | Role in corporate banking's balance sheet |
|---|---|
| Relationship managers | Propose deals and relationships; negotiate prices with clients |
| Product and pricing teams | Set price grids, run pricing tools, prepare pricing committee cases |
| Corporate bank management | Owns the division's revenue, capital and liquidity budgets |
| Treasury and ALM | Set FTP rates and charges; fund, hedge and manage liquidity and interest rate risk |
| Finance | Measures performance after FTP; allocates capital; reports profitability |
| Risk | Approves credit; independently challenges ALM models and limits |
| ALCO and pricing committees | Decide balance-sheet policies, FTP rules, exceptions |
| Supervisors | Review liquidity, interest rate risk and capital adequacy |
| Corporate treasurers | Negotiate prices, commitments and deposit rates; allocate their wallet |
Inside the corporate bank
Relationship managers
Relationship managers sit between the client and the bank's balance sheet. They want competitive prices and flexibility for their clients; they are measured — in well-run banks — on the risk-adjusted profitability of their relationships, not on loan volumes alone. A relationship manager who understands FTP, liquidity charges and capital can explain to a treasurer why a five-year loan costs more than a one-year one, why an undrawn back-up line has a fee, and why moving cash management would change the price of credit.
The pricing desk and balance-sheet management unit
Many corporate banks have a central pricing or balance-sheet management team that maintains price grids, runs the pricing tool, prepares cases for the pricing committee, and monitors the division's consumption of capital and liquidity against its budgets. It is the corporate bank's interlocutor with treasury and finance.
Treasury and ALM, seen from the corporate bank
The internal bank
For the corporate bank, treasury behaves like an internal bank: it lends funds for every loan at the FTP rate, borrows every deposit at the FTP credit, sells interest rate protection through fixed FTP, and charges for liquidity insurance on commitments. Its rules — published in the bank's FTP policy — determine how much of the client margin the corporate bank keeps.
What the corporate bank wants from treasury
Corporate bankers ask treasury for stable, predictable FTP rates; fair credit for the stability of corporate operational deposits; clarity on how contingent liquidity charges are calculated; and the capacity to fund large deals, in several currencies, quickly. Treasury, in turn, needs the corporate bank to originate business consistent with the bank's funding capacity and to provide data on client behaviour.
Finance: capital allocation and performance
Allocating scarce resources
Capital and liquidity are scarce. Each year, the bank's planning process allocates budgets of risk-weighted assets, leverage exposure and sometimes liquidity to each business line, based on expected returns. The corporate bank then allocates its budget across client segments and products. Clients with low relationship returns may be asked to bring more ancillary business, accept higher prices, or reduce their use of the balance sheet.
Performance measures
Finance measures the corporate bank's results after FTP, expected loss, operating costs and capital charges, using measures such as RAROC, economic profit — profit after a charge for the capital consumed — and return on risk-weighted assets. These measures feed relationship managers' objectives and the bank's decisions on which clients and products to grow.
Committees
The ALCO and the pricing committee
The asset-liability committee, chaired by the CFO or the chief executive, sets balance-sheet policy: FTP rules, liquidity and interest rate limits, funding plans, hedging strategy. The corporate bank's head usually sits on it. The pricing committee — often within the corporate bank — approves deals and relationships priced below grid or below hurdle, and reviews the profitability of the largest relationships. A capital or resource committee may arbitrate between businesses competing for capital.
Corporate treasurers on the other side
Clients who know the bank's economics
Large corporate treasurers know that their banks value deposits and fees more than thin-margin loans. They use this knowledge: they distribute ancillary business to the banks that commit credit, as the cash management module explained, and they negotiate deposit rates by pointing to the FTP value of their operational balances. Some ask banks to disclose how their deposits are classified, because an operational classification is worth more to the bank.
Negotiating deposit rates
When rates rose sharply in 2022 and 2023, corporate treasurers pushed banks to pay more on their deposits. The share of a market rate increase that a bank passes on to depositors — its deposit beta — was higher for corporates than for retail clients, and higher for large, sophisticated corporates than for small ones. Banks that had modelled corporate deposits as slow to reprice saw their margins on these deposits compress faster than expected.
