What you will be able to do
Tell shareholder types apart by horizon and behaviour.
Compute voting power from capital, double votes, turnout and holdings.
Explain the main ways to keep control with less capital, and the price each one charges.
Describe how a board, its committees and the pay system are meant to protect shareholders from managers.
Read the French regime and contrast it with the US and UK.
Judge the evidence on whether governance creates value, without overclaiming.
1Shareholders are not all the same
A share gives money rights and voting rights. Different owners value them differently, and the mix of owners shapes how a company behaves.
Each type of owner wants something different
Owners differ in horizon, size and temperament
Founders and families think in decades. They accept lower returns for independence and pass the company on. Their risk is that the family becomes less interested over generations.
Private equity and venture funds buy to sell. Northlight's fund has a life of about ten years and must return cash to its own investors. Buyout and growth funds work on the same logic (see CF34 and CF40).
Institutional investors (pension funds, insurers, mutual funds) hold small stakes in hundreds of companies. They vote through stewardship teams and increasingly follow the advice of proxy advisers.
Passive funds that track an index cannot sell a company they dislike, so they use their vote instead. A handful of very large index managers now hold a significant share of most listed companies.
Employees hold shares through savings plans, options and free shares.
States and sovereign funds may pursue strategy as well as returns. In France, Bpifrance and the Caisse des dépôts are examples of public investors that hold stakes in listed companies.
Activist funds buy a visible stake of a few percent and campaign for change: a divestment, a new strategy, a new director.
1.1 Northlight sells at the IPO
Suppose the IPO had also included a sale of 1.0 million existing shares by Northlight, on top of the 2.5 million new shares, all at 12.00. Compute Northlight's stake after the IPO, the size of the float, and what Northlight receives. How much cash does Harmony itself raise?
Northlight sells 1.0 million of its 3.5 million shares and keeps 2.5 million. After the IPO Harmony still has 12.5 million shares, so the stake is 2.5 / 12.5 = 20%, down from 28%.
The float is 2.5 million new plus 1.0 million sold, 3.5 million shares or 28%. Northlight receives 1.0 × 12.00 = 12.0 million. Harmony raises only the 2.5 × 12.00 = 30.0 million.
Chloé teaches primary school and owns a few shares through her pension plan. She says: if I own shares, I own a bit of the company, so I should have a bit of say. Explain to her, without jargon, what her shares do give her, why her say is tiny in practice, and why the large funds that hold her money behave differently from her.
Her shares give her a claim on dividends and one vote per share on matters put to the meeting. She does own a part of the company, but a tiny part, and one vote among millions cannot move a resolution.
Her pension fund holds shares for thousands of savers, has staff to read proposals, votes and meets boards. Her say is exercised through it.
a drag-and-drop board with seven shareholder cards (founder, venture fund, pension fund, index fund, employee, state fund, activist) and three axes: how long they hold, how big a stake they take, how likely they are to confront management. The learner places each card, then sees the typical position and why Harmony's register is a mix of all of them.
1
After the IPO, Harmony has 12.5 million shares. What is the founders' stake?
That is the public float.
Right. 4.0 million of 12.5 million: diluted from 40%, but still the largest block.
That was before the 2.5 million new shares.
That is founders and Northlight together.
Why does an index fund use its vote more than a typical mutual fund?
Its horizon is long because it cannot sell.
No such rule.
Right. It tracks the index whatever happens.
Stakes are significant collectively, not majorities.
What do most institutional investors do with a company they hold?
Stewardship teams vote, often guided by proxy advisers.
Most hold under 1% and have no wish to manage.
They rarely hold enough to control.
Right. Their power is collective, not managerial.
2Control is votes, not capital
Winning a vote depends on the rules of the meeting, on who turns up and on the structures built above the company. A small stake can control. A large one can fail.
Turnout turns a minority into a majority
Majorities are counted among votes present, not among all shares
At a general meeting many shareholders do not attend and do not send a proxy. A resolution needs a majority of the votes cast, with some minimum attendance called the quorum. If 70% of Harmony's shares are represented, that is 8.75 million votes. The founders' 4.0 million shares are then 45.7% of the votes cast, not 32%.