Where corporate banking and treasury disagree
| Issue | Corporate bank's view | Treasury's view |
|---|---|---|
| Term liquidity premium | Too high; makes long loans uncompetitive | Reflects the true cost of term funding |
| Contingent liquidity charges | Undrawn lines are rarely drawn; charges are excessive | They protect against the day they are all drawn |
| Deposit FTP credit | Operational deposits are stickier than modelled | Behavioural assumptions must survive stress |
| Excess deposits | All deposits are good | Non-operational deposits may be costly in some rate environments |
| Output floor allocation | Penalises the corporate bank for a group constraint | Pricing must reflect the capital actually consumed |
| Large tickets | Clients need underwriting capacity | Concentration limits and funding capacity bind |
Settling disagreements
Disagreements are settled through the FTP policy, the ALCO and the pricing committee, ideally on evidence: data on drawdowns, deposit behaviour, prepayments and client profitability. The worst outcome is an FTP system the businesses do not believe in, because they will then ignore its signals.
Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.
3.1 Deposit beta
Market rates rise by 3.00 percentage points. The bank raises the rate paid on a corporate's operational deposits from 0.10 to 1.60 per cent. What is the deposit beta? If the FTP credit rises by 1.80 percentage points, what happens to the deposit margin?
Beta: 1.50 / 3.00 = 50 per cent. FTP credit rises 1.80 and the client rate 1.50: the deposit margin widens by 0.30 percentage points.
3.2 Budget allocation
The corporate bank must cut 2 billion euros of risk-weighted assets. Rank these actions from least to most damaging to relationships, and explain: selling participations in large term loans; reducing commitments for clients with low relationship RAROC; raising prices across the board; exiting a sector.
From least to most damaging: selling participations in large term loans, which keeps the relationship; reducing commitments for low-RAROC clients, targeted and evidence-based; raising prices across the board, which penalises good relationships; exiting a sector, which breaks relationships entirely.
3.3 Disagreement
The corporate bank argues that undrawn facilities to investment-grade clients are almost never drawn and that the contingent liquidity charge should be removed. Prepare treasury's response.
Investment-grade facilities are rarely drawn in normal times, but in March 2020 large rated companies drew heavily and simultaneously; regulation requires buffers against such drawings; the charge is small relative to commitment fees; and removing it would encourage underpriced commitments that concentrate risk. Treasury could offer to recalibrate the charge using the bank's own drawdown data, including stress periods.
Explain to a new relationship manager why their bank's treasury charges them for a credit line their client never uses.
Who takes part in balance-sheet decisions affecting corporate banking?
Relationship managers, pricing teams, corporate bank management, treasury and ALM, finance, risk, ALCO and pricing committees, supervisors, corporate treasurers.
How does treasury act as the corporate bank's internal bank?
By lending at FTP rates for loans, borrowing deposits at FTP credits, selling fixed-rate protection and charging for liquidity insurance.
How are capital and liquidity budgets allocated?
Through annual planning, based on expected returns, then by the corporate bank across segments and products.
What is a deposit beta, and how did corporate betas behave in 2022–2023?
The share of a market rate change passed to depositors; corporate betas were higher than retail and higher for large corporates in 2022–2023.
Name three issues on which the corporate bank and treasury typically disagree.
For example: term liquidity premiums, contingent charges, deposit credits, excess deposits, output floor allocation, large tickets.
Why must businesses believe in the FTP system?
Because otherwise businesses ignore its signals and grow the wrong book.
3
How does treasury act as the corporate bank's internal bank?
Coverage's role.
No.
Credit's role.
Right.
Which committee sets balance-sheet policy?
Decides credits.
Oversight of audit.
Right.
Not a committee.
How are capital and liquidity budgets allocated?
No.
Right.
No.
No.
4Systems, Data, and IT
The CIB Treasury and Funding module described the engines that treasury runs: cash-flow capture, liquidity and ALM engines, the FTP curve. This part looks at the tools on the corporate bank's side of the interface: the pricing tool a relationship manager opens before quoting, the profitability system that shows what each client earns, and the behavioural data — facility usage, deposit balances, service usage — that turns treasury's assumptions into evidence.
Six building blocks connect corporate banking to the balance sheet
| Block | Purpose | Typical tools |
|---|---|---|
| Deal pricing tool | Computes price, FTP, liquidity charges, capital and RAROC before quoting | In-house or vendor pricing calculators linked to CRM and credit |
| FTP and charges service | Supplies FTP rates, liquidity premiums, contingent charges and option costs for each deal | Treasury's FTP engine exposed through services |
| Capital engine | Computes risk-weighted assets under internal models and standardised rules, and the floor allocation | Risk-weighted asset calculators |
| Profitability and relationship analytics | Shows actual revenue, costs, capital and RAROC by client, product and banker | Profitability systems, data warehouse, dashboards |
| Behavioural data | Facility drawdowns, deposit balances, rate sensitivity, service usage | Loan and payment systems, data lake |
| Budget and limit dashboards | Track consumption of capital, leverage, liquidity and concentration budgets | Management information tools |
The deal pricing tool
Before every quote
When the relationship manager prepares Helion's term sheet, the pricing tool asks for the structure — amount, tenor, currency, fixed or floating, fees, commitments — and the client's rating and expected loss. It retrieves the FTP rates and charges from treasury's service, computes the capital from the risk engine, adds operating costs, and shows the RAROC and economic profit, together with the minimum price that would meet the hurdle. It also shows the existing relationship's profitability, so that the deal can be assessed in context.
Consistency with the books
The pricing tool is only useful if it uses the same FTP rates, capital parameters and cost allocations as the systems that will later measure the deal's actual profitability. Otherwise relationship managers price on one basis and are measured on another, and lose trust in both.
A common failure is a pricing tool built on spreadsheets that copy FTP curves and capital parameters by hand, quarterly, while treasury's engines update them daily. A large deal priced on a stale curve during a period of rising funding costs can lock in a loss for years. Exposing FTP and capital parameters as services that the pricing tool calls at the moment of pricing — with the version and timestamp recorded with the deal — solves both the staleness and the audit problem.
The FTP service at deal level
What the corporate bank needs from treasury's engine
For each deal, the corporate bank needs: the base rate convention; the term liquidity premium for its tenor and currency, or for its behavioural profile if it amortises; the contingent liquidity charge for each undrawn commitment; the option cost for prepayment rights, caps and floors; the deposit credit for each deposit category; and the cross-currency cost for loans in currencies the bank must swap into. These are locked in at deal inception and stored with the deal, so that the deal's margin is stable over its life.
The capital engine and the output floor
Two numbers for every exposure
With the output floor, the bank must compute risk-weighted assets twice for every exposure: under internal models and under the standardised approach. The capital engine computes both, and the bank's chosen allocation method assigns part of the floor's effect to each business, portfolio or deal. For corporate banking, the data needed for the standardised calculation — external ratings, the investment-grade assessment for the transitional 65 per cent weight, exposure classes, credit conversion factors for commitments — must be as reliable as the internal-model data.
Profitability and relationship analytics
What each client really earns
The profitability system collects, for each client: loan interest and fees, deposit balances and their FTP credits, cash management and trade fees, FX and derivatives revenue, expected losses, operating costs allocated by activity, and capital by product. It computes relationship RAROC and economic profit, compares them with the pricing committee's assumptions, and highlights clients whose promised ancillary business has not materialised.
Behavioural data: turning assumptions into evidence
Facility drawdowns
How often, how much and when do clients draw their revolving facilities? Loan systems record every drawing; analysing them by client rating, sector and market conditions — including stress periods such as March 2020, studied in Part 5 — calibrates the drawdown assumptions behind contingent liquidity charges and capital conversion factors.
Deposit balances and rate sensitivity
How long do corporate deposits stay, how do balances respond to rate changes, and how quickly does the bank have to pass rate rises on? Daily balances by client and account, the rates paid, and the market rates at the time feed the replicating-portfolio and deposit-beta models that determine deposit FTP credits.
Evidence of operational deposits
To classify deposits as operational under the liquidity rules, banks must show that the client uses the bank's clearing, custody or cash management services and that the balances are needed for them. Data from the cash management systems — payment volumes, services used, the share of balances needed for operations — support the classification. Without this evidence, supervisors may require the less favourable treatment.
Budget and limit dashboards
Steering in real time
The corporate bank's management watches its consumption of risk-weighted assets, leverage exposure, liquidity charges and concentration limits against its budgets, by client segment and product, and the pipeline of deals that will consume more. Large deals are checked against the remaining budget before approval. In tight periods, dashboards inform decisions to distribute loans, reprice or slow origination.
Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.
4.1 Pricing tool inputs
List the inputs the pricing tool needs for Helion's term loan and revolving facility, and the source system of each.