At 60% turnout, 7.5 million votes, the same 4.0 million shares are 53.3% of the votes cast. The founders control ordinary decisions with a third of the capital. This is effective control, and it is common in listed companies with one large holder and a dispersed float.
2.1 The cheapest blocking minority
After the IPO, a corporate investor wants a blocking minority at an AGE. Assume 70% of Harmony's shares attend. How many shares, and what share of the total capital, must it own to hold strictly more than one third of the votes cast? Why is the answer lower than 33.3%?
At 70% attendance, votes cast are 0.7 × 12.5 = 8.75 million. One third of that is 2.92 million, so the investor needs just over 2.92 million shares, which is 23.3% of the capital.
The figure is lower than 33.3% because the quorum does not include absent holders. The blocking threshold is one third of the votes actually cast, not of all shares.
Disclosure thresholds make hidden control visible
Listed companies and the market regulator need to know who is building a stake. In France, crossing 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, one third, half, two thirds, 90% or 95% of the capital or votes must be declared to the company and to the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF). Crossing 30% triggers a mandatory takeover bid (CF38).
Five tools keep control with less capital, and each has a price
Tool 1: double voting rights reward loyalty
Under French law, in listed companies, shares held in registered form by the same holder for two years carry two votes, unless the statutes opt out. Suppose, for illustration, that every pre-IPO share of Harmony had qualified. Votes would total 22.5 million: 10.0 million old shares counted twice, plus 2.5 million new ones counted once. The founders would hold 8.0 million votes, or 35.6%, against 32% of the capital. Northlight would hold 31.1%, and the new investors 11.1%.
The price is paid by short-term holders, whose votes are worth half. Index funds and proxy advisers often oppose such devices.
Tool 2: a holding company stacks control on control
The founders place their 4.0 million shares in a holding company, FounderCo. Outside investors put in money and own 40% of FounderCo. The founders own 60%. FounderCo votes all 4.0 million shares, so the founders control 32% of Harmony's votes. Yet their own economic interest is 60% × 32% = 19.2%. They control 32% for the price of 19.2%.
The controller has the whole vote but bears only part of the loss, and the market often discounts such structures (CF36).
Tool 3: non-voting shares and limited partnerships separate the two rights
Non-voting preference shares (actions de préférence) give investors a dividend and no say. A société en commandite par actions (SCA) goes further: general partners manage and are liable without limit, while shareholders supply capital with limited rights over management. Michelin and Hermès are listed SCAs. Had Harmony been an SCA, Léa Moreau could manage it as general partner whatever her percentage of capital. Since 2024 French law also lets a company that lists its shares issue preference shares carrying several votes each, for a limited period; UK listing rules and an EU directive have moved in the same direction.
Tool 4: a shareholders' agreement turns several holders into one bloc
A shareholders' agreement (pacte d'actionnaires) is a private contract among holders. Typical clauses give board seats, require approval of sales, give the right to buy first (pre-emption), force a sale if a majority sells (drag-along) or let minorities join it (tag-along). If founders and Northlight sign a pact to vote together, they hold 7.5 million shares, 60% of the capital. They win every ordinary vote alone. An AGE needs two thirds of the votes cast, so they pass it alone only if other holders present hold no more than 3.75 million shares, or 75% of what the others own.
Voting together is action in concert: it must be disclosed, and the bloc counts as one holder for the 30% mandatory bid threshold, which is why such a pact is best signed before the listing.
Tool 5: defences against a hostile bidder
A hostile bidder must buy shares from the holders. The board can make that harder, at a cost. The best defence is a share price high enough that nobody bothers.
| Defence | How it works | What it costs |
|---|---|---|
| Double votes, voting caps | Cap or dilute the votes of a large newcomer | Entrenches managers, discourages large investors |
| Approval and pre-emption clauses | Sales need consent, insiders buy first | Reduces liquidity |
| Defensive warrants (BSA Breton, discussed in CF21) | Free warrants issued to all holders if a bid appears, exercisable below the offer price | Makes any bid dearer, raises doubts about managers' motives |
| Poison pill (US) | Rights that dilute any holder crossing a threshold | Gives the board a veto over bids |
| Golden parachute | Large payments to managers who leave after a takeover | Rewards failure |
Takeover defences and their price
a voting simulator with sliders for turnout (40% to 100%), for the founders' stake, for double votes (on/off) and for a pact with Northlight (on/off). The learner watches the founders' share of votes cast move against the 50% and two-thirds lines, and discovers that turnout changes the outcome as much as the stake does.
Your aunt Sophie believes one share, one vote is the only fair rule. A founder who owns 19% of a company but controls 32% of the votes seems, to her, to be cheating. Explain what the founder gains, what outside investors give up, and why some investors still accept such structures.
The founder gains control above the price paid: 32% of the votes for 19.2% of the cash. Outside investors in the holding hand over part of their say.
Some accept it because they back the founder's vision, because the shares are cheaper, or because the structure fades over time. The risk is private benefit.
2.3 Why can a shareholder with 32% of the capital control ordinary decisions while another with 51% sometimes cannot control an AGE?
At normal turnout, 32% of the capital is a large share of the votes cast, as the 70% case showed (45.7%). An AGE needs two thirds of the votes cast, so 51% with no allies can fall short of that majority, while a holder with more than one third of votes cast can block it.
2.4 A holding company controls 40% of a listed firm and is owned 50% by the controller. What are the controller's votes and economic interest in the firm?
The holding votes all 40% of the firm, so the controller votes 40%. Economic interest is 50% × 40% = 20%.
2.5 Name one defence that costs the company liquidity and one that costs it the trust of managers' critics.
Approval and pre-emption clauses cost liquidity, because holders find it harder to sell. A golden parachute costs the trust of managers' critics, because it pays managers for leaving after a takeover, whatever their results.
2
At 70% turnout, what share of votes cast do the founders' 4.0 million shares represent?
That is their share of all shares.
Right. 4.0 / 8.75: majorities are counted among votes cast.
That is at 60% turnout.
That is the turnout itself.
The founders sign a voting pact with Northlight: 7.5 million shares, 60% of the capital. When can they pass an extraordinary resolution alone?
Turnout below 100% can lift them above two thirds.
Right. They need two thirds of votes cast.
Turnout alone can be enough.
An AGE needs two thirds, not a simple majority.
Why is a founders' pact with Northlight best signed before the listing?
They are allowed but must be disclosed.
Right. Signed later, the bloc could trigger a takeover bid.
Not the reason.
Pacts and lock-ups are separate.
3The board is the shareholders' answer to managers
Owners cannot watch daily operations. They appoint a board to watch for them. Whether the board does so depends on its structure, its independence and the way managers are paid.
Governance exists because owners and managers want different things
Managers can drift towards their own interests
Managers prefer a comfortable life, larger empires and secure jobs. Shareholders prefer value. This gap is the agency problem. Rules and boards limit it. Take a loss of 2.4 million from a poor acquisition by Harmony. An investor with 12,500 shares, worth 150,000, owns 0.1% and would save only 2,400 by blocking it. No campaign costing 50,000 makes sense. This free-rider problem is why the board exists.
Codes ask the company to comply or explain
Codes of good practice are not binding. They use the comply or explain rule: follow each recommendation, or say publicly why not. Investors judge the explanation.
Boards work through independence, committees and pay
A board needs people who can say no
A director is independent if she has no tie that could cloud her judgement: no job or large contract with the company, no long service, no cross-directorship with the CEO. Codes recommend a share of independent directors, higher in widely held companies than in controlled ones. A board also needs competence, time and nerve.
A combined chair and CEO concentrates power; splitting the roles gives the board a leader who is not the manager being watched. There is no universal answer. The test is whether the board can really say no.