Amounts, tenor, currency, rate type, fees and commitment terms from the deal structure in the CRM or origination system; rating, PD and LGD from the credit system; FTP rates and charges from treasury's FTP service; risk weights and floor allocation from the capital engine; operating cost rates from finance; existing relationship profitability from the profitability system.
4.2 Stale curve
A pricing tool used an FTP curve with a five-year liquidity premium of 0.45 per cent while treasury's current curve showed 0.70 per cent. A 300 million euro five-year loan was priced on the old curve. What is the annual cost of the error to the corporate bank, and over the loan's life?
Error: 0.25 per cent × 300 million = 750,000 euros a year; about 3.75 million euros over five years, undiscounted.
4.3 Operational evidence
What data would you collect to support classifying a corporate's deposits as operational?
Cash management services used; payment and collection volumes through the accounts; balances needed to fund those flows; contractual arrangements such as cash pools; history of balances and their stability; notice periods or costs of moving services.
4.4 Drawdown analysis
Describe an analysis of revolving facility drawdowns that would help calibrate the contingent liquidity charge.
Collect daily utilisation for every committed facility over many years, including March 2020; segment by rating, sector, facility type and size; measure drawing rates in normal and stress periods; compare with the 10 and 30 per cent regulatory assumptions; set internal charges on the stressed experience, with a buffer for uncertainty.
Explain to a colleague in IT why the pricing tool and the profitability system must use exactly the same numbers from treasury.
Name the six building blocks connecting corporate banking to the balance sheet.
Deal pricing tool, FTP and charges service, capital engine, profitability and relationship analytics, behavioural data, budget and limit dashboards.
What does the deal pricing tool compute, and why must it be consistent with the profitability system?
FTP, liquidity charges, capital, costs and RAROC before quoting; consistency ensures that bankers are measured on the same basis as they priced.
What does the corporate bank need from treasury's FTP engine for each deal?
Base rate, liquidity premium, contingent charges, option costs, deposit credits and cross-currency costs, locked at inception.
Why must the capital engine compute two numbers for every exposure?
Because the output floor requires both internal-model and standardised figures.
What behavioural data supports treasury's assumptions?
Facility drawdowns, deposit balances and rates, prepayments, and cash management usage.
How do banks evidence the operational classification of deposits?
With data showing that the client uses clearing, custody or cash management services and needs the balances for them.
4
Why must the pricing tool match the profitability system?
No.
Right.
No.
It must.
When are FTP components locked for a deal?
They are locked.
No.
Too late.
Right.
Which is NOT a block connecting corporate banking to the balance sheet?
Right. Blocks: pricing tool, FTP service, capital engine, profitability analytics, behavioural data, dashboards.
A block.
A block.
A block.
5Risks, Pain Points, and Transformation
The CIB Treasury and Funding module studied how banks fail through their balance sheets — Silicon Valley Bank, Credit Suisse, Northern Rock. This part looks at two episodes that tested the corporate bank's balance sheet without bringing banks down: the years of negative interest rates, when corporate deposits became a cost, and the 2020 dash for cash, when corporates drew their credit lines all at once. It then maps the risks and the transformation agenda.
A MECE map of balance-sheet risk in corporate banking
| Risk | What goes wrong | Typical control |
|---|---|---|
| Mispricing | Deals priced below their true cost, locked in for years | Pricing tools with live parameters, pricing committees |
| Contingent liquidity | Committed facilities drawn en masse in stress | Contingent charges, buffers, commitment limits |
| Deposit behaviour | Deposits leave or reprice faster than modelled | Behavioural models, concentration limits, evidence |
| Interest rate and options | Fixed-rate loans, prepayments, floors create unhedged exposures | Fixed FTP, break-cost clauses, hedging |
| Capital consumption | RWA or output floor constraints bind; returns fall | Budgets, distribution, pricing |
| Concentration | Large exposures to a few clients or sectors | Limits, syndication, risk transfer |
| Model and data | Behavioural assumptions or data wrong | Validation, back-testing, data governance |
Two episodes that tested the corporate balance sheet
Negative interest rates, 2014–2022 — when deposits became a cost
What happened
In June 2014, the European Central Bank cut its deposit facility rate below zero, to −0.10 per cent, and later to −0.50 per cent in 2019. Banks holding excess reserves at the central bank paid to do so. Corporate deposits, which banks could only place at negative rates, stopped being a source of profit: a bank paying zero to a corporate and earning −0.50 per cent lost money on every euro. From around 2015, many European banks began charging large corporates negative rates on deposits above agreed thresholds, and treasury FTP credits for non-operational corporate deposits fell below zero. Corporate bankers found themselves asking their best clients to move cash elsewhere — into money market funds or other banks — while competing to lend to them. At the same time, loans with zero floors on Euribor protected banks' asset margins. In 2019, the ECB introduced a two-tier system that exempted part of banks' excess reserves from the negative rate, and in July 2022 it raised its rates back to zero and then into positive territory, ending the episode.
Root cause
Monetary policy pushed short-term rates below the level at which banks could pass them on to most depositors, compressing the value of deposits and making excess liquidity a cost.
The lesson
The value of corporate deposits depends on the rate environment, and FTP must reflect it. Banks that had distinguished clearly between operational and non-operational deposits, and charged or credited them accordingly, managed the period better; those that treated all deposits alike either lost money or damaged relationships with abrupt charges. The episode also showed that zero floors and deposit pricing are options whose value changes radically with rates — and that behavioural models calibrated in one regime may fail in the next, as the rapid deposit repricing of 2022–2023 then confirmed.
The dash for cash, March 2020 — when every line was drawn
What happened
When the Covid-19 pandemic shut down economies in March 2020, companies across the world drew on their committed revolving facilities to build cash buffers, fearing that markets would close and revenue would collapse. In the United States, studies estimated drawdowns of well over 200 billion dollars in a few weeks, concentrated among large, rated companies — including investment-grade companies whose facilities banks had assumed would rarely be used. Commercial paper markets seized up, and companies with back-up lines drew them. Banks' loan books grew sharply in days and their liquidity buffers were tested. Central banks responded with massive liquidity support — in the euro area, through more generous long-term refinancing operations — and governments launched state-guaranteed loan schemes, such as France's prêts garantis par l'État.
Root cause
Committed facilities are options held by clients, and they are exercised together in a systemic shock — exactly when the bank's own funding may be under pressure.
The lesson
Undrawn commitments are not free. The episode validated the contingent liquidity charges and buffers that treasury holds against undrawn facilities, and showed that investment-grade clients can draw as heavily as weaker ones when they fear for their access to cash. Banks reviewed their drawdown assumptions, the pricing of back-up lines, and their concentration of commitments to large clients. Central bank support made the episode manageable; without it, the strain on banks' liquidity would have been far greater.
Persistent pain points
Thin margins on large-corporate lending
Competition among banks for large investment-grade relationships keeps loan margins close to or below the cost of capital. Relationship RAROC justifies the lending, but only if ancillary business is real, and many banks remain over-committed to clients that give them little in return.
Behavioural models in a new regime
After more than a decade of near-zero or negative rates, the rate rises of 2022–2023 tested deposit models calibrated on a world that no longer existed. Corporate deposits repriced faster and moved more than expected. Models now need to capture regime changes, digital channels that let treasurers move cash in minutes, and the concentration of large deposits.
FTP disputes
Corporate bankers and treasury still argue over liquidity premiums, contingent charges and deposit credits. Without transparent methodology and data, these disputes undermine trust in the FTP system.
Five transformation moves
| Move | What it means | Benefit |
|---|---|---|
| Integrated pricing | Pricing tools calling live FTP, capital and behavioural services | Consistent, current prices |
| Evidence-based behaviour | Drawdown, deposit and prepayment models on granular data, back-tested | Fairer charges, fewer disputes |
| Relationship steering | Dashboards tracking promised versus actual ancillary business | Better allocation of the balance sheet |
| Balance-sheet velocity | Originate-to-distribute, risk transfer, participations | Higher returns on scarce capital |
| Climate and other new costs | Climate risk and transition considerations in capital and pricing | Alignment with supervisory expectations and strategy |
Balance-sheet velocity
As the distribution module explained, banks increasingly originate loans and distribute part of them — through syndication, participations, credit insurance or significant risk transfer securitisations — to free capital for new business. Treasury and the corporate bank work together to decide which assets to hold and which to distribute, using the same profitability measures that guide pricing.
Work these through before reading on. Full solutions are in the Answer Key.
5.1 Negative rates
In 2019, a corporate kept 500 million euros of non-operational deposits with a bank, paid at 0 per cent. The bank could place them only at −0.50 per cent. What was the bank's annual cost, and what options did it have?