Committees do the detailed work, but they do not decide for the board
Three committees are standard. The audit committee checks the accounts, the controls and the auditors. The remuneration committee sets pay for executives. The nomination committee finds and assesses directors. The danger is that the full board stops thinking about what a committee has handled.
Pay should reward value, not just survival
Executive pay is the sharpest agency tool. It has three parts: fixed salary, an annual bonus on short-term targets, and a long-term plan paid in shares if targets are met. Performance shares are often preferred to options, which pay on any rise in price, even a rising market, and encourage risk.
3.1 How fixed is the pay?
Harmony's board wants no more than 20% of Léa's package to be fixed at the time of vesting if the price reaches 18.00. Is the package above within that limit? What price at vesting would make the fixed share exactly 20%? Assume bonus paid at target.
At vesting at 18.00, total pay is 0.60 + 0.60 + 2.16 = 3.36 million and the fixed share is 0.60 / 3.36 = 17.9%. This is within the 20% limit.
For a 20% fixed share, total pay must be 0.60 / 0.20 = 3.00 million, so the shares must be worth 1.80 million. That is 1.80 million / 120,000 = 15.00 per share. Above 15.00 the fixed share is below 20%.
Outside forces test the board: activists and proxy advisers
Activist funds push companies in public, using a stake of a few percent and the support of larger holders. Proxy advisers publish voting recommendations that many institutions follow, which gives a few firms large influence.
a board-builder game. The learner picks eight directors from a pool of twelve profiles (independence, tenure, skills, ties to the CEO, gender) under rules for independence share, gender share and committee needs. The game scores the board and flags a combined chair and CEO.
Karim runs a village football club. He thinks a board with an audit committee is pointless bureaucracy: the treasurer is honest. Explain, using his club, why a body that checks the accounts and is separate from the person who keeps them makes sense even if everybody is honest.
Honest people still make mistakes, fall ill or face pressure. A second pair of eyes catches errors early and protects the honest treasurer, because a clean check clears him if questions arise. The same logic applies to Harmony's audit committee and its finance team.
3
Why does a small investor with 12,500 Harmony shares not campaign against a bad 2.4 million acquisition?
This one has an NPV of −2.4 million.
Right. The free-rider problem is why boards exist.
He votes, but one vote cannot move a resolution.
Every share loses 0.19.
Léa's package: fixed 0.60, bonus 0.60, 120,000 performance shares. At what price at vesting is her fixed share exactly 20%?
At grant the fixed share is 22.7%.
Right. Total 3.00, so shares worth 1.80, or 15.00 each.
At 18.00 the fixed share is 17.9%.
Far above: the fixed share would be much lower.
Why are performance shares often preferred to options for executives?
They dilute holders.
They are allowed.
Right. Shares reward the level of value, conditioned on targets.
Options vest like shares.
4Governance helps when it is real, and the evidence is mixed
Everyone agrees that governance matters. The data are less clear about how much, and which features count.
The evidence supports modest claims
Studies find a link, but cause is hard to prove
Investor surveys say investors will pay a premium for well-governed companies. Governance scores often correlate with performance, but better companies may simply adopt better practices. Studies of single features, such as independent directors or splitting chair and CEO, find weak and mixed results.
Concentrated ownership has benefits and costs
A large owner has a reason to watch managers and can act, which helps. A very large owner can extract private benefits at the cost of minorities, which hurts. Some studies find performance highest at intermediate levels of ownership by a large holder and weaker at either extreme, but the results depend on the sample and the method.
Harmony's governance should fit its stage
Design the rules for the owners you have
A company with a 32% founder, a fund on a limited life and a 20% float needs different rules from a widely held group. Harmony should ask four questions. Who can block it? Who will leave? How independent is the board? Does pay reward long-run value?
Founders: accept a double-vote clause only if there is a sunset, for example ten years, so control fades as the founders sell.
Northlight: agree that its seats on the board shrink as its stake falls, and set a lock-up and orderly exit (CF37).