Annual cost: 500 million × 0.50% = 2.5 million euros. Options: charge a negative rate above a threshold; offer money market funds or other investment products; reclassify part as operational if justified; accept the cost for the relationship; use the ECB's two-tier exemption where available.
5.2 Dash for cash
A bank has 50 billion euros of undrawn committed facilities to corporates, of which 10 billion are back-up liquidity facilities. Using the LCR rates of 10 and 30 per cent, compute the assumed stressed drawings. If, as in March 2020, 20 per cent of the credit facilities and 50 per cent of the liquidity facilities were drawn, what would the actual drawings be?
LCR assumption: 40 × 10% + 10 × 30% = 4 + 3 = 7 billion euros. Actual in the scenario: 40 × 20% + 10 × 50% = 8 + 5 = 13 billion euros.
5.3 Classify the risk
Name the risk: a loan is priced on last quarter's FTP curve; a corporate moves 1 billion euros of deposits to a money market fund in a week; a portfolio of fixed-rate loans is prepaid after rates fall; the output floor binds on the corporate portfolio.
Stale FTP curve: mispricing. Deposit flight: deposit behaviour risk. Prepayments: interest rate and option risk. Output floor binding: capital consumption risk.
5.4 Ancillary reality check
A relationship was approved with a RAROC of 18 per cent assuming 2 million euros a year of FX revenue. Actual FX revenue is 0.5 million. If the relationship's capital is 15 million euros and the tax rate 25 per cent, by how much does RAROC fall?
Shortfall: 1.5 million euros pre-tax, 1.125 million after tax. On 15 million of capital, RAROC falls by 7.5 points, from 18 to 10.5 per cent — below a 12 per cent hurdle.
Explain to a relative why, for a few years, some banks asked large companies to pay to keep their money in the bank, and why that has stopped.
Name the main balance-sheet risks in corporate banking and a control for each.
Mispricing, contingent liquidity, deposit behaviour, interest rate and options, capital consumption, concentration, model and data; controls as in the risk table.
How did negative rates change the value of corporate deposits?
Deposits that could only be placed at negative rates became a cost, leading banks to charge corporates on excess balances and to lower FTP credits.
What happened in the March 2020 dash for cash, and what did it teach about commitments?
Companies drew their committed facilities en masse; commitments are options exercised together in systemic stress, justifying contingent liquidity charges and buffers.
Why are client options central to the corporate bank's balance-sheet risk?
Because deposits, facilities and prepayment rights are options whose value changes sharply with conditions and which clients exercise together.
Why were deposit models challenged in 2022–2023?
Because they were calibrated in a long low-rate regime, while corporate deposits repriced and moved faster after rates rose.
Name the five transformation moves.
Integrated pricing, evidence-based behaviour, relationship steering, balance-sheet velocity, climate and other new costs.
5
What did the March 2020 dash for cash teach?
Right. Hence contingent liquidity charges.
It taught a lot.
The opposite.
No.
How did negative rates change corporate deposits?
No.
They changed.
The opposite.
Right.
Which risk concerns deposits leaving faster than modelled?
No.
Different.
Right.
Related, but the named risk is deposit behaviour.
Module Summary — The Six Ideas That Matter Most
If you retain only a handful of things, retain these. Each compresses a part of the module into a single, load-bearing idea.
Every corporate product carries balance-sheet costs
Funding, liquidity, interest rate risk and capital — plus expected loss and operating costs — stand between the client rate and the bank's profit. Treasury and ALM measure and charge most of them.
FTP is the corporate bank's internal market
Matched-maturity transfer prices, term liquidity premiums, contingent liquidity charges and option costs leave the commercial margin with the corporate bank and the transformation result with treasury.
Commitments and deposits are options held by clients
Undrawn facilities consume liquidity buffers and capital because clients can draw them together; deposits carry value or cost depending on their stability and the rate environment; prepayment rights and floors are options to price.
Capital decides what is worth doing
Risk-weighted assets under internal models, the output floor phased in to 2030 with a transitional treatment for unrated investment-grade corporates, and hurdle rates turn every deal into a RAROC test.
Relationships, not loans, earn the cost of capital
Large-corporate loans often fall below hurdle on their own; operational deposits, cash management, FX and trade fees make the relationship profitable — if the ancillary business is real and tracked.
Evidence ends the arguments
Pricing tools using live FTP and capital parameters, behavioural data on drawdowns and deposits, and relationship dashboards turn disputes between corporate banking and treasury into decisions based on data. The negative-rate years and the 2020 dash for cash showed why.
Process Cheat Sheet — Pricing a Corporate Relationship on One Page
A single reference for pricing a loan and a relationship. Everything below is developed in full in Part 2.
| Step | Question | Key number |
|---|---|---|
| Structure | Tenor, currency, fixed or floating, commitments, options? | Shapes every cost |
| Funding and liquidity | What does treasury charge for the drawn amount? | Term liquidity premium |
| Commitments | What do undrawn facilities cost? | Contingent liquidity charge, credit conversion factor |
| Interest rate | Fixed or floating; prepayment terms? | Fixed FTP, break costs, option costs |
| Capital | How much capital, under models and the floor? | Risk-weighted assets × capital ratio |
| Deal RAROC | Does the deal meet the hurdle? | After-tax profit ÷ capital |
| Relationship | Do deposits and fees lift the relationship above hurdle? | Relationship RAROC, economic profit |
| Monitoring | Did the relationship deliver what was assumed? | Actual versus assumed revenue |
Key numbers to remember
| Item | Rule or figure |
|---|---|
| LCR outflow, operational corporate deposits | 25 per cent |
| LCR outflow, non-operational non-financial corporate deposits | 40 per cent |
| LCR drawdown, committed credit facilities to non-financial corporates | 10 per cent |
| LCR drawdown, committed liquidity facilities to non-financial corporates | 30 per cent |
| NSFR required stable funding, undrawn committed facilities | 5 per cent |
| NSFR required stable funding, corporate loans over one year | 85 per cent, or 65 per cent if low risk-weighted |
| Output floor | 50 per cent in 2025, rising to 72.5 per cent in 2030 |
| EU transitional weight for unrated investment-grade corporates | 65 per cent, until end-2032 |
| Typical European bank hurdle rate | 10 to 12 per cent after tax |
| ECB deposit facility rate below zero | June 2014 to July 2022 |
The one-sentence version
Treasury and ALM tell the corporate bank what each loan, commitment and deposit really costs or earns once funding, liquidity, interest rate risk and capital are priced in — and the corporate bank earns its cost of capital only by pricing those costs, charging for the options clients hold, and building relationships whose deposits and fees justify the lending.
Sources and further reading
Regulatory positions and market facts stated in this module reflect sources available in mid-2026. Treat every date and figure below as a fact with a shelf life and verify it before relying on it in client work.
How to read this section
Regulatory weights are simplified for learning; the Basel standards, the CRR as amended by CRR3, and the delegated acts govern, with national options. Figures flagged as illustrative — Helion, the Corporate Banking division's balance sheet and all worked examples — are invented to teach a mechanic. For the bank's treasury seen from the inside, see the CIB module on Treasury and Funding.
Primary instruments and standards referenced
| Short name used in the module | Instrument | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| LCR | Basel III liquidity coverage ratio; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 | Outflow and drawdown rates |
| NSFR | Basel III net stable funding ratio; CRR as amended by CRR2 | Stable funding factors |
| CRR3 | Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 amending the CRR | Final Basel III, output floor, credit conversion factors |
| IRRBB | EBA guidelines and RTS on interest rate risk in the banking book | Supervisory outlier tests |
| EBA guidelines on loan origination | EBA/GL/2020/06 | Pricing considerations in loan origination |
Dated facts and where they come from
The ECB's deposit facility rate was cut below zero in June 2014, reached −0.50 per cent in September 2019 with a two-tier system from October 2019, and returned to zero in July 2022. CRR3 has applied since January 2025, with the output floor phased in to 2030 and the transitional treatment for unrated corporates until 2032. Estimates of US credit line drawdowns in March 2020 come from Federal Reserve and academic studies; they vary by source and definition. Sources: ECB decisions, the Official Journal of the EU, Basel Committee publications and central bank research.
Where to go deeper
The Basel Committee's standards on liquidity and the final Basel III framework, the EBA's guidelines on loan origination and on interest rate risk, and central bank research on the 2020 dash for cash and on negative rates and bank deposits are the primary references. The CIB Treasury and Funding module covers funding, FTP curve construction, liquidity management and bank failures in depth.