Board: a majority of independent directors, an independent lead director if chair and CEO are combined, an audit committee chaired by an independent.
Pay: mostly shares, vesting over at least three years, with clawback if accounts are restated.
4.1 Why is it hard to prove that good governance causes high returns?
Companies that do well may choose better governance, and companies with good managers may be both well governed and well run. The studies show a link, not which way it runs.
4.2 Give one benefit and one cost of a large holder who owns about 40% of a listed company.
Benefit: a large owner has the stake and the incentive to monitor managers. Cost: the owner can pursue private benefits at the expense of minorities, and its sale can be hard to absorb.
4.3 Why does a sunset on double voting rights help outside investors?
A sunset means the extra votes expire after a fixed period or when a holder sells. Control then fades with ownership, so a holder cannot keep power long after selling most of the capital. Outside investors accept the device because it is temporary.
4
Why is it hard to prove that good governance causes high returns?
Right. Studies show correlation, not cause.
No.
Scores exist; the problem is causality.
They are; the problem is attribution.
Why does a sunset on double voting rights help outside investors?
Right. The device becomes temporary.
It does not restrict sales.
Not its purpose.
Sunsets remove extra votes.
Harmony's board declines the 15.0 million acquisition after an independent director challenges the synergies. What did it save per share?
Right. 2.4 / 12.5 million shares.
That is the total, not per share.
That is 15.0 divided by 12.5.
Avoiding a value-destroying deal saves its negative NPV.
Summary and cheat sheet
The module’s formulas
Tap a term to see what it means and its value at Harmony.
Share of votes cast
= / ( × )
At 60% turnout: 4.0 / 7.5 = 53.3%.
Economic interest through a holding
= ×
FounderCo votes 32% of Harmony for an interest of 19.2%.
Blocking minority at an extraordinary meeting
= × / 3
Only 23.3% of the capital.
Fixed share of pay
= / (fixed + + )
| Idea | What to remember |
|---|---|
| Financial vs voting rights | A share carries a claim on cash and a vote. They can be separated by structure. |
| Effective control | Votes are counted among those present. A holder with a third of the capital can win at normal turnout. |
| Harmony after IPO | 12.5m shares: founders 32%, Northlight 28%, angels 16%, employees 4%, public 20%. |
| AGO and AGE (France) | Ordinary meeting: majority of votes cast. Extraordinary meeting: two thirds. More than one third blocks changes. |
| Double votes | Two votes after two years of registered holding in listed French companies unless statutes opt out. Favours loyal holders. |
| Holding structures | The controller votes the whole stake and owns only part of it: 60% × 32% = 19.2%. |
| Agency problem | Managers' interests differ from owners'. Small holders have no reason to police it, so boards do. |
| Board design | Independent members with competence, committees that inform, no dogma on chair and CEO. |
| Pay | Fixed pay, bonus and long-term shares. Shares reward the level of the price, options reward any rise. |
| Evidence | Mixed. Governance is worth most when it stops a bad decision. |
The one-sentence version
Control belongs to those who win the votes, not necessarily to those who own the capital, and governance is the set of checks that keeps managers working for the owners.
Key terms
| Term | Plain-language meaning |
|---|---|
| General meeting | The gathering where shareholders vote on accounts, directors and major changes. |
| Blocking minority | A holding large enough to stop a decision that needs a qualified majority. |
| Pact | A private contract among shareholders on how they vote or sell. |
| Agency problem | The conflict between owners who want value and managers who may want other things. |
| Comply or explain | Follow a code's recommendation, or say publicly why you do not. |
| Poison pill | Rights that dilute any holder who crosses a threshold without board consent. |
Going further
Vernimmen, Quiry, Le Fur — Finance d'entreprise (Dalloz), chapters on shareholding structure and corporate governance.
OECD — G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (latest edition).
AFEP-MEDEF — Code de gouvernement d'entreprise des sociétés cotées (current edition).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) — Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics.
Independent educational material. Not investment, legal or tax advice. All companies and figures in the running case are fictional.